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Security protocols are specifications for exchanging messages on a possibly inse-
cure network. They aim at achieving some security goals (e.g., authenticating the
parties involved in a communication, or preserving confidentiality of certain mes-
sages) preventing some malicious party to achieve advantages for its own. Goals
of security protocols are generally achieved through the use of cryptography, the
art of writing in secret characters, not comprehensible to anyone but the sender
and the intended recipient.
There is however a branch, in the computer science community, that, among
its wide field of activities, aims at studying possible attacks on secure procedures
without breaking cryptography, e.g., by manipulating some of the exchanged mes-
sages. This is the formal methods community, with an eye for security.
This thesis mainly investigates the formal modeling and analysis of secu-
rity protocols, both with finite and non finite behaviour, both within a process-
algebraic and an automata framework. Real life protocols for signing and protect-
ing digital contents and for giving assurance about authentic correspondences will
be specified by means of the above cited formalisms, and some of their properties
will be verified by means of formal proofs and automated tools.
The original contributions of this thesis are the following. Within the frame-
work of a formal modeling and verification of security protocols, we have applied
an automated tool to better understand some secure mechanisms for the delivery
of electronic documents. This has given us a deep insight on revealing the effects
of omitted (or even erroneously implemented) security checks. Furthermore, a
formal framework for modeling and analysing secure multicast and wireless com-
munication protocols has been proposed. The analysis is mostly based on some
new compositional principles giving sufficient conditions for safely composing
an arbitrary number of components within a unique system. Also, steps towards
providing the Team Automata formalism (TA) with a framework for security anal-
ysis have been taken. Within the framework, we model and analyse integrity and
privacy properties, contributing to testify the expressive power and modelling ca-
pabilities of TA.
To my parents, Olinto and Maria Grazia
Ai miei genitori, Olinto e Maria Grazia
Acknowledgments
Most of this work of thesis would not have been possible without the advice of
Fabio Martinelli and of my advisors, Nicoletta De Francesco, Anna Vaccarelli and
Gigliola Vaglini.
Also, here is a list of people I wish to thank. The list is randomly sorted. I hope
that, by finding your name in the list, you will know why you are here.
Luca Durante, Riccardo Focardi, Gabriele Lenzini, Maurice ter Beek, Lavinia
Egidi, with Federico and Domitilla, Franco Denoth, Chiara Braghin, Maria Grazia
Vigliotti, Marta Simeoni, Ivano Salvo, Paolo Mori, Salvatore Minutoli, Gianluigi
Zavattaro, Andreas Pfitzmann, Sandro Etalle, Rosa Meo, Roberto Gorrieri, Bea-
trice Lami, Claudio Baesso, Ada De Giorgio, Adrianna Alexander, Massimo Bar-
toletti, Giacomo Terreni, Stefano Zacchiroli, Giovanni Stea, Cinzia Bernardeschi.
Carlo and Walter Bruno, with Enzo and Maria Consiglia, Elena Michelucci, Al-
berta Schiavon, Fabrizio Tocchini, Maria Giovanna Melloni, Benedetta Calamari,
Elena Petrocchi, Zrinka Rezic.
Pietro Volpi, Marianna Bertini, Mario and Lebda Petrocchi.
Lavinia Egidi and Paolo Mori win a second mention, for the suggestion of sub-
stantial improvements to the overall presentation.
Special thanks go to Giovanni.
Un ringraziamento speciale a Giovanni. Grazie mille.
Finally, congratulations to myself for all I have managed to do, for better or for
worse. Hoping not to end up like all those English people who every year throw
themselves into the Thames because they did not play their trumps. :-)
Inne, mi congratulo con me stessa, per quel che son riuscita a fare, nel bene e
nel male. Con l’augurio di non far la ne di tutti quegli Inglesi che ogni anno si
buttano nel Tamigi per non aver battuto le atout. :-)
Contents
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Formal methods and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1.1 The Needham-Schroeder public key protocol . . . . . . . 17
1.2 Our line of research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3.1 Bibliographical note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Outline of the work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Preliminaries 25
2.1 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1.1 Cryptographic primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1.2 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.1 Team Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Process algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 Crypto-CCS and tCryptoSPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 GNDC and tGNDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3 The Multicast Chapter 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Modeling multicast communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.1 The Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.2 The EMSS protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.3 The µTESLA protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3 Stable processes and compositional results for the non-timed setting 72
3.4 Time-dependent stable processes and compositional results for the
timed setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 An analysis of the EMSS protocol: integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
9
10 Contents
3.6 An analysis of the µTESLA protocol: timed integrity . . . . . . . 81
4 The Team Automata Chapter 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Multicast/broadcast communication in TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 A case study: the EMSS protocol modelled by TA . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 An insecure communication scenario for TA . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Reformulating GNDC in terms of TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5.1 Security analysis strategies for TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.6 Analysis of the EMSS protocol by TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.7 Garbled circuits and secure agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.7.1 Garbled circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.7.2 The Wannabe Traveller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.7.3 The Wannabe-Traveller protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.8 The Wannabe-Traveller protocol modelled by TA . . . . . . . . . 114
4.8.1 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5 The Digital Certificate Chapter 121
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.2 Analysis approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.3 The OpenCA enrollment phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3.1 OpenCA model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4 OpenCA analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.1 Some attacks on the RA server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.4.2 A note on the use of SPKAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5 The SCEP enrollment phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.5.1 User certificate request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.5.2 Modeling the enrollment procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.6 SCEP analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6.1 Relevance of the user authentication. . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.6.2 How to avoid the issuance of two identical certificates . . 145
6 Conclusions 149
6.1 The Multicast chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.2 The Team Automata chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.3 The Digital Certificate chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Contents 11
A A secure protocol for mobile computing 169
A.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
A.2 Protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
A.3 The secured protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.3.1 Hostile environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.3.2 Bootstrapping authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
A.3.3 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
A.3.4 Authenticating the mobile sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
A.3.5 The broadcast environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
A.4 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
A.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
B Selfishness in mobile ad hoc networks 181
B.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
B.2 The credit table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
B.2.1 DSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
B.2.2 Authentication of data packets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
B.3 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
C Input Language and Example Input Files for PAMOCHSA 191
C.1 The input language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
C.2 OpenCA and SCEP specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
C.2.1 OpenCA experiment file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
C.2.2 SCEP experiment file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
List of Figures
2.1 Transition space of TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Example CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Example TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Operational semantics of Crypto-CCS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 Operational semantics of tCryptoSPA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1 Inference system for the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol. . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Inference system for EMSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 A µTESLA instantiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Inference system for µTESLA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 An insecure communication scenario for team automata. . . . . . 100
5.1 The OpenCA enrollment procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.2 Graphical representation of the OpenCA enrollment procedure. . . 128
5.3 Graphical interface of PAMOCHSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.4 OpenCA - First attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.5 OpenCA - Second attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.6 OpenCA: results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.7 SCEP Enrollment Phase – manual mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.8 SCEP Enrollment Phase – automatic mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.9 No fingerprint comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.10 Replay attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A.1 Transmitting a new message. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172




In computer science, a protocol is a set of rules, or procedures, for transmitting
data between electronic devices, such as computers. In particular, a security pro-
tocol is a specification for transmitting those data in a safe way, e.g., avoiding
them to be unveiled to unauthorized users or to be modified during their journey
from the sender to the intended recipient. These and other goals are generally
achieved through the use of cryptography, i.e., the art of writing in secret charac-
ters, not comprehensible by anyone but the authorized parties. There is however
a branch, in the computer science community, that, among its wide field of ac-
tivities, aims at studying possible attacks on secure procedures without breaking
cryptography, e.g., by manipulating some of the exchanged messages. For years,
the formal methods (and security) community has been working in these topics.
This work of thesis is all based on the same thread, i.e., to give methodologies
for the modeling and analysis of security protocols, by considering cryptography
reliable.
1.1 Formal methods and security
The use of cryptographic primitives is by now a standard practice within the area
of Internet communication. In the last decades, many researchers have covered
various mathematical issues involved in these primitives, leading to a better un-
derstanding of the foundations of cryptography. On the other hand, using such
well understood cryptographic primitives does not give full guarantees about the
fulfillment of the required security properties. Indeed, threats can lie, for example,
in the way messages are exchanged over the network.
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16 Chapter 1
A simple example is here informally presented, to show the possible uncer-
tainty about the correctness of a protocol specification. Notation is quite intuitive.
However, the reader is invited to see Chapter 2 for details about notation and cryp-
tographic constructs.
A simple example. Let the reader suppose that A wants to send to
the bank Bank an order to move some money to X’s account. Thus,
A sends the message “move $1000 to X’s account”, signed with its
private key, denoted by pk−1A . (We anticipate here that a digital signa-
ture is a cryptographic construct aiming at assuring authentication of
origin and integrity to a message.)
A 7→ Bank : {move $1000 to X’s account}pk−1
A
Since this message is signed by pk−1A , Bank should be assured that
it has been originated by A. Thus, Bank makes the money transfer.
Now, let the reader suppose that X eavesdrops on this message. It can
pretend to be A and it can send the message again to Bank, i.e., :
X(A) 7→ Bank : {move $1000 to X’s account}pk−1
A
The signature of this message is still valid. Possibly, X gets $2000.
Thus, the protocol has been attacked, even without breaking cryptog-
raphy.
Starting from these observations, a branch of research in computer security
assumes cryptographic primitives to be perfect, and uses a black box view of
cryptography.
Within this last area, formal methods and tools have been successfully applied
for the analysis of network security. Exploiting formal methods, the protocol
under investigation is described in a given language, then a formal specification
of the security property to be analyzed is defined. Whether or not the security
property is fulfilled is investigated by formally analyzing the protocol within a
hostile environment, i.e., considering the presence of a malicious agent running
the protocol together with the honest participants.
In many occasions, formal methods have been proved efficient either to better
define the goals of a security protocol (and the mechanisms through which they
are achieved) and to offer a rigorous description of the interactions among the
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participants. Indeed, many examples of correctness of a security protocol –as well
as the discovery of attacks on them– may be found in the literature, e.g., [AG97,
FGM00a, MM99, Mea95, LR97, SS98, FJTG99]. Furthermore, several formal
techniques have been developed. Some are based on state exploration, and they
can typically ensure error-freeness for bounded systems (e.g., [Low96, MMS97,
RG97]). Other approaches are based on proof techniques for authentication logic
(e.g., [AT91, KW96, Pau97]). Type systems and other static analyses have also
been successfully exploited (e.g., [Aba99, BDNN01]).
In the following, we give a paradigmatic example of how errors can be found
in security protocols using a process algebra based formalism and an analysis tool.
1.1.1 The Needham-Schroeder public key protocol
The aim of the Needham-Schroeder protocol [NS78] is to establish mutual authen-
tication between two users A and B . It uses public key cryptography and nonces,
i.e., parameters that vary with time, and generated with the purpose of being used
in a single run of the protocol, [Low95], (more details in Chapter 2, Section 2.1).
1 A 7→ AS : A,B
2 AS 7→ A : {B, pkB}pk−1
AS
3 A 7→ B : {A, nA}pkB
4 B 7→ AS : B,A
5 AS 7→ B : {A, pkA}pk−1
AS
6 B 7→ A : {nA, nB}pkA
7 A 7→ B : {nB}pkB
The protocol starts with A consulting the authentication server AS in order to
obtain B ’s public key (step 1). In step 2 AS replies to A by signing the public
key of B. It is assumed that A knows the public key of the authentication server,
in order to verify the signature. Communication with B starts in step 3, where the
message is encrypted by B’s public key. Thus, only B can decrypt it. This message
means that someone who claims to be A wishes to establish communication; nA
is the nonce generated by A . Upon decrypting the message, B asks for A’s public
key to AS (step 4). AS replies in step 5, similarly to what replied to A in step 2.
At this point a double handshake is needed to authenticate A and B to each other.
In step 6, B replies to A, sending the the new nonce nB and the one received from
A (nA), both encrypted with A ’s public key. When A receives the nonce nAback,
it can conclude that is really talking with B since only B could have decrypted the
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message sent by A containing nA. In the second message A replies to B , sending
back the nB nonce. Following the same reasoning as above, B will conclude that
he is indeed talking with A .
The protocol is composed by seven steps, but four of them can be avoided if
A and B have local caches of commonly used public key.
In 1995, a good 17 years after the publication of this protocol, Gavin Lowe
found the following attack, [Low95, Low96]. An intruder X may impersonate A,
by inciting B to initiate a second session. The messages involved in the attack are
the ones of the interactions between A and B. Thus, we ignore the exchanges with
the authentication server AS. Also, it is assumed that the intruder X possesses
a key pair pkX , pk−1X and that the public keys at stake are known by everybody
(as is common in security analysis, public objects are assumed to be available to
everybody). We indicate with i steps of the first session and with ii steps of the
second session. The first session sees A as the initiator of the protocol and X as the
responder, whereas the second session sees X as initiator and B as the responder.
3.i A 7→ X : {A, nA}pkX
3.ii X(A) 7→ B : {A, nA}pkX
6.ii B 7→ X(A) : {nA, nB}pkA
6.i X 7→ A : {nA, nB}pkA
7.i A 7→ X : {nB}pkX
7.ii X(A) 7→ B : {nB}pkB
In step 3.ii X pretends to be A and initiates a session with B, by replying the
message sent by A in step 3.i. As a consequence of the interleaving of the two
sessions, with the messages opportunely replied, X eventually discovers nB , with
the help of an unaware A. B concludes that it is indeed talking with A, when,
instead, it is talking with X.
The attack was found by running FDR, a model checker for formal automated
analysis, on a process algebra specification of the protocol. Lowe subsequently
proposed to fix the protocol by including the respondent’s identity in step 3. By
running the corrected specification with the same tool, he did not find any attack.
1.2 Our line of research
Given the (possible) sensitive nature of the information exchanged in a communi-
cation protocol, it appears reasonable to think about the presence of an adversary,
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either passive or active, able to interact (by eavesdropping on and by manipulating
messages) with the honest participants of a protocol, in order to achieve advan-
tages for its own. Indeed, the above-presented case study is a notable example:
the adversary, by opportunely following the steps of the protocol, is able to cheat
party B, since at the end of the second session party B believes to have talked to
party A. Furthermore, X discovers nB . If nA and nB are used as authenticators, X
has the ability to impersonate A to B for the rest of the session. Finally, this leads
to an inconsistent state, in which B believes that A has initiated a communication
with it, when in fact it has not.
Of course, this is not the unique example of the underlying uncertainty about
the good and the evil in a security protocol specifications. A lot of significant
work has been done in the past years for formally developing techniques and tools
for modeling and analysis of protocols (see, e.g., references in Section 1.1).
However, fields of survey are wide in this area and not all the formal and secu-
rity aspects were exhaustively investigated. In particular, we decided to investigate
the following three topics.
• The modeling and analysis of secure multicast/wireless protocols. Moti-
vations for this research should be found in the diversity of such protocols
from standard cryptographic schemes. Indeed, these protocols rely on an
underlying infinity, since a continuous (and possibly unbounded) stream of
messages is sent to a possibly unbounded set of receivers. Furthermore, par-
ticular scenarios may include mobility. Such features make these protocols
unfeasible to be verified with standard tools such as model checkers (unless
their specification is refined, see the debate between [Arc02] and [BL02]).
We anticipate that our approach is quite different from what has been pro-
posed in the literature and focuses its attention on the verifiability of a sys-
tem with an arbitrary number of components.
• The modeling and analysis of secure procedures for the delivery of digital
certificates. Motivations for this research should be found in the need for
a careful investigation of the aims and security mechanisms suggested by
some documents, like Request for Comments (RFCs) and Internet Drafts,
outlining the guidelines for building up a secure architecture. Often, docu-
ments of this kind are difficult to understand in their entirety. This is mainly
due to the informal way in which assumptions, requirements and goals of a
procedure are literally described. We anticipate that our approach focuses
on a translation of a series of informal steps into a given formalism and an
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evaluation of the consequences of the lack of some security mechanisms in
the specifications.
• The provision for Team Automata of an equipment for modeling security
protocols and analysing some of their properties. Originally introduced in
the context of Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) [BEKR03,
Ell97, Kle03], they have been proved to form a flexible framework for mod-
elling communication between components of distributed and reactive sys-
tems. Thus, motivations for our research should be found in the will to ex-
tend the use of this formalism with capabilities to treat also security aspects
of distributed and reactive systems. We anticipate that our approach shows
benefits in the natural way in which we model various kind of communica-
tion (e.g., the multicast one) and in the feasibility of performing the analysis
of some security properties, among them privacy, that is considered a very
important topic nowadays.
1.3 Contributions
With respect to the formal modeling and analysis of security protocols, the thesis
gives the following main contributions.
To the best of our knowledge, the first modeling of various real life secure pro-
cedures is given in the thesis. Starting from protocols to authenticate data streams,
passing through the world of secure mobile agents, not to mention commercially
available protocols for the secure delivery of electronic documents, both a process-
algebraic framework and an automata framework are exploited to highlight their
expressiveness in specifying such systems.
Compositionality principles for safely composing processes, without loosing
the security properties that each single process enjoys before the composition, are
first defined, then formally proved and finally applied to some case studies, for
verifying some of their security properties. Again, results are shown both in a
process-algebraic framework and within Team Automata (TA).
As a step towards a comprehension of the potentialities of exploiting formal
methods, and of the intrinsic limitations of informally specifying security pro-
cedures, an automated verification tool is used to analyze the secure and correct
emission of a digital certificate. The analysis gives an insight on the possible con-
sequences of the omission of some security mechanisms (or of their erroneous
implementation).
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Finally, the investigation of the possible equipment of TA with a framework for
treating security aspects leads to the following results. First, an insecure commu-
nication scenario for TA is defined. Secondly, the Generalized Non-Deducibility
on Compositions (GNDC) schema of [FM99] is reformulated in terms of TA and,
subsequently, a compositional analysis strategy is described for it. Then, a privacy
property is analyzed, and this represents the first attempt to use TA for modeling
privacy. To conclude, we show that TA capture in a native way the one-to-many
and one-to-all communications that are so typical of multicast and broadcast com-
munications.
1.3.1 Bibliographical note
The work we present here has been already published in international conferences.
In particular:
• The modelling and analysis of secure multicast in the process-algebraic
framework appeared in [GMPV03a, GMPV03b, MPV03].
• Results related to Team Automata were published as [BLP04a, BLP04b,
BLP03, EP04].
• The work on digital certificates has been divulged to the scientific commu-
nity through [GMPV01, MPV02].
• Additional material related to mobile computing appeared as [DP03] (a se-
cure protocol) and [MPV04] (on selfish behaviour in ad hoc networks).
We acknowledge joint research with Maurice ter Beek, Nicoletta De Francesco,
Lavinia Egidi, Roberto Gorrieri, Gabriele Lenzini, Fabio Martinelli and Anna
Vaccarelli.
1.4 Outline of the work
The original contributions of the thesis are organized into three main chapters,
plus three appendixes. Each of them (with exclusion of Appendix C), begins with
an introduction, that describes its contents and its main results. Related work in
the area are generally embedded into the chapter (or appendix).
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The thesis is mainly about formal modeling and analysis of security protocols,
both with finite and not finite behaviour, both from a process algebra point of view
and from a team automata point of view.
We describe the work presenting both modeling and analysis in the main chap-
ters, whereas the first two appendixes are devoted to describe work about archi-
tectures of systems (i.e., an original architecture is precisely proposed).
Thus, the reminder of the thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces some general background, aimed at helping the reader in
acquiring the basic notions required for the following chapters. More precisely,
security properties and security primitives are friendly introduced. Secondly, the
informal notation with which security protocols are generally described in the lit-
erature is presented. Then, hints to the two formalisms mainly used throughout
this work are introduced. In particular, details are given about Team Automata
and about two process algebras for the specification of cryptographic protocols.
Finally, Section 2.4 reminds the reader of two well-known schemes for the defini-
tion and analysis of (timed) security properties.
In the three main chapters, a journey is done towards the modeling and analysis
of some security procedures. More precisely:
• Chapter 3, also known as the Multicast chapter, is devoted to modeling and
analysis of multicast protocols. It first describes relevant multicast security
protocols. Then, new analysis strategies are presented. Finally, we ana-
lyze two of the modelled protocols, by means of the above-cited strategies.
The multicast chapter contributes towards the analysis of multicast security
protocols (with a non finite behaviour with respect to the number of partic-
ipants). A process-algebraic framework is adopted.
• Chapter 4, also known as the Team Automata chapter, is devoted to mod-
eling and analysis in the framework of TA. A first part describes a rele-
vant multicast security protocol and a secure protocol for mobile agents, by
means of TA. New analysis strategies within TA are then presented. Finally,
we analyze the modelled protocols, by means of the above-cited strategies.
The Team Automata chapter contributes towards the analysis of procedures
with non finite behaviour with respect to the number of participants. Fur-
thermore, it gives the first attempt to analyze security and privacy properties
by TA. An automaton framework is adopted.
• Chapter 5, also known as the Digital Certicate chapter, introduces some
basic notions on the automatic verification of finite-state security proce-
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dures. Then, part of the chapter is devoted to formally describe real world
procedures for digital certificates enrollment and delivery. The procedures
are hereafter analyzed by means of a software tool and the results are re-
ported in the chapter. The digital certicate chapter contributes towards
the automatic analysis of procedures with finite behaviour. Furthermore,
it gives a better understanding of how the lack of certain security checks
may result in breaking the desired properties of a specification. A process-
algebraic framework is adopted.
Chapter 6 summarizes contents and results of the three main chapters.
In the appendixes, two architectures are shown, to model a secure multicast
protocol and a scheme to fight against a new threat in mobile networks. More
precisely:
• Appendix A introduces a general architecture for giving authenticity to a
pre-existent reliable protocol for mobile computing.
• Appendix B introduces a scheme for monitoring possible selfish behaviors
in mobile ad hoc networks.
Finally, Appendix C shows excerpts of the formal specifications informally
described in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we recall the basic cryptographic and modelling tools that will
be used throughout the thesis, for the sake of completeness, and in order to fix
terminology and notation.
2.1 Security
We give here some basic (and) informal notions of the three most common secu-
rity properties. They will be more formally treated and rephrased throughout the
thesis.
• Secrecy (i.e., confidentiality of the exchanged messages) is that property that
should ensure the protection of information against unauthorized disclosure.
• Integrity (i.e., no alteration of the content of a message, also known as mes-
sage authenticity) is that property that should ensure the protection of infor-
mation against unauthorized modification.
• Authentication (i.e., capability of correctly identifying other parties during
a communication, also known as entity authentication) is that property that
should ensure the protection of the identities of the parties against unautho-
rized modification.
2.1.1 Cryptographic primitives
Symmetric cryptography, also called secret key cryptography, involves the use of
a secret key known only to the participants of the secure communication. If Alice
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wants to send the message securely over a public channel to Bob, she uses the key
they agreed on before, to send to Bob. He will decrypt the received cyphertext
with the same key to gain access to the message.
Asymmetric cryptography, also called public key cryptography, involves the
use of a pair of keys. Each pair consists of a public key and a private key. Alice
and Bob holds their own pair. What is encoded with one key, can only be decoded
with the other. As the terminology suggests, the private key remains a closely
guarded secret of its owner, whereas the public key is published so that everybody
knows it.
One can achieve both secrecy and authentication of origin by means of public
key cryptography. Indeed,
• to achieve secrecy, Alice encrypts message m with Bob’s public key; Bob
decrypts the cyphertext it with his private key. Secrecy is guaranteed since
only Bob knows his private key and thus only he could decrypt the cypher-
text.
• to achieve authentication of origin, Alice encrypts message m with her pri-
vate key; Bob decrypts the cyphertext with Alice’s public key. Authentica-
tion of origin is guaranteed since only Alice knows her private key and thus
only she could have generated the cyphertext.
Other cryptographic constructs useful throughout the thesis are the following.
• One-way hash functions, a class of mathematical functions with the follow-
ing peculiarities: i) they map arbitrarily long binary strings into strings of a
fixed length; ii) they are “collision resistant”, i.e., only with negligible prob-
ability it is possible to obtain the same output from two different inputs; iii)
they are not reversible (at least, with high probability).
We refer to the fixed length output of an hash functions as the ngerprint of
the input message.
The functions are public, i.e., no secrets are involved in computing a one-
way hash. They are used to check for matches, without discovering the
data that are being compared. Let us suppose that Bob and Alice receive a
catalog and want to know if they are qualified for the same discount. They
can compute the hash of the catalog they have received, and compare the
fingerprints. If they do not match, there something in Alice’s catalog that
does not match what is in Bob’s catalog.
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• Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are used to verify the authenticity
of a message. Suppose that Alice (the sender of a message) and Bob (the
recipient) share a secret key. Alice uses the message and the key to compute
the MAC, and sends the MAC along with the message. When Bob receives
the message, he computes the MAC, and then checks to see if his MAC
matches Alice’s. If it does, then he knows the message is from Alice and
that nobody has changed it since she sent it.
If an adversary does not have the secret key, then even though he is able to
modify the message, he cannot produce the matching MAC. Therefore Bob
will detect the alteration.
• Digital signatures (e.g., [RSA78]) are electronic signatures that can be used
to authenticate the identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a
document, and possibly to ensure that the original content of the message
or document that has been sent is unchanged. Furthermore, the ability to
ensure that the original signed message arrived means that the sender cannot
easily repudiate it later.
In practice, a digital signature is the result of the application of a private
key to the fingerprint of a document. Suppose Alice wants to digitally sign
document d. First, she computes the hash on that document. Then, she
encrypts the fingerprint with her private key. Finally, she sends both the
document and the signature to Bob. On his hand, Bob hashes the received
document. Then, he uses Alice’s public key to decrypt the fingerprint of
the document. Finally, he compares the fingerprints. If they match, the
signature is valid.
• Digital certificates, [HFPS99], that are electronic documents linking an iden-
tity (i.e., a person or a machine) to a public key. They are issued by a Cer-
tification Authority that can vouch for an individual identity. The way CA
vouches for such links is to digitally sign the issued certificate with CA’s pri-
vate key. Typically, a digital certificate contains a public key, information
specific to the user (a name, a company, an IP address, etc.), information
specific to the Certification Authority issuer, a validity period (starting date
- finishing date) and additional management information.
• Nonces. In information technology, a nonce is a parameter that varies with
time. A nonce can be a time stamp, a visit counter on a Web page, or
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a special marker intended to limit or prevent the unauthorized replay or
reproduction of a file.
Because a nonce changes with time, it is easy to tell whether or not an
attempt at replay or reproduction of a file is legitimate; the current time can
be compared with the nonce. If it does not exceed it or if no nonce exists,
then the attempt is authorized. Otherwise, the attempt is not authorized.
Nonces are commonly implemented as pseudo-random strings.
2.1.2 Notation
In the following, we give the standard, informal notation with which security pro-
tocols are generally described in the literature. We are going to use this notation
for the major part of this work, when using an informal language. In particular, it
has already been used in the Introduction, when the “Needham-Schroeder public
key protocol” has been described and it will be used in Chapter 5, where some
secure procedures for the deliveries of digital certificates will be presented. When
informally describing secure multicast protocols (Chapter 3 and Appendix A),
the notation will slightly change, due to the insertion of labels to indicate some
transmitted packets or to indicate the typology of the transmission (i.e., unicast,
multicast or broadcast). However, to avoid confusion, the opportune notation will
be reminded throughout the work, when needed.
A set of agents able to send and receive messages is here considered. The
sending and reception of a message is denoted as i A 7→ B : msg, where
msg is the exchanged message and i is the i-th communication channel, over
which the exchange takes place. A and B are the sender and the receiver of msg,
respectively.
When considering a malicious agent, we will generally denote it as X . X can
intercept and also fake messages:
(1) X(A) 7→ B : msg
(2) A 7→ X(B) : msg
Notation (1) describes X that sends a message msg to B pretending to be A
(forgery); (2) denotes: msg, originally intended for B, is actually intercepted by
X (interception).
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Notation that recurs periodically throughout the thesis is:
namei, pini, etc := name of agent i, password of agent i, etc.
pki, pk
−1
i := respectively, public and private key of agent i
{...}pk−1i := message signed by agent i
{...}pki := message encrypted by public key of agent i
{...}K := message encrypted by symmetric key K
h{m} := fingerprint of messagem
mac(m,K) := message authentication code of messagemwith key K
The reader is invited to note that somewhere, throughout the work, public and
private key of agent i will be denoted as pk(i), sk(i) instead of pki, pk−1i .
2.2 Automata
Automata are a model underlying formal specifications of systems. An automaton
consists of a set of states, a set of actions, a set of labeled transitions between
states, and a set of initial states. Labels represent actions and a transition’s label
indicates the action causing the transition from one state to another.
A synchronized automaton over a set of automata is an automaton, determined
by the way in which its constituting automata cooperate by means of synchronized
transitions. The label of a transition is the action being simultaneously executed.
When the synchronized automaton changes state by executing an action, all au-
tomata which participate simultaneously change state by executing that action,
while all others remain idle.
A team automaton, [Ell97, Bee03] is defined in a way similar to the definition
of synchronized automata. By starting from a set of component automata, whose
actions are divided into input, output and internal actions, a team automaton over
this set of components is defined by choosing the synchronizations of actions of
its constituting component automata.
2.2.1 Team Automata
A team automaton consists of component automata—ordinary automata without
final states and with a distinction of their sets of actions into input, output, and in-
ternal actions—combined in a coordinated way such that they can perform shared
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actions. Internal actions have strictly local visibility and cannot be used for com-
munication with other component automata, while input and output actions to-
gether form the external actions that are observable by other components and that
are used for communication between components. During each clock tick the
components within a team can simultaneously participate in one instantaneous
action, i.e., synchronize on this action, or remain idle. Component automata can
thus be combined in a loose or more tight fashion depending on which actions are
to be synchronized, and when. Team automata can in turn be used as components
in a higher-level team automaton.
Technically, team automata are an extension of I/O automata. However, whereas
I/O automata are required to be input enabled, i.e., in each state it must be pos-
sible to execute every input action, such a restriction does not hold for compo-
nent (and team) automata. Moreover, the composition of a set of component
automata need not result in a unique team automaton, but rather a whole range
of team automata—distinguishable only by their synchronizations—can be com-
posed over a set of component automata. I/O automata, on the other hand, are
uniquely defined by their constituents. Finally, I/O automata do not allow output
actions to be synchronized, whereas team automata do.
Apart from I/O automata, team automata also possess several features bearing
a close resemblance to characteristics of other models from the literature. The
distinction of actions into input, output, and internal actions originates from I/O
automata and it in fact occurs also in other models based on I/O automata, like the
aforementioned interactive state machines and reactive transition systems [CC02].
Similarly, the internal or silent action τ in process algebras like CCS [Mil80] de-
notes a handshake communication, i.e., the synchronization of two complemen-
tary (input and output) actions. Furthermore, the synchronization on common ac-
tions also occurs in many other automata-based models in which automata can be
composed, like the mixed product of automata [Dub86] and (timed) cooperating
(pushdown) automata [DH94, HH94, LMSP00]. The handshake communication
in CCS is of a slightly different nature. Many process algebras nevertheless con-
tain specific parallel composition operators that allow processes to communicate
by means of synchronizations [BPS01], like CSP [Hoa85].
The main distinction between team automata and many other models from the
literature is the freedom they offer by allowing one to choose the synchroniza-
tions when composing a team over a set of component automata. Most automata-
based models, on the contrary, use a single and very strict method of composition,
in effect resulting in composite automata that are uniquely defined by their con-
stituents. This holds for all the above mentioned automata-based models, while
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this principle also appears in disguise in several non-automata-based models, like
CSP and statecharts [Har87].
We now fix some notations and terminology used throughout the thesis, af-
ter which we recall some definitions and results concerning team automata from
[BEKR03, BK03].
For convenience we denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. The (Cartesian) product
of sets Vi, with i ∈ [n], is denoted by
∏
i∈[n] Vi. In addition to the prefix notation,
we also use the infix notation V1 × · · · × Vn. For j ∈ [n], projj :
∏
i∈[n] Vi → Vj
is defined by projj((a1, . . . , an)) = aj . The powerset of a set V is denoted by 2
V .
Let Σ and Γ be sets of symbols, Γ ⊆ Σ . The morphism presΣ,Γ : Σ
∗ →
Γ∗, defined by presΣ,Γ(a) = a if a ∈ Γ and presΣ,Γ(a) = λ (the empty string)
otherwise, preserves the symbols from Γ and erases all other symbols. We discard
Σ when no confusion can arise.
Let f : A → A′ and g : B → B′ be functions. Then f×g : A×B → A′×B′
is defined as (f × g)(a, b) = (f(a), g(b)). We use f [2] as shorthand for f × f .
Definition 1 An automaton is a construct A = (Q, Σ, δ, I), with set Q of states,
set Σ of actions, Q ∩ Σ = ∅, set δ ⊆ Q× Σ×Q of transitions, and set I ⊆ Q of
initial states.
The set CA of computations of A is dened as consisting of all the sequences
α = q0a1q1 · · · anqn, where n ≥ 0 and q0 ∈ I , and for all i ∈ [n]: qi ∈ Q, ai ∈ Σ,
and (qi−1, ai, qi) ∈ δ.
The Γ-behaviour BΓA of A, with Γ ⊆ Σ, is dened as BΓA = presΓ(CA).
The Σ-behaviour of A is also called the behaviour of A, in which case Σ may be
discarded from the notation. Let a ∈ Σ. The set δa of a-transitions ofA is defined
as δa = {(q, q′) | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ}. Finally, note that behavioral inclusion defines a
preorder relation on automata.
As said before, team automata are composed over component automata, which
are automata which distinguish input, output, and internal actions.
Definition 2 A component automaton is a construct C = (Q, (Σinp, Σout, Σint),
δ, I), with underlying automaton (Q, Σinp∪Σout∪Σint, δ, I) and pairwise disjoint
sets Σinp of input, Σout of output, and Σint of internal actions.
The set Σ denotes the set Σinp∪Σout∪Σint of actions of the component automaton
C and Σext denotes its set Σinp ∪ Σout of external actions.
For the sequel we let S = {Ci | i ∈ [n]} be an arbitrary but fixed set of
component automata specified as Ci = (Qi, (Σi,inp, Σi,out, Σi,int), δi, Ii), with set
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Σi = Σi,inp ∪ Σi,out ∪ Σi,int of actions and set Σi,ext = Σi,inp ∪ Σi,out of external
actions.
When composing team automata over S , the internal actions of the compo-
nents constituting S must be private, i.e., uniquely associated to one component
automaton. This is formally expressed by requiring that Σi,int ∩
⋃
j∈([n]−{i}) Σj =
∅, for all i ∈ [n], i.e., no internal action of any component from S may appear
as an action in any of the other components constituting S . (Recall that, by def-
inition, Σi,int, Σi,out and Σi,inp are disjoint.) If this is the case, then S is called a
composable system and for the sequel we let S be a composable system.
The state space of a team automaton composed over S is the product of the
state spaces of the components constituting S . Also the set of actions of a team
automaton over S is uniquely determined. The internal actions of the components
are the internal actions of the team. Each action which is output for one or more of
the components is an output action of the team. In particular, an action that is an
output action of one component and also an input action of another component,
is considered an output action of the team. The input actions of the team that
do not occur at all as an output action of any of the components constituting S ,
are the input actions of the team. The reason for this construction is as follows.
When relating an input action a of a component to an output action a of another
component, the input may be thought of as being caused by the output. On the
other hand, the output action remains observable as output to other components.
Finally, the transitions of a team over S are based on but not fixed by those of the
components constituting S . They are chosen by allowing certain synchronizations
on actions, while excluding others.
Definition 3 Let a ∈
⋃
i∈[n] Σi. The set ∆a(S) of synchronizations of a is dened





i∈[n] Qi | [∃ j ∈ [n] : projj [2](q, q′) ∈
δj,a] ∧ [∀ i ∈ [n] : [proji[2](q, q′) ∈ δi,a] ∨ [proji(q) = proji(q′)]]}.
The set ∆a(S) thus contains all possible combinations of a-transitions of the com-
ponents constituting S , with all non-participating components remaining idle. It
is explicitly required that in every synchronization at least one component partic-
ipates. The state change of a team automaton over S is thus defined by the local
state changes of the components constituting S that participate in the action of the
team being executed. Hence, when defining a team automaton over S , a specific
subset of ∆a(S) must be chosen for each action a. This enforces a certain kind of
communication between the components constituting the team.
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Definition 4 A team automaton over the composable system S is a construct T =
(Q, (Σinp, Σout, Σint), δ, I), with Q =
∏
i∈[n] Qi, Σinp = (
⋃
i∈[n] Σi,inp) − Σout,
Σout =
⋃
i∈[n] Σi,out, Σint =
⋃
i∈[n] Σi,int, δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q, where Σ = Σinp ∪
Σout ∪ Σint, is such that δa = {(q, q′) | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ} ⊆ ∆a(S), for all a ∈ Σ,
and δa = {(q, q′) | (q, a, q′) ∈ δ} = ∆a(S), for all a ∈ Σint, and I =
∏
i∈[n] Ii.
Each choice of synchronizations thus defines a team automaton. It is important to
observe that every team automaton is again a component automaton, which in its
turn can be used as a component in an iteratively composed team. In this way one
can construct, e.g., a team automaton T ′ over the composable system {T ′′, C3},
where T ′′ is a team composed over the composable system {C1, C2}.
Figure 2.1 describes the transition space ∆a(S) of a team automaton over S.
The choices of team transition relations δa, ∀a ∈ Σ, define a specific TA.
It may be useful, though, to hide certain external actions of a team automaton
before using this team in an iterative composition, in order to prohibit synchro-
nizations on these actions on a higher level of the composition.
Definition 5 Let T = (Q, (Σinp, Σout, Σint), δ, I) be a team automaton and let
Γ ⊆ Σext. Then hideΓ(T ) = (Q, (Σinp − Γ, Σout − Γ, Σint ∪ Γ), δ, I).
In hideΓ(T ), the external actions in Γ have thus become unobservable for other
automata by regarding them as internal actions. Without formally defining renam-
ing, we assume these actions to be indexed in order to guarantee composability.
It may sometimes be useful to construct unique team automata of a specified
type. In [BEKR03] several fixed strategies for choosing the synchronizations of
a team automaton were defined, each leading to a uniquely defined team automa-
ton. These strategies fix the synchronizations of a team by defining, per action a,
certain conditions on the a-transitions to be chosen from ∆a(S), thus determining
a unique subset of ∆a(S) as the set of a-transitions of the team. Once such sub-
sets have been chosen for all actions, the team automaton over S that it defines is
unique.
Definition 6 Let a ∈
⋃
i∈[n] Σi. The set is-ai for a in S , denoted by Raia (S), is
dened as Raia (S) = {(q, q′) ∈ ∆a(S) | ∀ i ∈ [n] : [a ∈ Σi ⇒ proji[2](q, q′) ∈
δi,a]}.
The setRaia (S) thus contains all and only those a-transitions from ∆a(S) in which





Figure 2.1: Transition space of TA
automaton over S defined by this set is the unique team automaton in which any
execution of a sees the participation of all components having a in their set of
actions.
Definition 7 The max-ai team automaton over S , denoted by ||| S , is T = (Q,
(Σinp, Σout, Σint), δ, I) if δa = Raia (S), for all a ∈ Σ.
Informally, the max-ai team automaton over S is the TA in which the synchro-
nization is defined on all, and only, those transitions in which, for each action,
all the component automata featuring that action participate to the transition. ai
stands for action indispensable.
Figure 2.2 shows two component automata C1 and C2. Figure 2.3 shows two
of the several team automata that can be built by starting from those component
automata, in particular, by choosing their transitions. We enforce maximal syn-
chronization in T ai = ||| {C1, C2}, that is the resulting team where any execution
of action a and action b sees the participation of all the two components (that, of
course, have both a and b in their set of actions), Definition 7. T free has not been
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formally defined. Informally, it is the team automaton over {C1, C2} where any
execution of action a and action b sees the participation of only one component.
In both the figures, an informal description of TA by their interactions is given.
The Γ-behaviour of a team automaton T , denoted as BΓT , is defined as usual in
automata theory (see Definition 1). In particular, BΓT = presΓ(CT ), with set CT
of computations of T consisting of all the sequences α = q0a1q1 . . . anqn, where
n ≥ 0 and q0 is an initial state, qi, are states, ai are actions and (qi−1, ai, qi) are
transitions.
Along with this general notion of behaviour, other notions can be defined.
When Γ = Σout, then BΣoutT is the output behaviour of T . By opportunely choos-
ing Γ, also the input and the internal behaviour of T can be defined.
Remark 1 In [BEKR03] it was shown that the behaviour of an iteratively com-
posed max-ai team automaton equals that of the max-ai team automaton over the
underlying components, i.e., continuing our above example: if T ′ and T ′′ are
the max-ai team automata over {T ′′, C3} and {C1, C2}, respectively, and T is the
max-ai team automaton over {C1, C2, C3}, then BT ′ = BT .
A team automaton is said to satisfy compositionality if its behaviour can be de-
scribed in terms of that of its constituting component automata, i.e., when the
sequences forming the behaviour of a set of component automata can be shufed
in such a way that the sequences forming the behaviour of a particular team over
these components result.
Definition 8 Let ∆i be alphabets. The full synchronized shuffle || {∆i|i∈[n]} Li of
Li ⊆ ∆
∗
i , with i ∈ [n], is dened as || {∆i|i∈[n]} Li = {w ∈ (
⋃
i∈[n] ∆i)
∗ | ∀ i ∈
[n] : pres∆i(w) ∈ Li}.
Example 1 Let ∆1, ∆2 be alphabets. Let L1 = {abc} be a sequence such that
L1 ⊆ ∆1 = {a, b, c} and L2 = {cd} a second sequence such that L2 ⊆ ∆2 =




cd = {abcd} (i.e., words
must synchronize on ∆1 ∩∆2 = {c}).
In [BK03] it was shown that the construction of team automata according to cer-
tain types of synchronization, like the one leading to max-ai team automata, guar-
antees compositionality.
Theorem 1 (Compositionality of team automata) Let T be the max-ai team au-























































Figure 2.3: Example TA
2.3 Process algebras
Process algebras are executable specification languages for the description of con-
current and distributed systems. Systems are composed of agents (also called pro-
cesses). Each process follows a certain behaviour, represented by a set of atomic
actions. A process can perform these actions both independently or by interacting
with each other. All the single actions are tied together through a set of operators
(e.g., , a non deterministic choice, or a sequentialization, or a parallel composi-
tion) and the overall result forms the specification for that system.
To facilitate a comparison between processes, several notions of behavioral
equivalences have been defined in the literature. To our aim, we mainly deal with
the notion of weak bisimulation, introduced in the following.
Classical process algebras (among the others CCS (the Calculus of Com-
municating Systems, [Mil89]) and CSP ( [RSG+00], Communicating Sequen-
tial Processes) have been successively extended to cope with the possibility to
detect flows in security protocols, e.g., [LR97, FG97b, Mar03] and even by ex-
pressing features like mobility, e.g., [AG97, NNHJ99, AFG98] and time, e.g.,
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[HR95, GLM03, BR04].
2.3.1 Crypto-CCS and tCryptoSPA
Here, two formal process algebras for the modeling of cryptographic protocols are
presented.
Crypto-CCS
This subsection presents a concise description of the Crypto-CCS syntax and se-
mantics. Some constructs of the language are here omitted, since they are not of
direct interest for the investigated topics. For a complete description, the inter-
ested reader is invited to see [Mar03].
The model of the language consists of sequential agents able to communicate
by exchanging messages.
The data handling part of the language consists of messages and inference
systems. Messages are the data manipulated by agents, they form a set Msgs of
terms possibly containing variables. The set Msgs is defined by the grammar:
m ::= x | b | F 1(m1, . . . ,mk1) | . . . | F
l(m1, . . . ,mkl)
where F i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ l) are the constructors for messages, x ∈ V is a countable
set of variables, b ∈ B is a collection of basic messages and ki, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
gives the number of arguments of the constructor F i. Messages without variables
are closed messages.
Inference systems model the possible operations on messages. They consist
of a set of rules r, e.g., :
r =
m1 . . . mn
m0
where {m1, . . . ,mn} is a set of premises (possibly empty) and m0 is the conclu-
sion. An instance of the application of rule r to closed messages mi is denoted
as m1 . . . mn `r m0. Given an inference system, a deduction function D is
defined such that, if φ is a finite set of closed messages, then D(φ) is the set of
closed messages that can be deduced starting from φ by applying instances of the
rules in the system. The syntax and semantics of Crypto-CCS are parametric with
respect to a given inference system. Example inference systems suitable to model
specific cryptographic protocols will be shown in the following sections.
The control part of the language consists of compound systems, i.e., sequential
agents running in parallel. The language syntax is as follows:
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COMPOUND SYSTEMS: S ::= (S1||S2) | S \ C | Aφ
SEQUENTIAL AGENTS: A ::= 0 | p.A | A1 + A2 | [m1 . . . mn `r x]A1; A2
| [m = m′]A1; A2 | E(m1, . . . , mn)
PREFIX CONSTRUCTS: p ::= c!m | c?x
where m,m′,m1, . . . ,mn are closed messages or variables, x is a variable, c ∈ Ch
(a finite set of channels) φ is a finite set of closed messages, C is a subset of Ch.
0 is the process that does nothing.
p.A is the process that can perform an action according to the particular prefix
construct p and then behaves as A. In particular,
• c!m denotes a message m sent on channel c;
• c?x denotes the receiving of a message m on channel c. The received mes-
sage replaces the variable x.
A1 + A2 represents the non deterministic choice between A and A1.
[m1 . . . mn `r x]A1; A2 is the inference construct. If, by applying an instance
of rule r, with premises m1 . . . mn, a message m can be inferred, then the process
behaves as A1 (where m replaces x), otherwise it behaves as A2.
[m = m′]A1; A2 is the match construct, to check message equality. If m = m′
then the system behaves as A1, otherwise it behaves as A2.
A compound system S1||S2 denotes the parallel execution of S1 and S2. S1||S2
performs an action p if one of its sub-components performs p. A synchronization,
or internal action, denoted by τ , may take place whenever S1 and S2 are able to
perform two complementary actions, i.e., send-receive actions on the same chan-
nel.
A compound system S \C allows only visible actions whose channels are not
in C. (Internal action τ being the invisible action).
The term Aφ is a single sequential agent whose knowledge, i.e., the set of
messages which occur in its term, is described by φ. The knowledge of an agent
increases either when it receives messages (see rule (?) in Fig. 2.4) or it infers
new messages from the messages it knows (see rule D in Fig. 2.4). For every
sequential agent Aφ, it is required that all the closed messages that appear in Aφ
belong to its knowledge φ.
The activities of the agents are described by the actions that they can per-
form. The set Act of actions which may be performed by a compound sys-
tem ranges over by a and it is defined as: Act = {c?m, c!m, τ | c ∈ C,m ∈
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6 ∃m s.t. m1 . . . mn `r m (A1)φ
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E(x1, . . . , xn) =def A A[m1/x1, . . . ,mn/xn]
a
−→ A1
E(m1, . . . ,mn)
a
−→ A1
Figure 2.4: Operational semantics of Crypto-CCS.
free variables). sort(P) is the set of all the channels that syntactically occur in the
term P.
The operational semantics of a Crypto-CCS term is described by means of the
labeled transition system (lts, for short) 〈P , Act, { a−→}a∈Act〉, where {
a
−→}a∈Act
is the least relation between Crypto-CCS processes induced by the axioms and
inference rules of Fig. 2.4 (in that figure the symmetric rules for ||1, ||2, \1, +2 are
omitted).
The expression S a−→ S ′ means that the system can move from the state S
to the state S ′ through the action a. The expression S =⇒ S ′ denotes that S
and S ′ belong to the reflexive and transitive closure of τ−→; let γ = a1 . . . an ∈
(Act\{τ})∗ be a sequence of actions. Then, S
γ
=⇒ S ′ if S =⇒ a1−→=⇒ . . . =⇒ an−→
=⇒ S ′.
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As behavioral relations among Crypto-CCS terms, we are interested in trace
inclusion (equivalence) and (weak) simulation.
Definition 9 We say that the traces of P are included in the traces of Q (P ≤trace
Q) whenever, if P γ=⇒ P1 then Q γ=⇒ Q1. We write that P=traceQ iff P ≤trace Q
and Q ≤trace P .
Definition 10 We say that a relation R among processes is a weak simulation, if
for every (P,Q) ∈ R we have:
 If P a−→ P ′, a 6= τ , then there exists Q′ s.t. Q a=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
 If P τ−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ s.t. Q =⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
The union of all weak simulations is a weak simulation and it is denoted by
≺. As usual, it holds that if P ≺ Q then P ≤trace Q.
tCryptoSPA
The real-time extension of the Cryptographic Security Process Algebra (for short,
CryptoSPA) of [FM99, FGM00a] has been proposed in [GLM03]. The new
language, timedCryptoSPA (tCryptoSPA for short), is adopted for describing
cryptographic protocols where information about the concrete timing of events
is necessary. We remind the reader of the syntax, the operational semantics of
the language and some auxiliary notions. The description is not exhaustive, since
some constructs are not of direct interest for the investigated topics. Furthermore,
some terms of the language are the same as in the Crypto-CCS language (previous
subsection, 2.3.1). Finally, the interested reader is referred to [GLM03] for a more
complete discussion of tCryptoSPA.
The set L of tCryptoSPA processes is defined as:
P ::= 0| c(x).P | cm.P | τ.P | tick.P | P1 + P2 | P1||P2 | P\L |
A(m1, . . . ,mn) | [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 `rule x]P1; P2
We omit to describe terms whose meaning has been already explained in Sub-
section 2.3.1. To this aim, note that the tCryptoSPA sequential construct ce.P is
syntactically and semantically equivalent to the Crypto-CCS sequential construct
c!m.P . Thus, cm.P is the process that can send m on channel c, then behaving
like P .
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m,m1, . . . ,mr,mn are messages or variables and L is a set of channels. Both
the operators c(x).P and [〈m1 . . . mr〉 `rule x]P1; P2 bind the variable x in P and
P1, respectively.
Let Def : Const −→ L be a set of defining equations of the form A(x1, . . . , xn)
.
= P , where P may contain no free variables except x1, . . . , xn, which must be
distinct. Constants permit us to define recursive processes. A term P is closed
with respect to Def if all the constants occurring in P are defined in Def (and,
recursively, for their defining terms). A term P is guarded w.r.t. Def if all the
constants occurring in P (and, recursively, for their defining terms) occur in a
prefix context [Mil89].
The set Act of actions which may be performed by a system is defined as:
Act = {c(m), cm, τ, tick, | c ∈ I, c ∈ O,m ∈ M,m closed}. τ is the internal,
invisible action. tick is the special action used to model time elapsing. We let l
range over Act\{tick}. We call L the set of all the tCryptoSPA closed terms (i.e.,
with no free variables) that are closed and guarded w.r.t. Def . We define sort(P)
to be the set of all the channels syntactically occurring in the term P .
τ.P is the process that executes the internal, invisible action τ and then be-
haves like P ;
tick.P is a process willing to let one time unit pass and then behaving as P ;
P1 + P2 (choice) represents the nondeterministic choice between the two pro-
cesses P1 and P2; with respect to tick actions, time passes when both P1 and P2
are able to perform a tick action – and in such a case by performing tick a config-
uration where both the derivatives of the summands can still be chosen is reached.
When only one of the two processes can perform tick, say P1, it could be either
that P1 performs tick – and in such a case P2 is discarded – or P2 performs its nor-
mal activity – and in such a case P1 is discarded; moreover, τ prefixed summands
have priority over tick prefixed summands;
P1||P2 (parallel) is the parallel composition of processes that can proceed in an
asynchronous way but they must synchronize on complementary actions to make
a communication, represented by a τ . Both components must agree on performing
a tick action, and this can be done even if a communication is possible.
P\L allows only visible actions whose channels are not in L;
A(m1, . . . ,mn) behaves like the respective defining term P where all the vari-
ables x1, . . . , xn are replaced by the messages m1, . . . ,mn.
The time model adopted in the language is known as the ctitious clock ap-
proach of, e.g., [HR95]. A global clock is supposed to be updated whenever all
the processes agree on this, by globally synchronizing on the special action tick,
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representing the passing of a time unit. All the other actions are assumed to take
no time.
It holds that also for tCryptoSPA the syntax and the semantics are parametric
with respect to the given inference system.
The operational semantics of a tCryptoSPA term is described by means of
the labeled transition system (lts, for short) 〈L, Act, { a−→}a∈Act〉, where {
a
−→
}a∈Act is the least relation between tCryptoSPA processes induced by the axioms
and inference rules of Figure 2.5 (symmetric rules for +1, +3, ||1, ||2 and \L are
omitted).




−→)∗P ′, a 6=
τ , where ( τ−→)∗ denotes a (possibly empty) sequence of transitions labeled τ .
The expression P ⇒ P ′ is a shorthand for P ( τ−→)∗P ′. Let γ = a1, . . . , an ∈
(Act\{τ})∗ be a sequence of actions; then P
γ
⇒ P ′ iff there exist P1, . . . , Pn−1 ∈
P such that P a1⇒ P1
a2⇒, . . . , Pn−1
an⇒ P ′. Let 0′ .= tick.0′.
For timed behavioural relations among tCryptoSPA processes, we will be
mainly interested in timed trace inclusions.
Definition 11 For any P ∈ L the set T (P ) of timed traces associated with P is
dened as follows T (P ) = {γ ∈ (Act\{τ})∗ | ∃P ′.P γ⇒ P ′ }. The timed trace
pre-order, denoted by ≤ttrace, is dened as follows: P ≤ttrace Q iff T (P ) ⊆
T (Q). P and Q are timed trace equivalent, denoted by P =ttrace Q, if T (P ) =
T (Q).
We define the concept of weak simulation as usual.
Definition 12 We say that a relation R among processes is a weak simulation, if
for every (P,Q) ∈ R we have:
 If P a−→ P ′, a 6= τ , then there exists Q′ s.t. Q a=⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
 If P τ−→ P ′ then there exists Q′ s.t. Q =⇒ Q′ and (P ′, Q′) ∈ R.
Let≺ the union of all weak simulations among processes. Then, we have≺⊆≤ttrace.
2.4 GNDC and tGNDC
In this section, we present the general schema Generalized Non Deducibility on





















































































P [m1/x1, . . . ,mn/xn]
a
−→ P ′ A(x1, . . . , xn)
.
= P




〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 `rule m P1[m/x]
a
−→ P ′1




6 ∃m s.t. 〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 `rule m P2
a
−→ P ′2
[〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 `rule x]P1;P2
a
−→ P ′2
Figure 2.5: Operational semantics of tCryptoSPA.
and its timed extension tGNDC given in [GLM03]. All the specifications that will
be referred to are intended to be written by exploiting some variants of the pro-
cess algebra CCS [Mil89]. In particular, the considered formal language will be
Crypto-CCS [FGM04, Mar03], Subsection 2.3.1, when the protocol specification
does not involve temporal issues, whereas the tCryptoSPA language will be used
to deal with timed properties of a protocol.
The reader is invited to note that in Chapter 4, where a dissertation on the
applicability of Team Automata [Bee03] to security will be given, a re-formulation
of GNDC in terms of Team Automata will be presented.
In the literature, several efforts have been made to prevent the unauthorized
information flow in multilevel computer systems [BP76], i.e. systems where pro-
cesses and objects are bound to a specific security level. An example from mili-
tary jargon is the fact that documents are generally hierarchized from unclassified
to top secret. The seminal idea of non interference proposed in [GM82] aims
at assuring that information can only flow from low levels to higher ones. The
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first taxonomy of non-interference-like properties has been uniformly defined and
compared in [FG94, FG97a, FG01] in the context of a CCS-like process alge-
bra. In particular, processes in the algebra were divided into high and low pro-
cesses, according to the level of actions that they can perform. To detect whether
an incorrect information flow (i.e. from high to low) has occurred, a particular
non-interference-like property has been defined, the so-called Non Deducibility
on Compositions (NDC). NDC essentially says that a process is secure with re-
spect to wrong information flows if its low behaviour in isolation appears to be
the same as its low behaviour when interacting with any high-level process. NDC
can be reformulated from the world of multilevel systems to the one of network
security. See [FM99, FGM00b], where the low-level process becomes a specifica-
tion of a cryptographic communication protocol and the behaviour of the protocol
running in isolation is compared with that of the protocol running in parallel with
any possible adversary.
As a further step, a Generalized NDC (GNDC) has been formulated in [FM99],
in order to encompass in a uniform way many security properties. The main idea
of GNDC is the following: a system P satisfies property GNDCα
¢
if the behavior
of P , despite the presence of a hostile environment X that can interact with P only
through a fixed set of channels C, appears to be same (w.r.t. a behavioral relation
¢ of observational equivalence) to the behavior of a modified version α(P ) of P
that represents the expected (correct) behavior of P . By varying α(P ), several
security properties can be defined and analyzed within this generalized schema.
The analysis of cryptographic protocols involves specifying a set of messages
known by the adversary at the beginning of the computation. This static (initial)
knowledge of the hostile environment must be bound to a specific set of messages.
This limitation is needed to avoid a too strong hostile environment that would be
able to corrupt any secret (as it would know all cryptographic keys, etc.). Given an
adversary X , we call ID(X) the set of closed messages that syntactically appear
in X . This set, intuitively, contains all the messages that are initially known by
X . Let φX be a set of messages representing the static, initial knowledge that we
would like to give to X . We want ID(X) to be consistent with φX . This can be
obtained by requiring that all the messages in ID(X) are deducible from φX by
means of the deduction function D.
The set EφXC of processes that can communicate on a subset of public channels
C and have an initial knowledge bound by φX can be therefore defined as follows:
EφXC = {X ∈ P | sort(X) ⊆ C and ID(X) ⊆ D(φX)}
We consider as hostile processes only the ones belonging to EφXC .
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We define the property GNDCα
¢
as follows:
Definition 13 A process P is GNDCα
¢
iff ∀X ∈ EφXC : (P ||X) \ C ¢ α(P )
where ¢ : P → P is a behavioral relation between processes and α : P → P is
a function between processes.
For the sake of completeness, it is worth noticing that a slightly extended
GNDC schema has been recently defined in [FGM04], incorporating the fact that
the set of bad behaviours of P may depend on P itself and on the property under
scrutiny.
For the analysis of safety properties it is enough to consider the trace inclu-
sion relation ≤trace as behavioral relation among the terms of the algebra. When
the ≤trace relation is considered, there exists a sufficient criterion for the static
characterization, i.e., not involving the universal predicate ∀, of GNDCα
¢
proper-
ties. In the following, we give hints to the definition of GNDC without the need
of the universal predicate, since some notions will be useful in the rest of the
chapter. For further details about this static characterization, the interested reader
can see [FGM00a, FM99], where the following statements were first declared and
proved.
Informally, the so called most powerful intruder in the trace setting ((TopCtrace)φ,
hereafter, for short TopCφ ) is that intruder whose knowledge is φ, that can commu-
nicate only over channels in C, that can receive every message passing over these
channels (increasing in such a way its knowledge) and, finally, that can send over
these channels every message that it can deduce starting from φ.









It has been proved ([FGM00a, FM99]) that the general way in which TopφC
is specified implies that its behaviour includes that of any X belonging to the set
EφXC of admissible hostile processes.
Corollary 1 For every function α : P → P , a process P is GNDCα≤trace iff
(P ||TopCφ ) \ C ≤trace α(P ).
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The corollary implies that, for the analysis of safety properties in the trace
setting, to check if a specification enjoys GNDC w.r.t. all the admissible hostile
environments, it is sufficient to check if the same specification enjoys GNDC with
respect to the most powerful intruder TopφC .
By varying the parameter α, the GNDC schema can be used to define and
verify many security properties—among which secrecy, integrity, and entity au-
thentication [FG95, FGM00a, FGM00b, FM99, GMPV03a, MPV03]. As an ex-
ample, we remind here how the secrecy and the entity authentication properties
have been formalized in [FGM00a] (relation ¢ for specifying these properties is
trace inclusion ≤trace).
The requirements for a secrecy property to be satisfied are quite intuitive: a
certain message M, declared to be secret, should not be learnt by unauthorized
users. Thus, let us consider the event learnt(M), signaling that M has been learnt
by the hostile environment. Then, αS(P (m)) “is the set of processes where the
event learnt(M) can never occur”. For more details, the interested reader can
see [FGM00b].
On the other hand, entity authentication “should allow the verification of an
entity’s claimed identity, by another entity” [FGM00a]. To formalize this action,
the followed approach is the one proposed in [Low96] and based on a so called
correspondence between actions. Let us consider two users A and B, participat-
ing through a protocol. To assure the property, one would like that, whenever
A concludes the protocol apparently with B, B has indeed executed the protocol.
This can be tested with the introduction of two events, commit(A,B) and run(B,A),
representing tha fact that A has indeed terminated the protocol apparently with B,
(action commit), and B has indeed started communicating with A, (action run). To
fulfill entity authentication means to require that event commit(A,B) is always pre-
ceded by event run(B,A). In the GNDC definition, αEA(P ) is the process where
commit(A,B) is always preceded by run(B,A).
Along with GNDC, a general schema for the definition of timed security prop-
erties, called timed Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC for
short) has been proposed in [GLM03].
Property tGNDC rephrases the analogue GNDC, but in a timed setting. A
system S is tGNDCα
¢
iff for every enemy X the composition of the system with
X satisfies the timed specification α(S). Basically, tGNDC guarantees that the
timed property α is satisfied, with respect to the ¢ timed behavioural relation,
even when the system is composed with any possible adversary X .
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We give here the set of admissible hostile environments for our timed setting.
For a certain enemy X , we call ID(X) the set of closed messages that syntacti-
cally appears in X , all the messages initially known by X . Let φ0 be the initial
knowledge we would like to give to the enemy at the beginning of the compu-
tation. We require that all the messages in ID(X) are deducible from φ0. We
consider as hostile processes only the ones belonging to the set tEφ0C
1. They can
communicate on a subset of public channels C and have an initial knowledge
bound by φ0:
tEφ0C = {X ∈ L | sort(X) ⊆ C and ID(X) ⊆ D(φ0)}
The property tGNDCα
¢
is defined as follows:
Definition 15 S is tGNDCα
¢
iff ∀X ∈ tEφ0C : (S||X)\C ¢α(S) where¢ : L →
L is a timed behavioural relation between processes and α : L → L is a function
between processes dening the property specication for S as the process α(S).
As for the case of GNDC, it has been shown that ([GLM03]), for the analysis
of safety properties in the timed-trace setting, it is possible to prove the existence
of a most general intruder (tTopCttrace)φ, acting as its companion in the non timed
setting. Moreover, (tTopCttrace)φ can let time pass, by performing tick actions.
Again, the timed traces of (tTopCttrace)φ include those of any X belonging to the
set tEφ0C , [GLM03].
Thus, the following corollary holds:
Corollary 2 For every function α : L → L, a process S is tGNDCα≤ttrace iff
(S||(tTopCttrace) \ C ≤ttrace α(S).
We may define several security properties through the tGNDC schema, e.g.,
see [GLM03]. For instance, timed secrecy expresses that a certain message m is
not known by the intruder within a certain amount of time, say at least n units of
time. A specification αtSec dealing with timed secrecy could be the following:
pub(m) = public(m).0′ + tick.pub(m)
αtSec = tick1 . . . tickn.(pub(m))
1Actually, there is another constraint that imposes that the enemy must eventually let time pass.
This is however not useful for safety properties we are going to study in this paper and so it has
been omitted for the sake of simplicity.
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where we assume public the unique not restricted channel. αtSec let n units of
time pass and then behaves like pub(m), i.e., it could either sends message m over
channel public or it could let one unit of time pass and then it eventually sends m.
Note that the GNDC theory is now a well established approach for security
analysis and it was developed for non-deterministic, probabilistic, real time and
cryptographic frameworks, e.g., see [ABG04, FGM03, FM99, GLM03, GM03].
Chapter 3
The Multicast Chapter
Formal models and analysis of secure multicast
and wireless communication
3.1 Introduction
MULTICAST COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY ISSUES. With the wide use of
Internet, the popularity of multicast has grown considerably. Examples include
live-broadcasts, digitized audio and video, news feeds, stock quotes, multi-party
video games, multi-party video conferences, data applets, software updates.
Dealing with multicast communication means, in the terminology currently
present in the literature, dealing with digital streams, i.e., long (potentially infinite)
sequence of bits. The stream is typically sends from one sender to an established
set of receivers.
Given that network security threats have flourished as well, increasing trend to
distribute streamed data over the Internet must provide sufficient security guaran-
tees. In particular, so called stream signature protocols were born with the intent
to efficiently solve the problem to sign digital streams. This class of protocols, de-
signed for open architectures, make usually use hashing techniques and a thrifty
use of standard digital signatures to ensure the authentication of the sender and
the integrity of the stream.
Indeed, two of the main challenges of securing multicast communication are
authentication and integrity. The first challenge deals with the problem of cer-
tainly identifying the identity of the sender of the stream. The second challenge
deal with enabling receivers of multicast data to verify that the received data was
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not modified en-route. These problems become more complex in common settings
where other receivers are not trusted and where lost packets are not re-transmitted.
In some cases, secrecy requirements are also due. Let the reader think, for
example, to the management of data in a pay per view environment: only a re-
stricted group of authorized users must have the ability to consume the stream.
Thus, group-encryption techniques are enabled, such as only an established group
of users, at a certain time, is able to read the received data.
FORMAL VERIFICATION OF SECURE MULTICAST. Along with the develop-
ment of schemes for secure multicast, the use of formal techniques for their anal-
ysis represents an interesting challenge because of the diversity of such protocols
from standard cryptographic schemes. Indeed, two peculiarities are: i) a sender
broadcasts a continuous (and possibly unbounded) stream of messages to a pos-
sibly unbounded set of receivers; ii) receivers use information retrieved in earlier
packets to legitimate later packets or vice-versa. Some particular scenarios may
include mobility, i.e., participants through the protocol can move and change dy-
namically.
Thus, such a formal analysis have recently raised an interest among researchers.
Some proposals have been given in the past few years. In [Arc02], Archer states a
formal analysis based on model checking techniques (i.e., checking all the reach-
able states of a system with respect to the fulfillment of a certain property) is
not feasible. In her opinion, this is because “an infinite state system is required
to represent the inductive relationship between an arbitrary n-th packet and the
initial packet”. Instead, she exploits theorem proving techniques to analyze the
basic version of a well known stream authentication protocol (the TESLA proto-
col, [PCST01]). On the other hand, in [BL02] Broadfoot and Lowe show their suc-
cessful results derived applying model checking techniques on TESLA [PCST01],
motivating, even though informally, several steps of the analysis. In particular,
they have shown how to build a finite model of TESLA, despite the possibly un-
bounded stream of messages (and cryptographic keys) broadcasted by the sender.
The analysis approach we are going to show throughout this chapter is quite
different from what has been proposed in the literature and focuses its attention
on the verifiability of a system with an arbitrary number of components (like the
case of stream signature protocols). In particular, it will be shown how to ap-
ply a compositional principle allowing us to safely compose processes, in such a
way that the overall system preserves the security properties that each subsystem
separately enjoys.
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WIRELESS COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY ISSUES. Along with secur-
ing multicast communication and, consequently, verifying the proposed schemes,
researchers have recently addressed the quest for securing (and verifying the secu-
rity properties of) wireless communication. Indeed, in the following we are also
going to show a study of some security aspects of a subclass of wireless networks,
i.e., the wireless sensor networks. The attention will be focused on a construction
where time plays an essential role.
By means of a wireless network, objects may interact with each other even
without the presence of a wired architecture. In particular, wireless systems con-
sisting of mobile nodes self-organizing in temporary routing topologies form wire-
less ad hoc networks. These networks are extremely useful in case of rescue op-
erations in remote areas or disaster recovery operations.
Various issues in the world of the ad hoc networks are greatly influenced by
timed relationships (e.g., whichever the media access control protocol may be,
real-time and temporal synchronization constraints characterize the communica-
tions between the hosts). The interested reader is referred to [Rom01] for a fully
detailed survey about real-time issues in ad hoc networks.
A wireless sensor network is typically composed of hundreds (or even thou-
sands) of sensors, (up to) cubic millimeters devices provided with autonomous
sensing, computation and communication. The network is coordinated in a dis-
tributed mode in order to collect information on their surroundings. Sensor net-
works applications are expected to range over many fields, from home applica-
tions like automation and smart environments to military uses (monitoring equip-
ment and ammunitions, battlefield management, etc.). Sensors may be used in
a building for heating and air conditioning control as well as in a hospital for
medical monitoring (e.g., drugs administration or telemonitoring of physiological
conditions of the patients), not to mention environmental monitoring, such as the
detection of possible fires in a forest.
The development of secure communication between sensors represents a new
challenge with respect to standard solutions. Indeed, sensors already have to cope
with severe constraints in terms of power consumption, bandwidth and storage and
they may not have the resources to perform cryptographic operations in their com-
pleteness. Standard solutions developed for conventional computers cannot be ap-
plied, hence new schemes have been proposed and surveys have been carried out
(see, e.g., [PST+02, LEH03]). A particular complexity is required in [PST+02],
where temporal constraints occur, since a time synchronization is needed between
a base station and the sensors in the network.
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THREAD OF THE CHAPTER. Thus, thread of this chapter is to show the formal
capability of capturing new security features in both stream signature protocols
and sensors protocols (with real time requirements). The analysis will be given by
means of detailed case studies and by exploiting two compositional principles.
COMPOSITIONAL STRATEGY. A compositional principle gives sufficient con-
ditions to conclude that the composition of two (or more) processes satisfies the
composition of two (or more) properties, provided that the single processes satisfy
the single properties. As an example, such a principle could work as follows: in
order to check if a system P ||Q satisfies a formula f1||f2, it is enough to check
whether both P satisfies f1 and Q satisfies f2. (Notation || represents the parallel
composition of subcomponents or subformulas, see also Section 2.3.1, Chapter 2).
The existence of such a principle would be particularly appealing for the target of
our analysis. Indeed, the state-space of the system P ||Q is usually considerably
bigger than those of P and Q, separately. Above all, it would help in analyzing
systems with a possibly unbounded number of components. Indeed, let the reader
consider the parallel composition of equal processes P :
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
P || . . . ||P
To prove that the overall system enjoys f∗ = f || . . . ||f (for whatever n) it is
sufficient to prove that P enjoys f .
Among the security properties we have briefly presented at the beginning of
the chapter, we will mainly deal with the property of integrity, i.e., a sort of ro-
bustness against packet modification. For the analysis property, two compositional
principles will be exploited.
The first principle was first introduced in [GLM03] for the Generalized Non
Deducibility on Compositions scheme of properties, (GNDC for short), defined
in [FGM00a, FM99]. In turn, the scheme (reminded in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2)
is based on the seminal notion of non-interference, [GM82]. The first principle
was successfully applied in [GMPV03a] to verify an instance of a pioneer proto-
col for signing digital streams, see [GR01] and Subsection 3.2.1 of this chapter. It
was also successfully applied in [MPV03] to verify an instance of a stream signa-
ture protocol dealing with packet loss, see [PCTS00] and Subsection 3.2.2 of this
chapter.
The second principle was first introduced in [GMPV03b] within a formal
framework aimed at verifying timed security properties, i.e., security properties
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whose fulfilment is based on timed conditions. In its turn, the timed formal frame-
work, namely the timed-Generalized Non Deducibility on Compositions (tGNDC
for short) has been introduced in [GLM03]. Part of Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 has
been devoted to remind the reader of the tGNDC schema.
CASE STUDIES. The analyzed case studies are three significant protocols
aimed at guaranteeing data integrity to the information flow from a sender to a
set of receivers, where integrity means, informally, that the information accepted
by each receiver is exactly what the sender has intended.
Namely, the protocols are: 1) the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol [GR01], a pioneer
protocol introduced in 1997 to sign digital streams; 2) the Efficient Multi-chained
Stream Signature protocol (EMSS) proposed in [PCTS00]. This stream signa-
ture protocol implements a significant improvement with respect to the Gennaro-
Rohatgi protocol, since it guarantees some robustness against packet loss, whereas
the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol does not; 3) finally, the µTESLA (“micro” Timed
Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication), a protocol to provide authenti-
cated broadcast in wireless sensor networks environments.
A detailed formal model of all of them will be given in a subsequent section,
by exploiting the formal process algebras whose syntax and semantics have been
concisely presented in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2.
CONTRIBUTIONS. The main contributions of this chapter are the following.
i) We develop a compositional analysis technique able to deal with multicast
protocols has been developed ([GMPV03a, MPV03]).
ii) In those two investigations, we are not able to manage protocols with time-
dependent security properties. Thus, we give a new compositional principle for
dealing with timed security properties (as timed secrecy and timed integrity). The
principle is new with respect to the one given in [GLM03, GMPV03a, MPV03]
and it has been first introduced in [GMPV03b].
iii) By means of a real-time process algebra, (tCryptoSPA in the Preliminar-
ies) we outline a formal framework ([GMPV03b]) for modeling wireless commu-
nication.
iv) We formally model and analyze three relevant proposals for authenticating
data streams. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to prove some
of the security properties of those protocols (by means of compositional rules).
v) Starting from modeling the basic scheme of Gennaro and Rohatgi, passing
through protocols dealing with packet loss, concluding with a time-dependent se-
curity wireless protocol, the proposed analysis aims at allowing the modeling and
formal validation of a set of multicast and wireless protocols.
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vi) Contrary to previous work in the area, e.g., [Arc02, BL02], the proposed
analysis is able to check a specification with an unbounded number of compo-
nents. (The target of our analysis however being different from TESLA, the pro-
tocol analyzed in [Arc02, BL02]).
SUMMARY. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 deals with the
informal description and the formal model of the three mentioned case studies.
Section 3.3 introduces the concept of stability of a process and it illustrates the first
compositional principle, to establish if a system enjoys a security property defined
by means of GNDC. Section 3.4 introduces the concept of time dependent stability
of a process and it illustrates the second compositional principle, to establish if a
system enjoys a timed security property defined by means of tGNDC. Section 3.5
shows hot to apply the results shown in Section 3.3 to successfully prove the
correctness of the EMSS construction in terms of packets’ integrity. Section 3.6
shows hot to apply the results shown in Section 3.4 to successfully prove the
correctness of the µTESLA construction in terms of packets’ timed integrity.
3.2 Modeling multicast communication
In this section, we present and formally model three security protocols for multi-
cast communication. Basically, all of them aim at ensuring integrity and authen-
ticity of the so called digital streams, i.e., long (potentially infinite) sequence of
bits. Typically, communication involve one sender and an arbitrary number of
receivers.
A formal analysis of the integrity property of two of the three protocols will
be carried out in the following sections.
3.2.1 The Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol
In [GR01], Gennaro and Rohatgi developed a mechanism to sign digital streams.
They aim at assuring a receiver that the information he received is exactly what
the sender has intended.
Applications that deal with streams are typically digitized audio and video,
data feeds, applets. This kind of applications requires the user to consume the
data it receives at almost the input rate, without excessive delay. For this reason,
signing digital streams represents a different problem compared with the signa-
ture of finite messages. Traditional digital signature schemes do not fit properly
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because they require the receiver to process the entire message in order to verify
the signature.
It is our opinion that the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol should be considered para-
digmatic, being essentially, in its 1997 version, one of the first proposals to effi-
ciently solve the problem to sign digital streams. Efficient cryptographic solutions
(i.e., fast to be computed and verified, with respect to the time in which these au-
thors made the proposal) have been adopted in the protocol to allow the entities at
stake to minimize their communication and computation overhead.
The authors present two solutions to the problem, distinguishing two cases:
i) the off-line case: a finite stream which is entirely known to the sender (e.g., a
movie); ii) the on-line case: a potentially infinite stream not known in advance to
the sender (e.g., a live broadcast for news feed).
We model the off-line scheme below. For details about the on-line scheme, the
reader is referred to [GR01, GMPV03a] and Appendix A.
The off-line scheme relies on the basic idea to divide the stream into blocks
and to add cryptographic information in each block such that receivers use infor-
mation retrieved in earlier blocks to legitimate later blocks.
We first use an intuitive notation usually found in literature. We consider a set
of agents able to receive messages. With the following notation,
label cj A → B : msg
we represent the transmission of message msg from a sender A to a receiver
B. cj is the j-th communication channel, label is the name of msg.
Thus, let {bi} ∈ Msgs be the set of meaningful payloads, i = 1 . . . l1. Then,
the protocol for the off-line case is:
Block b′0 c0 S → R : {h(b
′
1)}sk(S)
Block b′i ci S → R : bi, h(b
′
i+1) i = 1..l − 1
Block b′l cl S → R : bl
It exploits the technique of embedding the hash of the following block in the
current block. Bootstrapping integrity of the digital stream is obtained by applying
a single traditional signature in combination with hash chaining.
h(m) is the digest of m after applying the hash function; {m}sk(S) is message
m digitally signed by the sender’s private key sk(S).
The sender S first divides the stream to be sent into l blocks. Then, S generates
the digital signature on the hash of the first block (Block b′0). After verification
1It is assumed that the sender’s private key sk(S) does not occur in the set {bi}
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of the signature the receiver knows what the hash of the first block should be and
then it starts receiving the full stream (blocks b′i). When the receiver receives the
first block b′1, it computes its hash and checks the hash against what the signature
was verified upon. The other blocks consist of an authentication chain, in which
each block contains the hash of the subsequent block. Note that embedding the
hash of the subsequent block implies that the sender knows the stream in advance,
hence the non feasibility of this construction for applications like live broadcasts.
It is worth noticing that in the original paper [GR01], the first block contains
an encoding of the length of the stream. The structure of the first block is here
simplified (without however affecting the results of the analysis that will follow).
Furthermore, we assume the receiver knows in advance the number of blocks in
which the stream is divided. It is also worth noticing that to avoid replay attacks
when executing multiple runs of the protocol one can simply include nonces in
the digitally signed block.
Crypto-CCS specification of the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol
To formally specify the protocol, the sender and the receiver are modelled as
Crypto-CCS processes. A suitable inference system that is used to model this
digital stream signature protocol is shown in Fig. 3.1. Rule (pair) builds the pair
of two messages x and y; rules (fst) and (snd) return the components of a pair;
rule (sign) allows message x to be digitally signed by applying the secret key
sk(y) of agent y; rule (ver) allows a digital signature {x}sk(y) to be verified by
applying the public key of signer y, pk(y); rule (hash) allows an agent to apply a
one-way hash function to message x and obtain digest h(x).
In the following, each conclusion of an inference construct is a message vari-









































] Compute hash of next block
[bi xh(b′i+1)
`pair xb′i








cl!bl.0 Output last block and stop
The sender process builds the initialization block b′0 (more precisely, he builds a
variable containing b′0) to bootstrap the chain: by means of inference rules hash
and sign in Fig. 3.1 the sender computes block b′0, sends it on communication
channel c0 and travels to the next state Senderi. It now sends payloads bi together
with hashed blocks h(b′i+1) until the last state l is reached.
The receiver process is parameterized by the hashed blocks he receives from












] V erify signature
Receiver1(xh(b′1)































`fst xbi ] Extract payload






] Extract hash of next block and
Receiveri+1(xh(b′i+1)

































.0 Send block to application level and stop
In the initial state the receiver aims at verifying the digital signature (we assume
he has previously retrieved the public key pk(S) corresponding to the private key
of the supposed sender). Then, it travels to the next state Receiveri(xh(b′1)), by
maintaining history of the (supposed) next hashed block h(b′1). Acceptance of
the subsequent blocks is conditioned to the successful outcome of the equality
tests between the hash it maintains as a parameter and the hash it computes from
what it has presently received, respectively xh(b′i) and xh(b′MY i). The successful
outcome of the equality test is here modeled by imaging that the receiver sends the
meaningful payload contained in xbi to the application level to consume it. This
sending operation is over channel couti . The receiver then extracts the supposed
hash of the block to be received immediately later. This mechanism is repeated
until the reception of the l-th block. Whether the verification of the signature in
the initial state or the equality tests in subsequent states do not succeed the receiver
should abort.
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Extending the model to multiple receivers.
Extending the model to the treatment of multicast and broadcast communication
(i.e., , by allowing a potentially unbounded number of receivers) is as follows: a
new process MB is added, that is responsible for potentially sending each block
an unbounded number of times in order to simulate a one-to-many (one-to-all)
sending typical of a multicast (broadcast) communication. The new process is







Thus, in the light of this new process, the specification for the sender process































i and go to next state
Senderl
.
= MBl(bl) Output bl and go to next state
3.2.2 The EMSS protocol
Digital streams are usually sent over UDP, the User Datagram Protocol, [Pos80].
UDP is considered to be an unreliable transport protocol, i.e., when UDP sends
packets over a network, it just sends them and forgets about them. This does
not mean that UDP is ineffective, only that it does not handle reliability of the
communication. If a stream is received incomplete, we would still like to be able
to prove the integrity of all the packets that were not lost.
Along with the pioneer protocol modelled in the previous section, protocols
dealing with the problem of securing streamed data over channels with packet loss
have been recently proposed, [PCTS00, PCS02, GM01]. They all can be basically
considered as valuable extensions of the Gennaro-Rohatgi constructions.
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In particular, in [PCTS00], Perrig et al. presented the Efficient Multi-chained
Stream Signature (EMSS) protocol to sign digital streams. EMSS exploits a com-
bination of hash functions and digital signatures and–contrary to previous propos-
als [GR01]–achieves (some) robustness against packet loss.
The basic idea of EMSS is the following: a hash of packet Pi−1 is appended to
packet Pi, whose hash is in turn appended to packet Pi+1 and so on. A signature
packet, containing the hash of the final data packet along with a signature, is sent at
the end of the stream. To achieve robustness against packet loss (the event of one
or more packets loss would break the chain) each packet contains multiple hashes
of previous packets and the signature packet signs hashes of multiple packets.
[PCTS00] uses both deterministic and random distribution of hashes per packet.
Here we focus on a specific instance of the EMSS, viz. the deterministic
(1,2) schema, where packet Pi contains hashes of packets i − 1, i − 2 and whose
hash is contained in packets i + 1, i + 2. After an initial phase, each packet Pi
contains a meaningful payload mi2 together with the hashes h(Pi−1) and h(Pi−2)
of the previous two packets sent. Packets are sent over channels ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
from a sender S to a set of receivers {Rn | n ≥ 1}. The end of a stream is in-
dicated by a signature packet Psign over channel csign, containing the hashes of
the final two packets, along with a digital signature. The protocol can formally be
described as follows.
Packet P0 c0 S → {Rn} : m0, null, null
Packet P1 c1 S → {Rn} : m1, h(P0), null
Packet Pi ci S → {Rn} : mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2) 2 ≤ i ≤ last
Let Plast be the last packet of the stream. Upon sending Plast a signature packet is
sent:
Sign-Pack Psign csign S → {Rn} : {h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(S)
A packet Pi is said to be verifiable if there exists a path (in terms of hash
chains) from Pi to the signature packet. Given a set of verifiable packets, we in-
tend to prove the correctness of the construction in terms of packet integrity, i.e.,
to assure a receiver that the information it received is exactly what the sender has
originally intended. For the analysis, see Section 3.5. Furthermore, see the fol-
lowing chapter, Chapter 4, for a translation of EMSS in terms of Team Automata.
By taking into account the same case study, one can compare their expressiveness
in describing multicast communication and reliability of the transmission.
2We assume the sender’s private key sk(S) cannot be deduced from the set of messages {mi}.
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Crypto-CCS specifications of the (1,2) EMSS.
We present the Crypto-CCS specifications of the (1,2) scheme of the EMSS pro-
tocol.
We remind that the whole formalization, in particular the way a receiver pro-
cess acts, is based on implementative choices of the authors since some details are
not explicitly given in [PCTS00].
A suitable inference system that is used to model EMSS is shown in Fig. 3.2.
Rule (tuple) builds the tuple of three messages x, y and z; rules (1−st), (2−nd)
and (3− rd) return, respectively, the first, second and third component of a tuple;
rules (sign), (ver) and (hash) are the same as in the inference system for the
Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol.
The sender process is parameterized by variables containing the hashes it
should insert in the following packet. As in the formalization of the Gennaro-





[m0 `tuple xP0 ] Create tuple
[xP0 `hash xh(P0)] Compute hash of P0




[m1 xh(P0) `tuple xP1 ] Create tuple
[xP1 `hash xh(P1)] Compute hash of P1




[mi xh(Pi−1) xh(Pi−2) `tuple xPi ] Create tuple
[xPi `hash xh(Pi)] Compute hash of current packet




[xh(Plast) xh(Plast−1) `tuple xt] Create tuple of final hashes
[xt sk(S) `sign xPsign ] Sign the tuple
MBsign(xPsign) Output the signature packet
Again, the special process MB is responsible for potentially sending each























Figure 3.2: Inference system for EMSS.








Among the set of receivers, each process behaves in the same way. The generic
receiver process at step i is parameterized by: 1) the two last packets it received
(let them be Pj1 , Pj2) - over an ideal channel, without packet loss, we have that
Pj1 = Pi−1 and Pj2 = Pi−2; 2) a tuple tup
i−1
{mj}
. tup{mj} consists of the or-
dered sequence of payloads among {mj}j=0,1,...last whose corresponding packets’
hashes h(Pj) the receiver was able to check3. tupi−1{mj} is the tuple updated at step
i, by inserting either xmi−2 or xmi−3 . tup
i−1
{mj}







) (also, it may remain unchanged). Similarly, tuplast{mj} may either
be (xmlast , tup
last
{mj}
) or (xmlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}
) or, unchanged, tuplast{mj}.
The unreliability of the transmission over UDP is modeled by considering that
process Rec non deterministically chooses whether to receive a packet or not.
Finally, we assume that the signature packet Psign is always received (this is likely
since in the original protocol multiple copies of the signature packets are sent).
3For the sake of readability we assume the receiver may infer the sequence number of a packet
by simply observing the packet itself. Otherwise, we should arrange the receiver with more pa-
rameters or arrange a “sequence number” field in the packet structure and let the receiver retrieve





Rec1(0, 0, 0) + Packet loss : go to next state, otherwise
( c0?xP0 . Receive initial packet




Rec2(0, 0, 0) + Packet loss : go to next state, otherwise
( c1?xP1 . Receive packet P1
Rec2(xP1 , 0, 0) ) Go to next state
Rec1(xP0 , 0, 0)
.
=
Rec2(0, xP0 , 0)+ Packet loss : go to next state, otherwise
(c1?xP1 . Receive packet P1
[xP1 `2−nd xh(P0)] Extract hash of previous packet P0
[xP0 `hash xhMY (P0)] Compute my hash hMY (P0)
[xh(P0) = xhMY (P0)] Compare the hashes
([xP0 `1−st xm0 ] IF equal : extract previous payload
Rec2(xP1 , xP0 , xm0) Update parameters and go to next state
);0 ELSE abort
)






Reci+1(xPj1 , xPj2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
) + Packet loss : go to next state, otherwise
(ci?xPi . Receive packet Pi
([j1 = i− 1] Was Pi−1 received?
Rec′i(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
); Go to Rec′i; otherwise
([j2 = i− 2] Was Pi−2 received?
Rec′′i (xPi , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
) Go to Rec′′i ; otherwise
)
); Reci+1(xPi , xPj1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
) Go to next state :
) P1−1 and Pi−2 were not received






[xPi `2−nd xh(Pi−1)] Extract h(Pi−1) from Pi
[xPi−1 `hash xhMY (Pi−1)] Compute my hash hMY (Pi−1)
[xhMY (Pi−1) = xh(Pi−1)] Compare the hashes
([xPi−1 `1−st xmi−1 ] IF equal : extract mi−1 from Pi−1
Reci+1(xPi , xPj1 , (xmi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)) Update parameters and go to next state
);0 ELSE : abort
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[xPi `3−rd xh(Pi−2)] Extract h(Pi−2) from Pi
[xPi−2 `hash xhMY (Pi−2)] Compute my hash hMY (Pi−2)
[xhMY (Pi−2) = xh(Pi−2)] Compare the hashes
([xPi−2 `1−st xmi−2 ] IF equal : extract mi−2 from Pi−2
Reci+1(xPi , xPj1 , (xmi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)) Update parameters and go to next state
);0 ELSE : abort






csign?xPsign . Receive signature packet
Rec∗sign(xPsign , xPj1 , xPj2 , tup
last
{mj}
) Go to intermediary state Rec∗sign






[xPsign pk(S) `ver xver] V erify the signature
[j1 = last] Was Plast received?
Rec′sign(xver, xPlast , tup
last
{mj}
); If so, go to Rec′sign; otherwise
([j2 = last− 1] Was Plast−1 received?
Rec′′sign(xver, xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}




.0) Plast and Plast−1 were not received.
) Send the stream of verifiable payloads
to the application level






[xver `2−nd xh(Plast−1)] Extract h(Plast−1) from Psign
[xPlast−1 `hash xhMY (Plast−1)] Compute my hash hMY (Plast−1)
[xhMY (Plast−1) = xh(Plast−1)] Compare the hashes




).0; Send the stream of verifiable payloads
0 to the application level and stop; ELSE abort






[xver `1−st xh(Plast)] Extract h(Plast) from Psign
[xPlast `hash xhMY (Plast)] Compute my hash hMY (Plast)
[xhMY (Plast) = xh(Plast)] Compare the hashes




).0; Send the stream of verifiable payloads
0 to the application level and stop; ELSE abort






the receiver aims at verifying the digital signature (we assume it has previously
retrieved the public key pk(S) corresponding to the private key of the supposed
sender). The correct verification of the signature implies the receiver to have guar-
antees on the integrity of the verifiable payloads. It can now send the stream to
the application level to consume it. In our formalization, this is modeled by a
scenario where the receiver sends the content of its parameter tuple (the accepted
stream) over channel capp. If the verification of the signature in the final state or
the equality tests in the previous states do not succeed the receiver should abort.
3.2.3 The µTESLA protocol
In [PST+02], Perrig et al. presented µTESLA (“micro” Timed Efficient Stream
Loss-tolerant Authentication), a protocol to provide authenticated broadcast in
wireless sensor networks environments. [PST+02] considers a scenario where
sensors communicate with a base-station connected to the external world. The
base station may broadcast to all nodes messages for routing updates, reprogram-
ming, reset requests. The protocol is an extension of the TESLA stream authen-
tication protocol developed in [PCST01] and it was intentionally developed for
providing authenticated broadcast for the limited computing environments that
are encountered in sensor networks.
In the original TESLA schema, a single sender broadcasts a continuous stream
of packets. Receivers may use information in later packets to authenticate earlier
packets. Each packet contains a message authentication code (MAC), i.e., a value
computed by applying a public algorithm and a secret encryption key to the packet
itself. Given a message m and an encryption key k, we call mac(m, k) the message
authentication code of m. The algorithm is known by all the receivers, while the
encryption keys are disclosed by the sender after a certain amount of time. When
a receiver receives a key Ki it can use it to compute the MAC from the related
packet Pi and compare the computed MAC with that previously received. If the
two MACs match, the receiver can consider the packet Pi authentic. To avoid
the event that an intruder could use a disclosed key Ki to fake the packet Pi a
time synchronization protocol between the sender and the receivers is needed.
Then, each receiver will not accept the packet Pi if the sender might have already
disclosed the key Ki.
Bootstrapping authentication of the whole scheme is achieved in TESLA by
signing the first packet with a regular digital signature scheme. Nevertheless,
computation, communication and storage overhead make the use of asymmetric
cryptography unfeasible for the net of sensors under investigation. Thus, µTESLA
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has been proposed as an optimized extension for sensor networks. It just makes
use of MACs. The base-station randomly generates the last MAC key to be used,
Klast, and derives a key chain by repeatedly applying a publicly known one-way
function F to that key, such that Ki = F (Ki+1). Given the non-reversibility
property (at least with high probability) of function F, the disclosure of key Ki
should not lead to any knowledge of Ki+1 and subsequent keys.
Receivers’ requirements for correctly joining and executing the protocol are:
i) they are time synchronized with the base station; ii) they know the disclosure
schedule of the MAC keys; iii) they know at least one authenticated key of the
key chain, serving as a commitment to the entire chain. A protocol providing
time synchronization and one authenticated key has been proposed in [PST+02].
Basically, the base-station shares with each sensor a symmetric secret key KSM
and establishes a secure channel over which the exchange of a commitment to the
key chain, K0, and a set of temporal parameters, sett, takes place4. More formally,
the initial step of µTESLA is the following:
Packet P0 c0 S → {Rn} : K0, sett,mac(K0, sett, KSM )
where c0 ∈ {ci}i∈   , i.e., the set of communication channels, S is the identifier
of the sender (i.e., the base station) and {Rn} is the set of receivers (i.e., the
sensors)5.
µTESLA is parameterized by the schedule time at which MAC keys are dis-
closed. For the description of further steps in the protocol we consider a basic
formalization, Fig. 3.3, where we suppose that the sender discloses a MAC key
with a delay δ = 1, assumed to fall in the interval after that key has been used
to compute the MAC. Further, we suppose the sender sends one packet per time
interval. Basically, in each time slot a packet and a key packet will be sent, see
Fig. 3.3. First of all, each receiver should check the integrity of the received key,
say Ki, by verifying it w.r.t. an authenticated commitment (e.g., by checking
K0 = F
i(Ki)), then the verified key will be used to verify the integrity of the
packet received in the previous time slot.
Packet Pi ci S → {Rn} : mi,mac(mi, Ki) i ≥ 1
4There are as many symmetric keys as the number of sensors and the communication over
channel c0 is supposed to be a point to point communication. Nevertheless, to simplify our for-
malization, we assume a unique key and a unique communication. This means to implicitly assume
that possible adversaries are not in the set of receivers.
5To assure freshness when executing multiple runs of the same sender, one can simply insert























F (Ki−2) = Ki−3 F (Ki−1) = Ki−2 F (Ki) = Ki−1
Figure 3.3: A µTESLA instantiation.
Packet Pi consists of a meaningful payload mi plus the message authentication
code computed on mi with key Ki. We assume that KSM cannot be deduced from
the sets {mi}, {Ki}.
Upon receiving the packet, the sensor stores the packet until its MAC can be
verified, i.e., until the sender broadcasts packet disclosing Ki:
Key-Packet KPi ci+1 S → {Rn} : Ki
The integrity of key Ki can be checked by verifying K0 = F i(Ki) (or, equiv-
alently, Ki−1 = F (Ki)). Packets may be lost in transit from the base station
to the sensors. In particular µTESLA is tolerant to packet loss in the sense that
receivers may still be able to authenticate all the received packets Pi even when
the corresponding keys’ disclosure packets are lost. Suppose Kj is lost, then a
receiver is not able to verify MAC packet Pj . The following key the receiver re-
covers, let it be Kj+1, can be verified w.r.t. a previous authenticated key (e.g.,
K0 = F
j+1(Kj+1)) and is used to derive Kj , i.e. Kj = F (Kj+1).
The tCryptoSPA specifications of the µTESLA protocol
We present the tCryptoSPA specification of the basic µTESLA presented in
Fig. 3.3.
The fundamental requirement of a time synchronization between a base sta-
tion and each sensor in µTESLA is naturally captured in tCryptoSPA (Subsec-
tion 2.3.1) by its time modeling action tick, upon which sender and receivers’
processes may synchronize (this allows us to avoid the explicit presence of sett in
packet P0).
A suitable inference system that is used to model µTESLA is shown in Fig. 3.4.
Rule (one − way) allows to apply a one-way hash function F to message m and
obtain digest F (m); rule mac computes the message authentication code (MAC)
68 Chapter 3
of a message with a key; rules (pair), (fst) and (snd) are the same as in the
inference system for the Gennaro-Rohatgi protocol.
We consider a sender machine with ample resources. It can be parallelized or
split into n senders, each of them possibly sending different streams, {mji}i≥1,1≤j≤n.
We first present the generic sender process Sj , parameterized by a sequence of
MAC keys (tied together by means of a key chain)6. We assume the symmetric
key KSM , the keys belonging to the key chain and the streams of packets to be












SM `mac y] Compute MAC
[Kj0 y `pair P0] Create packet P0










1 `mac x] Compute MAC
[mj1 x `pair P1] Create packet P1










i `mac x] Compute MAC
[mji x `pair Pi] Create packet Pi
Bji (Pi, K
j
























i , . . .) i ≥ 2
Construct Bji (. . .) is responsible for potentially sending packets (and keys) an un-
bounded number of times, in order to simulate broadcast sessions. Sender S j re-
mains in the same state repeatedly sending messages unless the non-deterministic
6Actually, we consider constants with an arbitrary number of parameters. We could avoid this
by considering, for modeling purposes, a special function fun, not available to possible adver-
saries, that may be used to represent the keys as a sequence.
7We remind the reader that the whole formalization we are going to give is based on personal
choices since some details are not explicitly given in [PST+02]. In particular, the mechanism
through which a receiver possibly identifies each sender process (and consequently each stream)

















Figure 3.4: Inference system for µTESLA.
choice is resolved by choosing the derivative of the second summand in B ji ; this
causes a time unit to pass (a tick action is performed). The construction models
the behaviour of a wireless antenna making signals available only in a particular
time interval. The presence of a non-deterministic choice in the construct makes it
possible the passage to the following time interval without performing any (even-
tually zero) communication. This may implicitly model the unreliability of the
wireless transmission and the occurrence of packet loss.
Among the receivers’ set, each process behaves in the same way. The generic
receiver process at step i is parameterized by a commitment to the key chain (let it
be Kj0) and by the packets it should still authenticate. We assume the receiver’s set
is divided into subgroups, each of them sharing a particular KSM with one sender
process. Sender Sj and receivers belonging to subgroup number j share K jSM .
KjSM may denote a particular service each element in subgroup j is devoted to. Let
us consider pay per view-based applications: among the receivers’ set, the sub-
group knowing KjSM may consist of all the paying spectators for movie number j.
For environments closer to those depicted for µ-TESLA, let us consider a scenario
in which sensors are used to periodically transmit readings regarding heating and
air conditioning control in a building (and consequently receive broadcasted mes-
sages for routing updates or reprogramming): sensors in subgroup j may be all
the sensors devoted to carry out the service for room number j. (S j being the base
station responsible for room number j.).
Below, we refer to Rj,qi to indicate the q-th receiver process belonging to sub-
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c0(x). Receive first packet
[x `fst xK0 ] Extract commitment to the key chain
[xK0 K
j
SM `mac z] Compute MAC
[x `snd xmac] Extract MAC
[z = xmac] Verify MAC: if verified:
tick.Rj,q1 (xK0); Allow a time unit to pass and go to next state
Rj,q0 (null) Wait for key
Upon receiving a value x on channel c0, the receiver verifies the correctness of the
commitment to the key chain, xK0 : he computes mac(xK0 , K
j
SM) and he com-
pares it with the message authentication code in the received packet. If the two
MACs match, a time unit passes and the receiver goes to the next state, otherwise
the receiver remains in the same state waiting for the right key K jSM .





tick.Rj,q2 (y, xK0) Allow a time unit to pass and go to next state
) + tick.Rj,q2 (null, xK0) Go to next state after a time unit
Rj,q1 is willing to accept any arbitrary packet, because it cannot perform any ver-
ification yet. If nothing is received before the end of a time unit, transition takes






i (pi, pi−1, xK0) Receive i-th packet; go to intermediary state R
′j,q
i
+tick.Rj,qi+1(null, xK0) Go to next state after a time unit
Rj,qi is willing to accept packet Pi and travels to an intermediary state R
′j,q
i . If
nothing is received before the end of a time unit, transition takes place to the next
71
state.
R′j,qi (pi, pi−1, xK0)
.
=
ci(xKi−1). Receive key packet
[xK0 = F
i−1(xKi−1)] Verify the key w.r.t. the commitment
[pi−1 `fst ypay] Extract payload
([ypay xKi−1 `mac z] If xKi−1 = K
j
i−1 then: Compute MAC
[pi−1 `snd ymac] Extract MAC
[z = ymac] Verify MAC
appypay. Send m
j
1 to application level
tick.Rj,qi+1(pi, xK0) Allow a time unit to pass and go to next state
); R′j,qi (pi, pi−1, xK0) Wait for key
In intermediary state R′j,qi receives a key packet and verifies the correctness of
the key w.r.t. the authenticated commitment xK0 = K
j
0 . Given the collision-





i simply stays in the same state waiting for the right sub-
group key. If the verification succeeds, the correctness of Pi−1 is verified by check-
ing that the enclosed MAC is authentic. The successful outcome is here modeled
by a scenario where the receiver sends the payload of the accepted packet over
channel app8.
Suppose packet Pi−1 was correctly received, suppose also packet disclosing
Kji−1 is lost. At step i the receiver still cannot authenticate packet Pi−1. The key
chain mechanism of the original protocol takes into account such a possibility: in
interval i + 1 the base station broadcasts key K ji , which the receiver authenticates
by verifying Kj0 = F
i(Kji ). The receiver can authenticate Pi and derives K
j
i−1 =
F (Kji ), so it can also authenticate Pi−1. Actually, our formalization does not take
into account recovering lost keys. For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to suppose
that the key packet related to subgroup j is received (state R′j,qi ).
We report below the formalization at step i, with i ≥ 2, when a packet was not






i+1(pi, xK0) Receive i-th packet; go to next state
+tick.Rj,qi+1(null, xK0) Go to next state after a time unit
8We omitted to insert an idling behavior when a deduction construct fails to be executed and
in our formalization the system simply stops without letting time pass. This is not realistic, but it
has no consequences since we use trace semantics for the analysis and makes it simpler.
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3.3 Stable processes and compositional results for
the non-timed setting
In this section a result about conditions for safe composition of processes will be
given. In order to achieve this result, we should introduce the concept of stability
of a process ([GLM03, GMPV03a, MPV03]).
Definition 16 We say that a process P is stable w.r.t. φX , whenever for every X
with ID(X) ⊆ φX , (P ||XφX ) \ C
γ
=⇒ (P ′||X ′φ′
X
) \ C then D(φX) = D(φ′X).
Basically, a process P is stable when an enemy with a certain knowledge φX does
not increase significantly φX during the execution of P .
A series of lemmas are hereafter introduced. Their proofs are useful for the
main result of this section, Proposition 1, introduced and proved at the end of the
section.
Lemma 1 Assume that P1 and P2 are stable w.r.t. φX; then P1||P2 is stable w.r.t.
φX .
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that φX = D(φX). By contradiction,
consider a computation γ such that
(P1||P2||XφX )\C
γ
=⇒ (P ′′1 ||P
′′
2 ||Xφ′X )\C
and D(φ′X) 6= D(φX) = φX . Then, it means that P1||P2 outputs at least one
message m such that m /∈ φX . Let m1 be the first (and last) of such messages
sent during the computation under consideration. Let us assume, without loss of






c!m1−→ (P ′′1 ||P
′′
2 ||Xφ′X )\C
During the prefix of the computation, P2 emitted over channels in C only mes-
sages in φX , since P2 is stable by the hypothesis. Thus, that trace must be simu-
lated by P1||XφX . On the other hand, this implies: (P1||XφX )\C
γ
=⇒ (P ′′1 ||Xφ′X )\C
and D(φ′X) 6= D(φX). This is contradictory by the hypothesis.
Also, it is possible to prove the stability of the parallel composition of an
arbitrary number n of processes, by induction on n. 2
In the following, we will often exploit the fact that the general way in which
TopφC is specified implies that its behaviour includes that of any X belonging to
the set EφXC (proved in [FGM00a, FM99]).
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Lemma 2 Let P1 and P2 be stable processes w.r.t. φ; then,
(P1||P2||Top
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace (P1||Top
C
φ ) \ C || (P2||Top
C
φ ) \ C
Proof. The proof consists in checking that the following relation is a weak
simulation:
R = {((P ′||P ′′||TopCφ ) \ C, (P
′||TopCφ ) \ C || (P
′′||TopCφ ) \ C) |
(P1||P2||Top
C
φ ) \ C
γ
=⇒ (P ′||P ′′||TopCφ ) \ C, #
tick(γ) = i}
• Assume (P ′||P ′′||TopCφ ) \ C
a!m
−→ (P ′1||P
′′||TopCφ ) \ C due to a transition
P ′
a!m
−→ P ′1, with a /∈ C. Then, also (P
′||TopCφ ) \ C || (P





φ ) \ C||(P
′′||TopCφ ) \ C.
A similar reasoning holds even if the transition is due to a receiving action
by P ′ or when a τ action is performed by one of the two processes.






φ ) \ C due to a transition
P ′
a!m
−→ P ′1 and P
′′ a(m)−→ P ′′1 . If a /∈ C then the case is trivial. If a ∈ C, since
m ∈ D(φ) (P ′1||P
′′
1 is a stable process), we have that (P





φ ) \ C and (P
′′||TopCφ ) \ C
τ
−→ (P ′′2 ||Top
C
φ ) \ C. Thus, we get
(P ′||TopCφ ) \ C || (P
′′||TopCφ ) \ C
τ
−→
(P ′1 || Top
C
φ ) \ C || (P









φ ) \ C
The case of a synchronization between P ′ (P ′′) and TopCφ is a simplified
instance of this case.
2
We can generalize the previous result as follows.
Lemma 3 Let {Pj}j=1,...,n be stable processes w.r.t. φ; then,
(P1|| . . . ||Pn||Top
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace (P1||Top
C
φ ) \ C || . . . || (Pn||Top
C
φ ) \ C
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Proof. By induction on n. The base case is trivial. The case n + 1 may be
treated as follows:
(P1|| . . . ||Pn||Pn+1||Top
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace Lemma 2
(P1|| . . . ||Pn||Top
C
φ ) \ C||(Pn+1||Top
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace Induction hypothesis
(P1||Top
C
φ ) \ C|| . . . ||(Pn+1||Top
C
φ ) \ C
2
Thus, the following compositional rule holds for the GNDCα≤trace schema
(under the assumption that the involved processes are stable).




with 1 ≤ r ≤ n and Pr stable w.r.t. φ. It follows that (P1|| . . . ||Pn)
is stable w.r.t. φ and (P1|| . . . ||Pn) ∈ GNDCα1(P1)||...||αn(Pn)≤trace .
Proof.
(P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn||Top
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace Lemma 3
(P1||Top
C
φ ) \ C|| . . . ||(Pn||Top
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace (≤trace is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ||)
α1(P1)|| . . . ||αn(Pn)
Note 1 A behavioral relation ¢ : P → P between processes is a pre-congruence
with respect to || if it is a pre-order and if, for every P,Q,Q′ ∈ P , if Q¢Q′ then
P ||Q¢P ||Q′. In particular, the fact that ≤trace is pre-congruence with respect to
the parallel operator has been proved in [FM99].
2
3.4 Time-dependent stable processes and composi-
tional results for the timed setting
In this section a result about conditions for safe composition of timed processes
will be given. In order to achieve this result, we refine the concept of stability de-
fined in [GLM03] and reminded in the previous section. To fix this definition, we
briefly recall that the simple stability basically requires that the intruder knowl-
edge does not increase when composing the intruder process with a process P .
If so, we call P a stable process. As already discussed, (again, see Section 3.3
and [GLM03]), if we assume that the intruder knowledge does not increase when
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composing the intruder process with P (i.e., P ||X) and with Q (i.e., Q||X) (using
the same communication channels) then the intruder knowledge does not increase
when composing the intruder itself with the process P ||Q. Unfortunately, such a
form of stability is not time-dependent, i.e., it takes into account the same knowl-
edge during all the temporal execution of the processes at stake. This does not
make it feasible to check properties based on a timed notion of secrecy and, con-
sequently, to check protocols as µTESLA, whose security features exactly depend
on a form of timed secrecy. We give now a refined notion of stability, called time-
dependent stability, that allows us to cope with timed secrecy and so also with
security properties of protocols that rely on it.
We let γ be a sequence of actions (possibly empty) ranging over Act\{τ}. Let
#tick(γ) be the number of occurrences of tick actions in the sequence γ.
Definition 17 Let Xφ be the closed term in X belonging to the messages de-
ducible from φ. We say that a process P is time-dependent stable w.r.t. the se-
quence {φi}i≥0 if, whenever (P ||Xφ0)\C
γ
=⇒ (P ′||X ′φ′)\C and #tick(γ) = i,
then D(φ′) = D(φi).
Basically, a process P is time-dependent stable if an enemy cannot increase
significantly its knowledge when P runs in the space of a time slot.
A series of lemmas are hereafter introduced. Their proofs are useful for the
main result of this section, Proposition 2, introduced and proved at the end of
the section. The proofs are somehow similar to the ones shown in the previous
sections. They are however introduced for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 4 Assume that P1 and P2 are t.d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i≥0; then P1||P2 is t.d.
stable w.r.t. {φi}i≥0.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that φi = D(φi),∀i. By contradic-
tion, consider a computation γ such that
(P1||P2||Xφ0)\C
γ
=⇒ (P ′′1 ||P
′′
2 ||Xφ′′)\C
andD(φ′′) 6= D(φi) = φi. Then, it means that P1||P2 outputs at least one message
m s.t. m /∈ φi. Let m1 be the first (and last) of such messages sent during the
computation under consideration. Assume, without loss of generality, that m1 has










During the prefix of the computation, P2 emitted over channels in C only mes-
sages in φi, for each time slot i, since P2 is t.d. stable by hypothesis. Thus,
that trace must be simulated by P1||Xφi . This would imply: (P1||Xφ0)\C
γ
=⇒
(P ′′1 ||Xφ′′)\C and D(φ
′′) 6= D(φi). This cannot be possible since P1 is t.d. stable
w.r.t. {φi}i≥0.
The same result holds for an arbitrary number n of processes (proved by in-
duction on n). 2




) \ C ≤ttrace (P1||tTop
C
φ0
) \ C||(P2||tTopφ0) \ C
Proof. The proof consists in checking that the following relation is a weak
simulation:
R = {((P ′||P ′′||tTopCφi) \ C, (P
′||tTopCφi) \ C||(P






=⇒ (P ′||P ′′||tTopCφi) \ C, #
tick(γ) = i}
• Assume (P ′||P ′′||tTopCφi) \C
am
−→ (P ′1||P
′′||tTopCφi) \C due to a transition
P ′
am








) \ C||(P ′′||tTopCφi) \ C.
A similar reasoning holds when the transition is due to a receiving action
by P ′ or one of the two processes performs an internal computation.







) \C due to a transition
P ′
am
−→ P ′1 and P
′′ a(m)−→ P ′′1 . The case a /∈ C is trivial. If a ∈ C, since
m ∈ D(φi) ( P ′1||P
′′







)\C and (P ′′||tTopCφi)\C
τ
−→ (P ′′2 ||tTop
C
φi
)\C. Thus, we get








(P ′1||Topφi) \ C||(P
′′
1 ||Topφi) \ C
The case of a synchronization between P ′ (P ′′) and tTop is a simplified
instance of this previous case.
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) \ C is due to
a time synchronization, i.e., P ′ tick−→ P ′1, P ′′
tick











)\C and (P ′′||tTopCφi)\
C
tick
−→ (P ′′1 ||tTop
C
φi+1
)\C (due to time stability of P1 and P2 and henceforth
of P ′ and P ′′). Thus, we get











We can generalize the previous result as follows.
Lemma 6 Assume that {Pj}j=1,...,n are t.d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i≥0; then,
(P1|| . . . ||Pn||tTop
C
φ0
) \ C ≤ttrace (P1||tTop
C
φ0




Proof. By induction on n. The base case is trivial. The case n + 1 may be treated
as follows:
(P1|| . . . ||Pn||Pn+1||tTop
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace Lemma 5
(P1|| . . . ||Pn||tTop
C
φ ) \ C||(Pn+1||tTop
C
φ ) \ C ≤trace Induction hypothesis
(P1||Top
C
φ ) \ C|| . . . ||(Pn+1||tTop
C
φ ) \ C
2




with 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Assume also Pr t. d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i≥0. It
follows that (P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn) ∈ tGNDCα1(P1)||α2(P2)||...||αn(Pn)≤ttrace and
(P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn) is t. d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i≥0.
Proof.
(P1||P2|| . . . ||Pn||Topφ0) \ C ≤ttrace Lemma 6
(P1||Topφ0) \ C|| . . . ||(Pn||Topφ0) \ C ≤ttrace (≤ttrace is a pre-congruence w.r.t. ||)
α1(P1)|| . . . ||αn(Pn)
The fact that ≤ttrace is a pre-congruence w.r.t. || has been proved in [GLM03]
and reminded in [GMPV03b]. 2
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Example 2 The process P = tick.ck.0′ enjoys the secrecy of k for one time unit.
In the more complex process Q = (c(x).[x = k]cm) + tick.0′ the secrecy of k in
the rst time unit is crucial to get the secrecy of m. Indeed, either Q is willing to
receive the key k only in the rst time unit (if so, it releases m) or it starts to idle.
We have that P and Q are t.d. stable w.r.t. φ0 = {∅}, φi = D({k}) for i ≥ 1.
Then, P ||Q is t.d. stable w.r.t. {φi}i≥0 (by Proposition 2) and so m will never
belong to the knowledge of the intruder (whose initial knowledge is ∅).
3.5 An analysis of the EMSS protocol: integrity
Proposition 1 will be applied in this section for verifying integrity of the (1,2)
EMSS. The specification of the protocol has been given in Subsection 3.2.2.
A more general specification, with an arbitrary number n of receivers, is
S0||
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
Rec0|| . . . ||Rec0.
Integrity is defined within the GNDC schema as the ability to accept only the
message mi by a receiver as the i − th message sent by the sender (assuming
mi is not lost). Let us assume that a receiver signals the acceptance of a stream
of messages as a legitimate one, by issuing it, as a unique list of messages, on
a special channel capp. Thus, let αint be Specsign =
∑
s∈streams capp!s.0, where
streams is the set of all the possible ordered sub streams of m0 . . . mlast.
Definition 18 A system P , consisting of a sender of a stream of messages {mi}
and a receiver, enjoys the integrity property whenever P ∈ GNDCαint≤trace .
Basically, integrity holds when the receiver accepts exactly a subset of the
messages mi in the correct order even in presence of an adversary. The key point
is that the intruder will never acquire the private key of the sender to successfully
sign the final packet of the stream.
In a multi-receiver setting with one sender, a protocol guarantees integrity
whenever each receiver accepts only the stream of messages that the sender wishes
to deliver. In our case, the specification for n receivers is simply the parallel
composition of αint n-times.
S0, Rec0 are stable w.r.t. the following initial knowledge φX :
φX = {P0} ∪ {P1} ∪ {Pi | i = 2, . . . , last} ∪ {pk(S), Psign}
This can be verified by looking at the specifications of S0 and Rec0.
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The initial knowledge φX includes indeed all the messages an adversary would
be able to add to its knowledge by eavesdropping on a run of the protocol (in other
words, X does not increase its knowledge when S0 and Rec0 run.
This implies that the considered intruder has the most powerful means to act
since the beginning of the computation. One may comment that this is not correct,
since it does not follow the reality. On the other hand, this is only a trick in
the model, and, if the protocol satisfies the integrity property in this very hostile
environment, then it means that it will satisfy this property in a less powerful
one. This may be formally justified, [FM99]. Here, we prefer to give an informal
discussion of the matter: let us suppose that there exists a sequence of actions,
leading to an attack w.r.t. a procedure, performed by an intruder whose initial
knowledge is φ. Then, let us suppose that the intruder knows φ′, with φ ∈ φ′.
Again, there will be at least the attack found starting from φ. On the other hand,
if no attack exists with φ′, one may reasonably conclude that no attack will exist
by starting from a subset φ of φ′.




that is to say for all X ∈ EφXC we have (S0||X)\C ≤trace 0 and (Rec0||X)\C
≤trace αint. This may be done by finding a suitable weak simulation relation be-
tween (S0||X) \C and 0, and between (Rec0||X) \C and Specsign (∀X ∈ E
φX
C ),
respectively. (The easier way is to prove the same with one check, by simply
considering the top element TopCφ ).
Let C = {csign} ∪ {ci | 0 ≤ i ≤ last} be the set of channels over which each
element of set EφXC is able to communicate.
The candidate weak simulation relation we consider for dealing with the sender
specifications is the following:
RS = (((Si(...)||X)\C,0) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 0 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Ssign(...)||X)\C,0) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
The candidate weak simulation relation we consider for dealing with the re-
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ceiver specifications is the following:
RR = (((Rec0(0, 0, 0)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec1(0, 0, 0)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec1(xP0 , 0, 0)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Reci(xPj1 , xPj2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 2 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Rec′i(xPi , xPi−1 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 2 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Rec′′i (xPi , xPi−2 , tup
i−1
{mj}
)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C , 2 ≤ i ≤ last)
∪(((Recsign(xPj1 , xPj2 , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec∗sign(xPsign , xPj1 , xPj2 , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec′sign(xver, xPlast , tup
last
{mj}
)||X)\C, Specsign) | X ∈ E
φX
C )
∪(((Rec′′sign(xver, xPlast−1 , tup
last
{mj}






are lists of meaningful payloads (also updated). By inspection of
the possible cases we may show that RS and RR are weak simulations. We omit-
ted to explicitly put in RS and RR the pairs in which the first process performs
deduction constructs.
The reader will probably be bored with the long pen-and-paper proofs required
to prove that those pairs form a weak simulation. Here, we give only a sketch
of the proof dealing with the receiver specification. Nevertheless, the interested
reader will find a very similar proof, in its completeness, in the next section.
When the first process performs inference (or match) constructs and it gets
stuck because an inference rule does not apply, or simply travels to the next state,
it can be weakly simulated by whatever process, in particular Specsign. When
Rec0 performs a receiving action, the process on the left may perform a τ action
and it can be weakly simulated by whatever process, in particular Specsign. The
interesting case is when the first process outputs a tuple of messages tup{mj} over
channel capp /∈ C. In this case, it must be {xver}sk(S) = Psign and, assuming that
digital signatures and hash functions cannot be forged, all the messages in tup{mj}
must be replaced with one of all the possible ordered sub streams of m0 . . . mlast.
This can be weakly simulated by Specsign that has been defined as the process
sending all the possible ordered sub streams of m0 . . . mlast.
Each resulting pair consisting of the derivatives still belong to RR.
Proposition 3 S0 ∈ GNDC0≤trace and Rec0 ∈ GNDCαint≤trace.
The following proposition follows by the fact that S0, Rec0 are stable w.r.t. φX ,
by Proposition 1 and Proposition 3.
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Proposition 4 S0||Rec0 ∈ GNDCαint≤trace.
Then, the following statement holds because Proposition 1 is applicable once
again.
Proposition 5 The (1,2) EMSS Protocol enjoys integrity for whatever number of
receivers.
To check a systems with an arbitrary number of components, what we did is
simply consider the components separately. The result follows by Proposition 1
where index r is not fixed a priori and P1 = S0 and Pr, 2 ≤ r ≤ n is Rec0.
In [GMPV03a], compositional principles have been applied also to the Genna-
ro-Rohatgi scheme (in particular, that paper reports a detailed analysis of the off-
line case, whereas the proofs for the on-line case are sketched.). In both the cases,
the stability condition and the fulfillment of GNDC of a sender and an unbounded
number of receivers with respect to a certain fixed intruder initial knowledge are
proved.
3.6 An analysis of the µTESLA protocol: timed in-
tegrity
Proposition 2 will be applied in this section for verifying timed integrity of the
µTESLA protocol. The specification of the protocol has been given in Subsec-
tion 3.2.3.
So called timed integrity belongs to a new class of security properties defined
in [GLM03]. A stream signature protocol guarantees timed integrity on a set of
messages {mi} if, whenever the generic receiver accepts an item in a time interval
i, let us say item x, then x = mi−δ, i − δ being the time interval in which x has
been received. (δ = 1 in the formalization of µTESLA given in Subsection 3.2.3.)
In µTESLA, let us assume that a receiver signals the acceptance of a payload
as a legitimate one, by issuing it on a special channel app.
Let P q .= Sj0||R
j,q
0 be the system consisting of a single sender and the q-th
receiver in subgroup j, sharing K jSM . Let function αtInt(P









= tick.tSpeci+1 + app(m
j
i−1).tick.tSpeci+1 i ≥ 2
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αtInt(P
q) may denote the correct external behaviour of P q. In the first two steps
it simply let time pass, while in further steps it may either let time pass (denoting
packet loss) or let a verified payload to be sent on the special channel app and then
let time pass. The set of all messages sent on channel app is the set of all the possi-







nj being the cardinality of the receivers in subgroup j.




0 || . . . ||R
j,nj
0 , consisting of a sender
of streamed data {mji} and the receivers in subgroup j enjoys the timed integrity






Basically, it means that each receiver accepts exactly the messages belong-
ing to {mji} in the correct order and within the time interval following the one
in which the sender actually sent the messages, even in presence of an intruder
(unless packets Pi are lost). The key point is that the intruder will never acquire
the shared key KjSM to establish a secure channel over which the commitment to
the key chain is exchanged9.
We first consider system P q. We may prove that Sj0 and R
j,q
0 (Subsection 3.2.3)







SM ) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}






1) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}








1 | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
. . .








i−1 | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}
. . .
where n is the number of senders. φi is equal to φi−1 plus the set of all the mes-
sages an intruder would be able to add to its knowledge by eavesdropping on a
run of the protocol during the whole time interval i (of course including those
messages coming from all the other senders processes). The same considerations
about the power of the intruder hold as in the previous section. Actually, the in-
truder have more powerful means to act since the beginning of each time interval.













and (Rj,q0 ||X)\C ≤ttrace αtInt(P
q). This may be done by finding a suitable weak
9We remind the reader that KmSM 6= K
n




l if m 6= n or i 6= l.
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simulation relation between (Sj0||Xφ0) \ C and 0
′ and between (Rj,q0 ||Xφ0) \ C
and tSpec0, respectively. The set C of channels over which an intruder is able to
communicate is C = {ci | i ≥ 0}. The weak simulation relation dealing with the















i (. . .)||Xφi)\C,0
′) | i > 1, Xφi ∈ tE
φi
C )
The weak simulation relation we consider for dealing with the receiver specifica-
tions is the following (superscript q is omitted for simplicity):
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0)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci) | fst(xi−1) 6= m
j





0)||Xφi−1)\C, tSpeci−1) | fst(xi−1) 6= m
j






0)||Xφi−1)\C, tick.tSpeci) | i ≥ 2, Xφi−1 ∈ tE
φi−1
C )
where p1, pi−1, pi∗, pi−1∗ and xi−1 are not empty fields. pi∗, pi−1∗ are shortcuts
to denote either authentic packets sent by the sender or others. We omitted to
explicitly put in RS and R the pairs in which the first process performs deduction
constructs.
Lemma 7 Sj0 and R
j,q
0 are t. d. stable w.r.t. {φi}.








Proof. Throughout the proof, we omit to consider the cases in which the
sender and the receiver by themselves perform internal actions.
• Sj0 ∈ tGNDC
0′
≤ttrace . Let us consider relationRS . RS is a weak simulation:
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– ((Sji ||Xφi)\C,0′). S
j
i may
* either perform a tick action: in this case the whole system on the




able to simulate it and ((Sji+1||Xφi+1)\C,0
′) ∈ RS .
* or go to intermediary state B
j
i . 0
′ is able to simulate it and
((Bji ||Xφi)\C,0
′) ∈ RS .
– ((Bji ||Xφi)\C,0′). B
j
i may perform a sending action, whereas Xφi






−→ (Bji ||Xφi)\C, i = 0, 1. 0
′ is able to simulate it
and ((Bji ||Xφi)\C,0
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′) ∈ RS .
– ((ciKji−1.Bi(. . .)||Xφi)\C,0′). The process on the left may perform a




i (. . .)||Xφi)\C
τ
−→ (Bji (. . .)||Xφi)\C. Simi-
lar to the previous item.




. Let us consider relation R. R is a weak simula-
tion:
– ((Rj0(null)||Xφ0)\C, tSpec0). Suppose R
j
0(null) performs a receiv-
ing action and Xφ0 the corresponding sending action. Xφ0 could have
sent any message ∈ D(φ0) whereas the only message R
j
0(null) will





0)||Xφ0)\C and tSpec0 is able to
simulate τ and (tick.(Rj1(K
j
0)||Xφ0)\C, tSpec0) ∈ R. When the re-
ceived message contains a MAC not computed with K jSM the system
maintains the same configuration and tSpec0 is able to simulate it.
– (tick.(Rj1(K
j
0)||Xφ0)\C, tSpec0). The first process may only perform
tick by reaching the configuration (Rj1(K
j
0)||Xφ1)\C. Note that also
tSpec0
tick
























0) performs a receiving action and Xφ1 the corresponding







0)||Xφ1), where p1∗ could
be either the authentic packet send by the sender p1 or another one




0)||Xφ1), tSpec1) ∈ R.
– (tick.(Rj2(p1, K
j
0)||Xφ1)\C, tSpec1). The first process may only per-
form a tick action reaching the configuration (Rj2(p1, K
j
0)||Xφ2)\C.
Note that also tSpec1
tick






– ((Rji (pi−1, K
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0)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci).
* The first process may perform tick by reaching
{(Rji+1(null,K
j
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0)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci) ∈ R.
– ((Rj
′
i (pi∗, pi−1, K
j
0)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci). If R
j′
i outputs a message over
channel app, it must be z = ymac, pi−1 = snd(ymac), xKi−1 = K
j
i−1

















Both the derivatives ∈ R.
– ((tick.Rji+1(pi∗, K
j
0)||Xφi)\C, tick.tSpeci+1). Both the processes may








0) performs a receiving action and Xφi the corre-










0)||Xφi), tSpeci) ∈ R.
* If the first process performs tick, it reaches the configuration
(Rji+1(null,K
j





0)||Xφi+1)\C, tSpeci+1) ∈ R
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– ((Rji (xi−1, K
j
0)||Xφi)\C, tSpeci). In this case the equality check among
hashes does not succeed and the system gets stuck. tSpeci is always
able to simulate it.
2
The following proposition follows by Lemmas 7 and 8 and by Proposition 2,
where r = 1, 2, P1 = S
j
0, P2 = R
j,q
0 .





The correctness of the multiple receivers version (considering all the receivers
belonging to subgroup j), can be also proved using results of Lemmas 7 and 8 and
Proposition 2, where index r is not fixed a priori and P1 = Sj0 and Pr = R
j,q
0 with
1 ≤ q ≤ nj .






We get into the issue of considering a multiple senders/receivers environment.
Let us consider Γ = Π1≤j≤nP j and αtInt(Γ) = Π1≤j≤nα
j
tInt(P
j), where n is the
cardinality of the senders processes.
Proposition 8 System Γ ∈ tGNDCαtInt(Γ)≤ttrace .
The result follows by application of Propositions 2 and 7.
We note that, in order to have timed integrity on the messages mi, µTESLA
must ensure timed secrecy on the keys Ki. Indeed, we could also check explicitly
timed secrecy on the keys with the same machinery.
We also note that, with respect to the previous analyzed case study (EMSS)
here we have some results about not only an arbitrary number of receivers, but
also an arbitrary number of senders.
10Note that 0′||αtInt(P q) ≤ttrace αtInt(P q).
Chapter 4
The Team Automata Chapter
The Team Automata point of view in the formal
modelling and analysis of security and privacy
4.1 Introduction
THREAD OF THE CHAPTER. Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the
use of automata-based formalisms for the specification and verification of security
properties in communication protocols [GOR02, LMST03, Lyn99, Ohe03, OL02].
This chapter is devoted to show the results obtained in using Team Automata —
an extension of Input/Output (IOA) automata [LT89]—in the modelling of secure
multicast communication [BLP03, BLP04b] and secure mobile agents [EP04] and
in the analysis of some properties. In particular, we analysed a functional property
called integrity, i.e., robustness against modification of messages, and a privacy
property.
TEAM AUTOMATA. Team Automata (TA) have originally been introduced in
the context of Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) [BEKR03, Ell97,
Kle03].
They are inspired by—and form an extension of—Input/Output automata (IOA)
[LT89]. Like IOA, TA form a flexible framework for modelling communication
between components of distributed and reactive systems. They model the logi-
cal architecture of a system by describing it solely in terms of an automaton, the
role of actions, and synchronizations between these actions. A TA is composed
of component automata (CA), which are ordinary automata without final states
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and with a distinction of their actions into input, output and internal actions. The
only difference between a CA and an IOA is that IOA are by definition input en-
abled: in each state it must be possible to execute every input action. The crux of
composing a TA is to define the way in which its constituting CA communicate
by synchronizations. Whereas IOA are constructed according to a single and very
strict method of composing automata, in effect resulting in composite automata
that are uniquely defined by their constituents, there is no such thing as the unique
TA composed over a given set of CA. Rather, a whole range of TA, distinguishable
only by their synchronizations, can be composed over this set of CA. In particular,
contrary to the case of IOA, in TA also output actions may be synchronized upon.
The rigorous setup of these frameworks allows one to formulate and verify
general and specific logical properties of complex (distributed, reactive) systems
in a mathematically precise way. In realistically large computer systems, secu-
rity is a big issue, and these frameworks allow formal proofs of correctness of its
design. Moreover, such a formal approach forces one to unambiguously describe
one’s design and it may suggest new approaches not seen otherwise. The particu-
lar characteristics of TA with respect to IOA were showed to be useful in specific
circumstances, two of which we describe next. In [BEKR01], the synchroniza-
tion of output actions was used to define so-called peer-to-peer and master-slave
synchronizations. These are two important CSCW phenomena, which were thus
introduced with a clear practical motivation in mind. Neither of them can however
be distinguished in IOA.
CONTRIBUTIONS I. We use the freedom of choosing the synchronizations of
a TA over a set of CA to define a so-called multicast composition operator ‖J
as a one-to-J synchronization between a sender and a subset J of the total set
of receivers. This notion cannot be distinguished in IOA. In particular, we show
the potential of TA for modelling secure multicast and broadcast communication.
To this aim, TA were used to model an instance of a particular stream signature
protocol. The one-to-many and one-to-all communications that are so typical of
multicast and broadcast communications, could be captured by TA in a native way
as synchronizations between the set of CA constituting a TA [BLP03].
We attempt to provide TA with a framework for security analysis [BLP04b].
First, we define an insecure communication scenario for TA, based on adding a so-
called most general intruder (a kind of Dolev-Yao model, that is commonly used
in security analysis, [DY83]) to a TA model of a secure communication protocol.
The intruder is modelled as an active agent able to influence the communication
among honest agents. Secondly, we reformulate in terms of TA the Generalized
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Non-Deducibility on Compositions (GNDC) schema of [FM99] (recalled in the
Preliminaries) and, subsequently, a compositional analysis strategy is described
for it, which can be used for verifying security properties in the communication
protocol modelled by the scenario. Thirdly, we apply this framework to show that
the property of integrity, i.e., a sort of robustness against packet modification, is
guaranteed for a case study in which TA model a particular instance of the Effi-
cient Multi-chained Stream Signature (EMSS) protocol family of [PCTS00]. (In
a previous chapter of this thesis it has been shown how the same protocol can be
modeled by means of process algebras and the same property has been analyzed.
Adopting the same case study should help in facilitating an easy comparison for
those familiar with other approaches.)
RELATED WORK. The approach of using an automata-based formalism for
the specification and verification of properties in the field of security is not unique,
but has become very popular in recent years [GOR02, LMST03, Lyn99, Ohe03,
OL02, Sch00]. We briefly describe some approaches closest to those proposed in
this chapter.
In [Sch00], so-called Security Automata are defined as a form of Bu¨chi au-
tomata, similar to ordinary (finite) automata, and applied to a simple access con-
trol model. Similar to composition of IOA and TA, so-called conjunction security
automata are defined. It remains to see whether also complex access control poli-
cies with delegation and revocation can be modelled by security automata. Such
policies have been taken into account in [BEKR01], where the potential of TA
for capturing information security and protection structures, and critical coordi-
nations between these structures, is demonstrated. On the basis of a spatial access
metaphor, various known access control strategies are formally specified in terms
of synchronizations in TA. Moreover, in [tBB] an attempt was initiated to validate
some of the resulting specifications with the model checker SPIN [Hol03]. These
matters are not however further discussed in this chapter.
In [Lyn99], an experiment involving the combination of simple shared-key
communication with the Diffie-Hellman key distribution protocol [DH76] is mod-
elled and proved correct using IOA. As noted by the author herself, a limitation
of this approach is the fact that the protocol allows only purely passive eavesdrop-
pers to listen in on the communication. This choice simplifies the formulation of
compositional results, as an eavesdropper cannot change the course of communi-
cation, e.g. by conducting a communication in which it pretends to be an honest
participant. The approach does provide attractive compositional reasoning tech-
niques. In this chapter we discuss how the TA approach can be exploited in order
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to overcome the limitations of [Lyn99] (see also [BLP04b]). In particular, the pro-
posed insecure scenario shows an active intruder is a priori able to listen to public
communication between honest components, but also to inject fake messages back
to the network.
Finally, another related approach can be found in [Ohe03, OL02], where In-
teracting State Machines (ISMs)—yet another extension of IOA—are introduced
and applied to security analysis. In fact, ISMs are used to model and analyze
the classic Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol in the version
fixed by Lowe [Low96]. A strong point of this approach is the fact that it allows
simultaneous input/output and machine assistance. ISMs are defined, and theo-
rems proved, in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [NPW02]. What is missing are
solid techniques for compositional reasoning over more complex communication
protocols. We define and prove, for a particular insecure communication scenario,
a compositional analysis strategy for a TA setting. That strategy allows, to some
extent and under some conditions, to verify properties of a formal specification by
separately analysing its components ( [BLP04b]).
PRIVACY WITHIN SECURE AGENTS. Along with (almost) general analysis
techniques for TA, the chapter will present some results in the area of secure
agents and privacy properties. Here, a brief introduction to the overall scenario.
Agent technology is assuming a central role in various areas of computer science.
Mobile agents are indeed a powerful tool for limiting data traffic or managing
remote service provision. But since mobile agents are software meant to run on
foreign hosts, various security issues arise in their respect. On the one side, hosts
must be protected from non trusted agents that might carry malicious code. This is
the easy side of the question, and is addressed with computer security techniques.
In contrast, it is much harder to protect a mobile agent from a hostile environment.
While an agent executes on a host, its code must be in the clear; if it needs to use
sensitive data that it carries along, this data must be in the clear as well. If it is
stored in an encrypted form, it must be decrypted prior to use, and therefore the
appropriate decryption key must be available to the agent. This suggests that usual
cryptographic tools cannot protect an agent from being robbed or spied upon.
But, although some vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated (the agent can be
killed or bogus data can be supplied to it), it would be very appealing to pro-
vide data privacy and integrity mechanisms to mobile agents. Enhancing them
with security features can result in a very powerful and effective way of handling
services on potentially hostile resources.
Because of the wide range of applications that can be imagined for a secure
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agent, the issue is currently a hot topic in research. Recent approaches look for
a solution by carrying the idea of encryption to an unusual level; briefly stated,
although the agent code itself remains in the clear, the function computed by the
agent is transformed so that the agent’s behaviour is incomprehensible to an ob-
server that doesn’t have a key for interpretation. The first proposal in this direction
is due to Sander and Tschudin [ST98]. Their technique has been generalized by
Cachin et al. [CCKM00] who use the idea of garbled circuits by Yao [Yao86].
It must be noted that these approaches are still pioneer solutions to the security
problem posed above, in that the security goals achieved are still very restrictive
and the agent model to which they apply is somewhat awkward.
CONTRIBUTIONS II. As a first step towards a comprehension of the poten-
tialities of these methods, and of intrinsic limitations of software agents from the
point of view of security, Team Automata are used to formalize the protocol of
Cachin et al. [CCKM00]. The latter is based on the idea of entrusting data to
an agent in the form of a circuit that evaluates to a single output. The circuit is
obtained as a cascade of components each one constructed by one of the hosts
visited by the agent. In [CCKM00], it is proven that the protocol preserves the
privacy of all actors’ inputs.
Part of this chapter is devoted to showing the recent contributions within a TA
based analysis of this privacy property. To the best of our knowledge, TA have not
been used before in the study of privacy.
Our analysis also has the merit of providing a high level model of the actors’
behaviour and interaction, abstracting out from cryptographic details, giving a
clearer insight of the protocol. Our model, interestingly, naturally represents the
agent as a set of actions as opposed to an entity per se. This suggests that the
protocol does not respect the object oriented spirit of agents. On the other hand,
taking the perspective of the agent’s source, it models the source’s view of the
system according to the intuition that the source delegates tasks fully to the agent.
Moreover, our effort contributes to testify the expressive power and modelling
capabilities of team automata.
SUMMARY. This chapter is organized as follows. First, we formally define the
framework for TA with multicast-broadcast communication (Section 4.2). Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the model of the deterministic (1,2) EMSS by TA (this security
multicast protocol has been already presented and modeled through process al-
gebras in one of the previous chapters). In Section 4.4 we describe an insecure
communication scenario for team automata. In Section 4.5 we reformulate the
GNDC schema in terms of team automata and enrich the insecure scenario with
92 Chapter 4
a compositional analysis strategy. We subsequently apply this in Section 4.6 by
verifying integrity of the instance of EMSS modeled in Section 4.2. In section 4.7
we give a high level description of the protocol by Cachin et al. and recall the rel-
evant results about garbled circuits and the protocol itself. Section 4.8 is devoted
to show the model of the protocol and the formal analysis of its privacy features.
4.2 Multicast/broadcast communication in TA
In [BEKR03] several fixed strategies for choosing the synchronizations of a TA
were defined, each leading to a uniquely defined TA. These strategies fix the
synchronizations of a TA by defining, per action a, certain conditions on the a-
transitions to be chosen from ∆a(S), thus determining a unique subset of ∆a(S)
as the set of a-transitions of the TA. Such subsets are referred to as predicates for
a. Once predicates have been chosen for all actions, the TA over S defined by
these predicates is unique. In [BLP03], new predicates specifically for modelling
multicast/broadcast communication in TA have been introduced. Here, we recall
them.
Definition 20 Let a ∈
⋃
i∈I Σi and let J ⊆ I. The predicate J-cast for a in S , de-
noted by RJa (S), is dened as RJa (S) = {(q, q′) ∈ ∆a(S) | [∀j ∈ J : [ a ∈ Σj ∧
aenCj projj(q))] ⇒ projj [2](q, q′)∈δj,a] ∧ [∀ i∈I\J : [proji(q)=proji(q′)]}.
The predicate J-cast thus contains all and only those a-transitions from ∆a(S)
in which every CA from J participates whenever a is currently enabled in that
CA, while none of the other CA does. These predicates thus model multicast
communication between CA. Obviously, the I-cast predicate models broadcast
communication between CA. Hence, we may also refer to it as the broadcast
predicate.1
Definition 21 Let J ⊆ I, let RJa (S) ⊆ ∆a(S) for all a ∈
⋃
i∈I Σi, and let
RJ = {RJa (S) | a ∈
⋃
i∈I Σi}. Then T = (Q, (Σout, Σinp, Σint), δ, I) is the
RJ -TA over S , denoted by ||JS , if δa = RJa (S), for all a ∈
⋃
i∈I Σi.
Each RJ -TA over S , with J ⊆ I, is also called the J-cast TA over S because it
is the unique TA with the following property: the addition of any synchronization
results in a TA that contains a synchronization in which a CA from J in which a
is currently enabled does not participate. Furthermore, the RI-TA over S is also
called the broadcast TA over S and it may also be denoted by 9S .
1The broadcast predicate is called is-state-indispensable in [BEKR03].
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4.3 A case study: the EMSS protocol modelled by
TA
Among the multicast protocols presented in Chapter 3, here we remind EMSS,
exploiting a combination of hash functions and digital signatures for achieving
authentication of streams and some robustness against packet loss.
In this section, we show how to specify the deterministic (1,2) schema of the
EMSS protocol by team automata. Again, we specify team automata in the way
that I/O automata are commonly defined [Lyn99, LT89], i.e., by means of states,
actions and transitions. As already done for the specification of TopφC , we omit
the precondition (effect) of an action when it is true.
The sender S of the stream is modeled by a CA TS and the set {Rn | n ≥ 1} of
receivers by n copies of a CA TR. TS uses its private key sk(TS ) and a public key
pk(TS ) to perform regular digital signature operations. Let Messages denote the
set {m0,m1, . . . ,mlast} of meaningful payloads. Then TS uses the hash function
h : Messages → Hashed, while TR uses the hash function h¯ = h. Moreover, TS
uses the function s : 2HashedTS → SignedTS , defined by s(H) = Hsk(TS ), to sign
sets of hashed messages with its private key sk(TS ), whereas TR uses the function
s¯ : SignedTS → {true, false} and the public key pk(TS ) to verify whether or not a








〈m1, h(P0), ∅〉} ∪ {
Pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)〉 | 2 ≤ i ≤ last}
∪ {〈{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS )〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Psign
}
Int: {Hashi | 0 ≤ i ≤ last} ∪ {Sign}
States
sent ⊆ Messages, hashed ⊆ Hashed, signed ⊆ Signed, all initially ∅
Transitions
P0
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {P0}
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Hashi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: Pi ∈ sent ∧ h(Pi) /∈ hashed
Eff: hashed := hashed ∪ {h(Pi)}
P1
Pre: h(P0) ∈ hashed ∧ P1 /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {P1}
Pi, 2 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: {h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)} ⊆ hashed ∧ Pi /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {Pi}
Sign
Pre: h(Plast) ∈ hashed ∧ s({h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}) /∈ signed
Eff: signed := signed ∪ {s({h(Plast), h(Plast−1)})}
Psign
Pre:{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS ) ∈ signed ∧ Psign /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {Psign}
Clearly TS has no input behaviour, while its output behaviour BΣoutTS consists
of all prefixes of P0P1 · · ·PlastPsign. To send the packets P0, P1, . . . , Plast, Psign in
this order, TS must perform some internal computations. This is reflected by its
internal behaviour BΣintTS consisting of all prefixes of Hash0Hash1 · · ·HashlastSign.
We continue with the specification of TR. It is capable of receiving as input
behaviour all packets P0, P1, . . . , Plast, Psign, built over the set Payloads′ of vari-
ables m′i that should contain the meaningful payloads mi. Upon receiving Pi, TR
verifies whether it has received Pi−1. First consider that TR indeed received Pi−1.
Then it extracts the hash h(Pi−1) from Pi, computes the hash h¯(Pi−1), and com-
pares these two hashes. If they are equal, then the variable m′i−1 that should
contain the verifiable payload mi−1 is extracted from Pi−1. Otherwise TR has no
output behaviour.
Secondly, consider that TR did not receive Pi−1. Then it verifies whether it
received Pi−2. If it did not, then TR concludes that it is unable to check the hashes
of either Pi−1 or Pi−2, so it goes on to verify whether it did receive Pi+1. If TR did
receive Pi−2, then it extracts the hash h(Pi−2) from Pi, computes the hash h¯(Pi−2),
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and compares the two hashes. If they are equal, then the variable m′i−2 that should
contain the verifiable payload mi−2 is extracted from Pi−2. Otherwise TR has no
output behaviour.
Eventually TR receives the signature packet Psign (we assume that Psign is al-
ways received, but in the specification of TR we sometimes check if Psign has
already been received to avoid a transition to take place before Psign has actually
been received), after which it verifies the accompanying digital signature (we as-
sume that TR has previously retrieved the public key pk(TS ) corresponding to the
private key sk(TS )), before repeating the above procedure. The verification of the
signature allows TR to have guarantees on the integrity of the stream of verifiable
payloads collected in xtractedM, which is consequently sent to the application
level as the output behaviour of TR.
Note that in the specification of TS we explicitly modelled that each of its
actions is enabled only once during a computation, thus prohibiting loops. For
example, as soon as TS has sent P0, then this action’s precondition P0 /∈ sent
prohibits this action to be executed again. For the sake of readability, we omit the
addition of such preconditions to the specification of TR, but implicitly assume







〈m′1, h(P0), ∅〉} ∪ {
Pi︷ ︸︸ ︷
〈m′i, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)〉 | 2 ≤ i ≤ last}




Int: {XtractHi, XtractMi, Hashi | 0 ≤ i ≤ last} ∪ {Verify, Stream}
States
received, xtractedM ⊆ Payloads′, xtractedH, hashed ⊆ Hashed, all ini-
tially ∅
verified, send ⊆ {true, false}, both initially false
Transitions
Pi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Eff: received := received ∪ {Pi}
XtractHi,1, 1 ≤ i ≤ last
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Pre: {Pi−1, Pi} ⊆ received
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {h(Pi−1)}
XtractHi,2, 2 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [{Pi−2, Pi} ⊆ received] ∧ [Pi−1 /∈ received]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {h(Pi−2)}
Psign
Eff: received := received ∪ {Psign}
Verify
Pre: [Psign ∈ received] ∧ [s¯({h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS )) = true]
Eff: verified := true
XtractHsign,1
Pre: [{Plast, Psign} ⊆ received] ∧ [verified = true]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {h(Plast)}
XtractHsign,2
Pre: [{Plast−1, Psign} ⊆ received] ∧ [Plast /∈ received] ∧ [verified = true]
Eff: xtractedH := xtractedH ∪ {h(Plast−1)}
Stream
Pre: [[m′last ∈ xtractedM] ∨ [[m
′
last−1 ∈ xtractedM] ∧ [Plast /∈ received]]]
∧[verified = true]
Eff: send := true
XtractMi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [h(Pi) ∈ xtractedH] ∧ [h¯(Pi) ∈ hashed] ∧ [h¯(Pi) = h(Pi)]
Eff: xtractedM := xtractedM ∪ {m′i}
Hashi, 0 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: h(Pi) ∈ xtractedH
Eff: hashed := hashed ∪ {h¯(Pi)}
m′0
Pre: [send = true] ∧ [m′0 ∈ xtractedM]
Eff:xtractedM := xtractedM− {m′0}
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m′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ last
Pre: [send = true]∧ [m′i ∈ xtractedM]∧ [{m
′
k | 0 ≤ k < i}∩xtractedM =
∅]
Eff: xtractedM := xtractedM− {m′i}
Clearly the input behaviour BΣinpTR of TR consists of all prefixes of all possible
permutations of P0P1 · · ·PlastPsign. When TR subsequently actually receives the
packets P0, P1, . . . , Plast, Psign in this particular order, then TR is able to perform a
series of internal computations, which is reflected by the fact that its internal be-
haviour BΣintTR contains XtractH1,1Hash0XtractM0XtractH2,1Hash1XtractM1 · · ·
XtractHlast,1Hashlast−1XtractMlast−1VerifyXtractHsign,1HashlastXtractMlastStream as
well as other traces representing other orders of performing these internal com-
putations. Finally, the output behaviour BΣoutTR of TR consists of all prefixes of
m′0m
′
1 · · ·m
′
last.
Now the max-ai team automaton over {TS , T
(i)
R | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, denoted by
TEMSS , is defined as
TEMSS = ||| {TS , T
(i)
R | 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
which formalizes the EMSS protocol. Note that TEMSS has no input actions, while
it has the union of the output (internal) actions of TS and the TR’s as its output
(internal) actions.
In the previous section, the reader has been reminded about the definitions of
the broadcast and multicast operators given in [BLP03]. To apply those operators
to the EMSS case study leads to the following.
Let C1 = TS and let Ci = TR,2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. Then the {1}-cast
TA over {Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1} is essentially the same as TS . Since it has the
same output behaviour as TS , it thus models multicast/broadcast communication
with full packet loss. The K-cast TA over {Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1}, where K ⊃
{1}, has the union of the output (internal) actions of TS and TR as its output
(internal) actions and it has no input actions. The fact that its output behaviour
consists of all prefixes of P0P1 · · ·PlastPsignm0m1 · · ·mlast implies that it models
multicast/broadcast communication.
Finally, we illustrate how we can model multicast/broadcast communication
with some packet loss by varying the type of synchronization per output action.
2Strictly spoken, the internal actions of each TR must be indexed to satisfy the composability
condition.
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Assume that TS performs a multicast communication with two receivers, viz. the
jth and the kth receiver, and let L = {1} ∪ {j, k | 2 ≤ j < k ≤ n + 1}.
If there would be no packet loss, then we would compose the L-cast TA over
{Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1}. Let Σ be the alphabet of this TA. Then we recall that
the L-cast TA may also be called the RL-TA or—even more detailed—the {RLa |
∀ a ∈ Σ}-TA over {Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1}. Next we assume that there is some
packet loss, viz. the jth receiver does not receive P1 and the kth receiver does not
receive Plast−1. To reflect this packet loss, we would compose the ({RLa | ∀ a ∈






})-TA over {Ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1}.
4.4 An insecure communication scenario for TA
In this section we adopt a generic communication protocol in order to obtain an
insecure communication scenario for team automata in which to analyze security
properties.
We assume all actions to be built over a first order signature σ, where predicate
symbols are seen as communication channels and atomic formulae as messages.
We assume the function symbols in σ to contain at least the ones that we will use
in the sequel, that are: the symbols denoting encryption and pairing, e.g., { } and
〈 , 〉; those denoting hashing, e.g., h( ); and those indicating the secret and public
key, e.g., sk( ) and pk( ). We let m,m′ range over the set Messages of atomic
formulae and c, c′ over the set Channels of predicate symbols. In the sequel Eve,
Eve
′, Pub, Pub′, Reveal, and Reveal′ will be used as particular predicate names.
Every action will thus be written as c(m), denoting message m sent over channel c.
Given a set M ⊆ Messages of messages, we define c(M) = {c(m) | m ∈ M}.
Given a set C of predicate names we define C(M) = {c(m) | m ∈ M, c ∈ C}.
Finally, with a little abuse of notation, we will also write C as a shortcut for the
set C(Messages).
We abstract from the cryptographic details concerning the operations accord-
ing to which messages can be encrypted, decrypted, hashed, paired, et cetera,
but we assume the presence of an inference system (defined by a derivation op-
erator `) that implements these operations. By applying (cryptographic) oper-
ations from this inference system to a set M of messages, a new set D(M) =
{m | M ` m} of messages (usually called the deduction set) can be obtained.
This approach is standard in the analysis of (cryptographic) communication pro-
tocols [CJM00, FM99, LGL03, Lyn99].
In the sequel we assume a cryptographic communication protocol specifica-
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tion involving two roles, viz. an initiator TS and a responder TR. Rather than
a direct communication between TS and TR, we assume all the communication
to flow through an insecure channel (cf. Figure 4.1). This insecure channel may
release some messages to an intruder which, in its turn, can either listen to or
modify (fake) the messages passing through this channel. The insecure channel
automaton should be seen as a completely passive pipe. Furthermore, it has been
introduced for modeling reasons, and it acts as the door for the intruder automaton
to interact with the other participants. This automaton has been introduced mainly
for structural reasons, given the absence, in the TA world, of any structural no-
tion of channels names over which the automata can synchronize. Automata just
synchronize on actions. To give a short, and naive, comparison with process al-
gebras, in that world a third party may synchronize with others by synchronizing
on the same channel (performing a complementary action, i.e., a send or a receive
action). Instead, in the presented architecture, the way for the intruder to listen to
and inject new messages back is through this added automaton.
When verifying security properties for (cryptographic) communication pro-
tocols, it is indeed quite common to include an additional intruder ( a la Dolev-
Yao [DY83]) component that is supposed to be malicious and whose aim is to
subvert the protocol’s correct behaviour. A protocol specification is consequently
considered secure with respect to a security property if it satisfies this property
despite the presence of the intruder. Based on the approach of [Lyn99], the in-
secure channel and the intruder are modelled by team automata TIC and TX . We
thus propose a framework of four types of team automata:
1. TS plays the role of the protocol’s initiator,
2. TR plays the role of the protocol’s responder,
3. TIC plays the role of the insecure channel, and
4. TX plays the role of the active and malicious intruder.
We do not explicitly model the team automata of our framework, but we infor-
mally describe them by their interactions. More precisely, we let the initiator and
the responder communicate with the insecure channel through disjoint sets of ac-
tions ΣScom and Σ
R
com, respectively, such that a direct communication between them
is impossible. The TIC , in its turn, can interact with the intruder only through a
distinct set ΣIcom of actions. Finally, some particular actions may be used by an
honest role in order to reveal some information to the outside concerning, e.g.,
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a state reached during a run of the protocol. In Figure 4.1 we have depicted the












Figure 4.1: An insecure communication scenario for team automata.
We let TP denote the team automata representing our protocol specification in the
absence of the intruder. We thus define TP to be the max-ai team automaton over





all messages passing through the insecure channel (e.g., ΣPcom = {Pub, Pub′} in
Figure 4.1). Hence
TP = hideΣPcom( ||| {TS , TR, TIC}).
Recall that, with previously defined notations, the shortcut {Pub, Pub′} stands for
{Pub(m), Pub′(m) | m ∈ Messages}. By hiding ΣPcom, these actions are no longer
available for synchronizations in further team automata composed over TP . To its
environment, TP thus appears as a black box, possibly with some output actions
ΣSsig and Σ
R
sig—signalling the successful reception of messages. Usually such
signals are used only for verification purposes and for the sequel we assume that
ΣSsig ∩ Σ
R
sig = ∅ (e.g., ΣSsig = {Reveal} and ΣRsig = {Reveal′} in Figure 4.1).
We let TI denote the team automaton representing our protocol specification
in the presence of the intruder. Actions ΣIcom serve as the back-door for intrusion
and are added to TIC (e.g., ΣIcom = {Eve, Eve′} in Figure 4.1). This is exactly
what we need to guarantee that the intruder TX may communicate with TP only
through the insecure channel. We thus define TI to be the max-ai team automaton
over {TP , TX} that is obtained after hiding the actions ΣIcom, i.e., all messages that
the intruder can eavesdrop from and inject back into the insecure channel. We thus
enforce maximal synchronization between the intruder and the protocol. Hence
TI = hideΣIcom( ||| {TP , TX})
101
We have now defined an insecure communication scenario for team automata by
composing a secure communication scenario with an intruder.
4.5 Reformulating GNDC in terms of TA
In this section, a re-formulation of GNDC in terms of TA is given ([BLP03,
BLP04b]). GNDC, the general schema for defining security properties, has been
already presented in its original version (i.e., in terms of process algebras) in
Chapter 3.
We begin by instantiating TP to be a team automaton modelling communi-
cation between an initiator and a set of responders through the use of an inse-
cure channel, in the style of the team automaton TP considered in the insecure
communication scenario of Section 4.4. To this aim, we let TP be specified
as TP = {Q, (Σinp, Σout, Σint), δ, I}. Because the original definition of GNDC
(Chapter 3, Section 2.4, Definition 13) requires P to communicate with X through
the channels contained in C, we require a set C = Cinp∪Cout of actions Cinp that
are input to X and actions Cout that are output to X , and for which C ∩ΣPext 6= ∅
and C ∩ ΣPcom = ∅. This resembles requiring TP to be able to communicate
with the intruder TX only by executing actions in ΣIcom (e.g., {Eve, Eve′} in Fig-
ure 4.1). In the sequel we thus assume C to coincide exactly with ΣIcom and, in
particular, Cinp with the actions in ΣIcom that are input to TX (e.g., {Eve} in Fig-
ure 4.1) and Cout with the actions in ΣIcom that are output to TX (e.g., {Eve′} in
Figure 4.1). We are now able to formalize the hostile environment EC in terms of
team automata as
EC = {(Q, (Σinp, Σout, Σint), δ, I) | Σinp ⊆ Cinp, Σout ⊆ Cout}. (4.1)
In addition, the original GNDC definition requires the initial knowledge of the
environment to be bound to a specified set of messages φ. This informally means
that the environment should be able to produce, by means of only its internal
functioning, at most the messages contained in D(φ). In terms of team automata
this means that a component automaton in the environment, when considered as
a stand-alone component, can only execute output actions belonging to C(D(φ)).
This is formally defined by restricting its behaviour to those sequences consist-
ing of solely output actions since—at a more abstract level—these are the se-
quences that it can produce without receiving any additional messages from out-
side, i.e., by exploiting only its own knowledge. Let, for a team automaton T ,
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IdΓ(BT ) = {γ ∈ BT | γ ∈ Γ
∗}, where Γ is a set of actions. Consequently,
the initial knowledge of T is defined as IdΣTout(BT ). The formal definition of the
environment EφC in terms of team automata now thus becomes
EφC = {X ∈ EC | Id
ΣXout(BX ) ⊆ (C(D(φ)))
∗}. (4.2)
Finally, we need a behavioral notion of comparison between team automata which
abstracts from their internal and communicating actions. Furthermore, we also
require that some predefined set C of actions is prevented from being executed
by a fortiori excluding all sequences in which they do occur. Therefore, we hide
those output actions involved in communications and we define the observational
behaviour (with respect to actions not in C) of the resulting team automata as
those subsequences of the (remaining) external behaviour that consist solely of
actions not in C.
Definition 22 Let T = (Q, (Σinp, Σout, Σint), δ, I) be a team automaton over S ,
let Σcom ⊆ Σext and let T ′ = hideΣcom(T ).
Then the observational behaviour of T ′ with respect to actions not in C, de-
noted by OCT ′ , is dened as
O
C





As a result we are able to reformulate the definition of GNDC (given in Chap-
ter 3 within a process algebraic framework) in terms of team automata.
Definition 23 Let α(TP) be the expected (correct) behaviour of TP . Then
TP ∈ GNDC
α(TP )
⊆ iff ∀X ∈ EφC : OChideC( ||| {TP ,X}) ⊆ α(TP).
Informally, Definition 23 says that TP (i.e., a cryptographic communication proto-
col specified in the insecure communication scenario) satisfies GNDC α(TP )⊆ if and
only if its observational behaviour, despite communicating with any intruder X
through the actions C, is included in α(TP) (i.e., the expected correct behaviour
of the communication protocol specified by TP ). A significative instance of α
is, e.g., αint(TP ) = OCTP , which will be make precise and used in Section 4.6
to express integrity. Additionally, Definition 23 requires the intruder to be any
team automaton able to interact with TP through the actions C and with an initial
knowledge bound to D(φ).
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4.5.1 Security analysis strategies for TA
While allowing a uniform approach to specifying security properties, Definition 23
does not provide effective strategies for the security analysis of (cryptographic)
communication protocols. The universal quantification over EφC causes serious
problems when deciding whether TP ∈ GNDC
α(TP )
⊆ . However, the theory devel-
oped for GNDC in terms of process algebras inspires similar methodologies for
team automata.
The Most General Intruder. As a first analysis strategy we give a static char-
acterization of the intruder, not involving the universal quantification of Defini-
tion 23.
One reasonable way to avoid the infinite number of checks that the universal
quantification would require is to study whether there is an attacker that is more
powerful (with respect to a chosen behavioral relation) than all the others. In this
way one can reduce the analysis against any environment to an analysis against
only one, albeit very powerful, so-called most general intruder. From the theory
of GNDC [FGM04] we know that a sufficient condition for the existence of such
a most general intruder, is to have a behavioral relation that is a pre-congruence
with respect to the (parallel) composition and restriction operators. Restated in our
framework we say that / is a pre-congruence (with respect to ||| and hideC) if for
every automaton T , X and X ′ in EC , whenever BCX / B
C
X ′ then O
C
hideC( ||| {T ,X}) /
O
C
hideC( ||| {T ,X ′}). It is not difficult to prove that this is true in our case, viz.






X ′ implies OChideC( ||| {T ,X}) ⊆ O
C
hideC( ||| {T ,X ′}).




X ′ . By (4.1),
ΣXext ⊆ C because X ∈ EC . Then by Definition 22, for all i ∈ [n], ai ∈
ΣText − C. We now use that by definition also all prefixes of a1 · · · an are in-
cluded in OChideC( ||| {T ,X}) and show by induction that all prefixes of a1 · · · an are
also included in OChideC( ||| {T ,X ′}). First consider a1. By Definition 22, either
a1 ∈ BhideC( ||| {T ,X}) or b1 · · · bma1 ∈ BhideC( ||| {T ,X}), for some m ≥ 1 and
where, for all j ∈ [m], bj is an internal action of hideC( ||| {T ,X}). In both cases,
since BCX ⊆ B
C
X ′ and ai ∈ Σ
T
ext − C, for all i ∈ [n], it follows by Definition 22
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that a1 ∈ OChideC( ||| {T ,X ′}). Now assume that a1 · · · ak ∈ O
C
hideC( ||| {T ,X ′}), with
k < n, and consider a1 · · · ak+1. Using similar arguments as above and the induc-
tion hypothesis it follows that a1 · · · ak+1 ∈ OChideC( ||| {T ,X ′}). 2
Since EφC ⊆ EC , this lemma holds for X ,X
′ ∈ EφC as well. Based on the
approach of [FM99] we now define a component automaton TopφC , representing
the most general intruder mentioned above, in order to circumvent the universal
quantification of Definition 23. Recall that the set C of predicates that the intruder
uses to interact with the insecure channel is partitioned into Cinp and Cout, i.e., the
channel names the intruder uses to retrieve messages from and to inject messages
back into the insecure channel, respectively (e.g., in Figure 4.1, Cinp = {Eve} and
Cout = {Eve
′}).
We specify TopφC in the way that I/O automata are commonly defined [Lyn99,
LT89]. Its states are thus defined by the current values of the variables listed under
States, while its transitions are defined, per action a, as preconditions (Pre) and
effect (Eff), i.e., (q, a, q′) is a transition of TopφC if the precondition of a is satisfied
byq, while q′ is the transformation of q defined by the effect of a. We omit the
precondition of an action when it is true.
Recall that C (Cinp, Cout) is a shortcut for C(Messages) (Cinp(Messages),





Inp: Cinp(Messages) Out: Cout(Messages) Int:
∅
States
received ⊆ Messages, initially φ
Transitions
c(m) ∈ Cinp(Messages) c(m) ∈ Cout(Messages)
Eff: received := received∪{m} Pre: m ∈ D(received)
The asymmetry between input and output relies on the fact that the automaton
has the capability to possibly apply the rules from its inference system to the
messages it receives. In other words, TopφC could not act as a passive pipe only.
The general way in which TopφC is specified implies that its behaviour includes
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that of any automaton from EφC .
Lemma 10 For all X ∈ EφC , BCX ⊆ BCTopφC
.
Proof. Let X ∈ EφC . Then (4.2) implies that X ∈ EC and thus, by (4.1)
and the specification of TopφC , Σ
X


















Lemmata 9 and 10 directly imply the following result.
Theorem 2 For all X ∈ EφC , OChideC( ||| {TP ,X}) ⊆ O
C
hideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC})
.
Together with Definition 23, this gives us the following result.
Corollary 3 Let α(TP) be as in Denition 23. Then
TP ∈ GNDC
α(TP )
⊆ iff OChideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC}) ⊆ α(TP).
Compositionality results. We now describe some compositionality results for
the insecure communication scenario of Section 4.4. To begin with, we let
T1 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TS , TIC}) and T2 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TR, TIC}).
We then let TP be the team automaton defined at the end of Section 4.4, i.e., with
ΣIcom = C added to TIC .
Now TP thus represents the communication scenario in which an initiator and
a responder are connected by an insecure channel, but not yet connected to an
intruder. If we add the most general intruder, some general compositional results
can be proved. To this aim we let




2 = hideC( ||| {T2 , Top
φ
C}).
Lemma 11 Let {m | {c(m) ∈ ΣPcom} ⊆ φ. Then
O
C















sig. Now let T
′′ = hideC( ||| { ||| {T1 , T2}, TopφC}). Then it remains to








}. Since ΣSsig ∩ Σ
R
sig = ∅, this however
follows directly from the fact that {m | {c(m) ∈ ΣPcom} ⊆ φ, i.e., adding TR (TS )
to T ′1 (T
′




sig) which TS (TR) can output
because all messages that TR (TS ) can send to TIC have already been included in
the initial knowledge of TopφC . 2
Before continuing, we observe the following property of full synchronized
shuffles.
Remark 2 Let ∆i, with i ∈ [4], be alphabets and let Li ⊆ ∆∗i . Then clearly
||
{∆1,∆3}
{L1, L3} ⊆ || {∆2,∆4} {L2, L4} whenever L1 ⊆ L2 and L3 ⊆ L4.
Theorem 3 If T1 ∈GNDCO
C
T1










Proof. Let T1 ∈ GNDCO
C
T1
⊆ and T2 ∈ GNDC
OCT2







⊆ OCT2 and thus, by Lemma 11 and Remark 2, O
C
















4.6 Analysis of the EMSS protocol by TA
In this section we use the GNDC schema in terms of team automata together with
the insecure communication scenario for team automata in order to show that in-
tegrity is guaranteed in the deterministic (1,2) schema of the EMSS protocol. Note
that this has already been validated in [MPV03], where a CCS-like process alge-
bra was used instead, and the results of the analysis have been shown in Chapter 3.
Our goal here is thus to use this particular case study to show the effectiveness of
team automata for security analysis. Moreover, their use is not limited to proving
integrity, but also security properties like secrecy and entity authentication can be
verified. The important aspect is that these properties can be defined through a
preorder relation on team automata.
In the following, we refer to the specification given in Section 4.3. We define
integrity as the ability of TR to accept a message mi, for any i, only as the ith mes-
sage sent by TS . We moreover assume that TR signals the acceptance of a stream
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of messages as a legitimate one by issuing it as a list of messages through special
actions {Reveal′}. In this case study, TS does not output any such signals. We re-
quire the expected (correct) observational behaviour αint(TP) of TP with respect to
integrity as OCTP , i.e., as all prefixes of Reveal
′(m0)Reveal
′(m1) · · · Reveal
′(mlast).
Note that following the notation introduced at the beginning of Section 4.4, ac-
tions may henceforth be written as composed terms, e.g., Reveal′(m0)’s outer-
most part Reveal′ is a predicate symbol while its innermost part m0 is an atomic
formula.
Consequently, we equip TopφC with an initial knowledge φ consisting of all
output actions of TS and the public key pk(TS ), i.e., φ = {P0, P1, Pi, Psign | 2 ≤
i ≤ last} ∪ {pk(TS )}, where P0 = 〈m0, ∅, ∅〉, P1 = 〈m1, h(P0), ∅〉, Pi =
〈mi, h(Pi−1), h(Pi−2)〉, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ last, and Psign = 〈{h(Plast), h(Plast−1)}sk(TS )〉.
We do so solely for analysis reasons, viz. in order to enable TopφC to send the cor-
rect messages to TR through the insecure channel when analyzing the max-ai team
automaton over T2 and TopφC (cf. the forthcoming proof of Proposition 10). Note
that the messages contained in its initial knowledge are exactly those that it is
anyway able to receive in the max-ai team automaton over TP and TopφC by eaves-
dropping when TS sends them through the insecure channel. As is common in
security analysis, we rely on the perfect encryption assumption, i.e., TopφC cannot
deduce sk(TS ) from φ nor can it forge hash and encryption functions by guess-
ing. We also assume that there are no unintended clashes. Hence the observa-
tional behaviour of the max-ai team automaton over T1 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TS , TIC})
and TopφC is empty, i.e.,
Proposition 9 T1 ∈ GNDC ∅⊆.
Proof. Directly by Corollary 3 because OChideC( ||| {T1 ,TopφC}) = ∅. 2
The way in which the receiver verifies the messages it receives implies that the
observational behaviour of the max-ai team automaton over
T2 = hideΣPcom( ||| {TR, TIC}) and Top
φ
C is thus included in the expected observa-
tional behaviour αint(TP) of TP with respect to integrity, i.e.,
Proposition 10 T2 ∈ GNDC
αint(TP )
⊆ .
Proof. The proof distinguishes two cases. If TR does not output any ac-
tion Reveal′(mi), for all payloads mi, then its empty output behaviour is trivially
included in αint(TP). Next assume that TR outputs actions Reveal′(mi), for all
payloads mi. To do so, the definition of the EMSS protocol guarantees that TR
108 Chapter 4
must have verified that Psign was signed with sk(TS ). Because TopφC cannot de-
duce this private key from its initial knowledge and none of the team automata
ever outputs this private key, it follows that TopφC does not know sk(TS ). Since
digital signatures and hash functions cannot be forget by the intruder, the only
possibility for TR to output the Reveal′(mi), for all payloads mi, is that TopφC has
sent TR all the correct packages in the correct order. This shows why, in absence
of TS , we had to equip TopφC with an initial knowledge consisting of all output
actions of TS . Hence TR must output all payloads mi in the correct order and thus
O
C
hideC( ||| {T2 ,TopφC})
⊆ αint(TP) because the behaviour of any team automaton is
prefix closed. 2
Finally, after an observation on the composition of team automata that have
no internal actions, we can show that integrity is guaranteed in the instance of the
EMSS protocol under scrutiny.
Remark 3 If {T , T } is a composable system, then clearly B ||| {T ,T } = BT .
Proposition 11 TP ∈ GNDC
αint(TP )
⊆ .
















hideC( ||| { ||| {T1 ,T2 },TopφC})
⊆ αint(TP) by Corollary 3. Since TIC has no inter-
nal actions, {TIC , TIC} forms a composable system. It then follows from Re-
marks 1 and 3 that B ||| { ||| {T1 ,T2 },TopφC} = B ||| {TS ,TR,TIC ,TopφC} = B ||| {TP ,TopφC} and
consequently OChideC( ||| { ||| {T1 ,T2 },TopφC})
= OChideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC})
by Definition 22.
Hence OChideC( ||| {TP ,TopφC})




4.7 Garbled circuits and secure agents
The last part of this chapter is devoted to present the results obtained in the area
of privacy and secure agents within a TA scenario. Full details in [EP04].
The soundness and privacy properties of the protocol of [CCKM00] follow
from mathematical results based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We ab-
stract out from the details and are interested in the behaviour of the actors (the
agent, the agent’s source and the hosts that are visited by the agent) at a higher
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level. Our description of the protocol focuses on the interactions between the ac-
tors. We give as much insight on the cryptographic bases on which the protocol
relies, as is sufficient for our arguments. We refer to [CCKM00] for a detailed
description.
We confine ourselves to the simpler case of the “honest but curious model,” in
which actors are supposed to follow the protocol correctly, but they might try to
learn the private inputs of the other parties.
The goal of the design is a secure agent that travels through many hosts col-
lecting sensitive information and then back to its source; back home, it will be
able to deliver the result of a computation on inputs collected at the various hosts
together with the source’s input. The security feature that the protocol aims at is
privacy of all the inputs, that is no party learns the inputs of any other party.
The idea is to combine in a cascade Yao style garbled circuits [Yao86]. The
software agent travels from host to host collecting private information in the form
of a (portion of) garbled circuit. The circuit (potentially software) is actually data,
since it can only be evaluated to a single value once it has been brought back to
the agent’s source.
4.7.1 Garbled circuits
A garbled circuit is a generalization of a circuit, with the following properties:
• each wire can carry one of two specified random strings (not just bits 0/1),
the random strings changing from wire to wire (the pair of strings on each
wire have semantical interpretation 0 and 1);
• for each gate a specific computational rule is given, that defines how the
random strings in input are to be combined to produce the output, which is
again a random string (the semantical interpretation of a gate is a NAND or
a XOR, for instance).
The garbled inputs are the random strings of each input wire whose semanti-
cal value is the value of the corresponding input bit. The decoding of the output is
a translation of the random strings on the output wires to their semantical mean-
ings. The garbled circuit is a description of the structure of the circuit together
with computational rules for each node but no information on the random strings
carried by each wire.
The following holds (see [Rog91]):
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Lemma 12 (Indistinguishability) For any two actors C and D knowing the gar-
bled circuit, if C only knows the garbled version of D’s input (and not the other
random strings carried by D’s input wires) garbled circuit evaluation will not dis-
close more information than if C ran the protocol assuming any random input for
D.
4.7.2 The Wannabe Traveller
For a lighter exposition, and without loss of generality, we present the protocol
in the specific setting of an actor W (the Wannabe Traveller) who dispatches an
agent in quest of the best offer for a holiday on a tropical island.
The agent visits travel agencies Agj , chosen according to some policy that we
do not specify here. At each agency, it browses the catalogue and requests the best
offer for a holiday matching conditions on the destination, the period, the services,
etc., that W requires.
We assume that travel agencies want the privilege of tailoring their offers to
the specific client, and therefore prefer that the offer be known only if it is highly
likely to be accepted. Moreover each agency does not want that its offer be known
to competitors. On the other hand, W does not want to disclose in advance her
budget, to avoid that travel agents use it as an information to adjust their offer.
Assuming correctness, this leads us to the following definition of the privacy goals
we aim at:
Definition 24 (Privacy) W’s agent respects privacy if
1. W cannot determine any other offer but the lowest one less than or equal to
her budget, if it exists;
2. each agency cannot learn W’s budget, nor the offer of any other agency.
4.7.3 The Wannabe-Traveller protocol
Our analysis is focused on the privacy aspects. Therefore we only consider the
agent’s functionality related to privately (in the sense described above) convey-
ing to W the best offer. Also, we will not model the agent itself as a separate
entity. Rather, the agent is represented by a sequence of actions which it repeats
identically at each host visited: the collection of sensitive data.
For simplicity, we first consider the case of an agent that visits a single host.
W is the source of the agent, and Ag is the host that the agent visits.
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In our setting, Ag constructs a garbled circuit that on input 〈id1, x〉, 〈id2, y〉,
outputs computes 〈idmin, min(x, y)〉, where idmin = id1 if x = min(x, y) and
is id2 otherwise. We call this function tagged minimum. (The description and
analysis that follow are absolutely independent of the specific function computed
by the garbled circuit.)
Let inputW (resp. inputAg) be W’s (resp. Ag’s) private input.
In order to evaluate the circuit on 〈idW , inputW 〉 and 〈idAg, inputAg〉, W must
learn the garbled circuit, the decoding information of the output and the values of
her and Ag’s garbled inputs. Ag must not learn W’s input. In order to transfer
to W the garbled inputs corresponding to W’s input 〈idW , inputW 〉, without Ag’s
learning the value of the input itself, the two parties use an oblivious transfer (OT)
protocol [BM89]. (Also see [CCKM00] for the implementation of a one-round
oblivious transfer; we assume that W and Ag share a pseudo random generator
and a seed.)
Let β be W’s committal data for OT, referred to 〈idW , inputW 〉. Let GC =
gc(〈idAg, inputAg〉, OT (β)) be the garbled circuit computed by Ag, with Ag’s in-
put hardwired into it, and information OT (β) attached to it, for obliviously trans-
ferring to W her garbled input. We denote by decode the decoding information
for the output.
Then the protocol is as follows:
W−→Ag : β
Ag−→W : 〈GC, decode〉
W computes the single value tagged min(〈idAg, inputAg〉, 〈idW , inputW 〉).
Assuming correctness, the protocol guarantees privacy in the sense of Defini-
tion 24:
Lemma 13 (Privacy–two parties) In the honest but curious model, assuming
correctness of the protocol, the two party protocol above guarantees privacy in
the sense of Denition 24.
See [CCKM00] for a proof.
In the general case, the agent visits many hosts. We assume, without loss of
generality, that the agent travels from W to Ag1 to Ag2 and so on, and then back
from Agn to W .
We generalize and complete the notation that we used for the two-party case.
Let inputW be the private input of W, and inputj be the private input of Agj . As
above, let β be W’s commitment to 〈idW , inputW 〉.
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Ag1 computes a garbled circuit GC1 = gc(〈id1, input1〉, OT (β)) as in the
two-party protocol above. It then forwards 〈GC1, decode1〉 to Ag2. (The OT
data for Alice attached to GC1 will be forwarded to Alice along with the garbled
circuit.)
All other agencies will compute garbled circuits for the tagged minimum func-
tion and combine it in cascade one after the other.
For j > 1, let gcj = gc(〈idj, inputj〉, transl(decodej−1)) be the garbled cir-
cuit computed by Agj , with input 〈idj, inputj〉 hardwired to it, and translation
information transl(decodej−1) for translating the garbled output of the cascade
of circuits GCj−1 computed by agencies Ag1 through Agj−1 to a garbled input for
gcj . Then, GCj is gcj concatenated to GCj−1. Let decodej be the instructions for
decoding its output.
Agj forwards to Agj+1 〈GCj, decodej〉.
W receives the output of AGn as if she were an AGn+1, and evaluates it.
The protocol is summarized below (W−→∗ describes W’s output of the final
value).
W−→Ag1 : β
Agj−→Agj+1 : 〈GCj, decodej〉 j =1,. . .,n− 1
Agn−→W : 〈GCn, decoden〉
W−→∗ : eval(GCn, decoden, β)
Lemma 14 (Cascade of garbled circuits) For all j = 1, . . . , n,
1. a polynomially bounded actor cannot infer the private inputs of W and
Ag1, . . . , Agj from the garbled circuit 〈GCj, decodej〉;
2. moreover, with knowledge of W’s (garbled) input, a polynomially bounded
actor cannot infer the private inputs of Ag1, . . . , Agj .
Proof. [Sketch] For j = 1, the thesis follows from Lemma 13. For j > 1, it can
be proven inductively, based on Lemma 12. 2
We use TA to prove the following privacy property:
Theorem 4 (Privacy—many parties) In the honest but curious model, assuming
correctness of the protocol, the multi-party protocol above guarantees privacy in
the sense of Denition 24.
The proof of the theorem is given in the sequel as it follows from our TA analysis.
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Notation
For convenience of the reader, we summarize the notation that we used to describe
the protocol.
• tagged min(〈t1, x1〉, 〈t2, x2〉) = 〈tmin, min(x1, x2)〉, where
tmin =
{
t1 if x1 = min(x1, x2)
t2 otherwise;
• inputW is the private input of W;
• inputAg is the private input of Ag in the two-party protocol;
• inputj is the private input of Agj in the multi-party protocol;
• β is W’s committal data for OT, referred to 〈idW , inputW 〉.
• GC = gc(〈idAg, inputAg〉, OT (β)) is the garbled circuit computed by Ag,
with Ag’s input hardwired into it, and information OT (β) attached to it, for
obliviously transferring to W her garbled input, in the two-party case;
• decode is the decoding information for the output of GC;
• GC1 = gc(〈id1, input1〉, OT (β)) is the garbled circuit analogous to GC
above, computed by AG1 in the multi-party protocol;
• decodej is the decoding information for the output of garbled circuit GCj;
• for j > 1, gcj = gc(〈idj, inputj〉, transl(decodej−1)) is the garbled circuit
computed by Agj , with input 〈idj, inputj〉 hardwired to it, and translation
information transl(decodej−1) for translating the garbled output of the cas-
cade of circuits computed by agencies Ag1 through Agj−1 to a garbled input
for gcj;
• GCj is gcj concatenated to GCj−1;
• eval(GCn, decoden, β) denotes evaluation of circuit GCn with decoding in-
formation decoden to interpret the output and additional input β to complete
the OT.
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4.8 The Wannabe-Traveller protocol modelled by TA
We now show how TA can be used to model the Wannabe Traveller protocol. We
model the Wannabe Traveller W by a CA TW , the set {Agj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} of travel
agencies by CA TAg1 , . . . , TAgn .
Let Input denote the set of pairs {〈idj, inputj〉 | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}∪{〈id0, inputW 〉}
where inputj (resp. inputW ) is a string that is private to Agj (resp. to W).
Let Computed denote the set of garbled circuits.
Let β be W’s OT commitment data. Let Decode denote the set {decodej |
0 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ {β} where decodej (j = 1, . . . , n) is the decoding information for
the output of circuit GCj .
Then TAgj uses the function gc : Input× Decode → Computed to com-
pute the garbled circuit gcj and the function || : Computed× Computed →
Computed to build up the circuit GCj consisting of the cascade of garbled cir-
cuits gc1 through gcj .
Let Result = Input. Then, TW evaluates the final result using the function
eval : Computed× Decode× Input → Result.
For each j = 1, . . . , n, define Pj = 〈GCj, decodej〉 and P0 = β. Then,
Messages denotes the set {Pj | 0 ≤ j ≤ n} ∪ Result.
As in previous sections, we specify TA in the way IOA are commonly de-
fined [Lyn99, LT89].
In all the specifications, we explicitly prohibit loops, i.e., we allow each action
to be performed only once. See, for example, the specification of TAg1 . As soon
as TAg1 has received P0, then precondition P0 /∈ received prevents this action to
be executed again.










Pre: Pj−1 /∈ received
Eff: received := received ∪ {Pj−1}
Computej
Pre: Pj−1 ∈ received ∧GCj /∈ computed
Eff: computed := computed ∪ {GCj}
Pj
Pre: GCj ∈ computed ∧ Pj /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {Pj}
The input behaviour BΣinpTAgj of TAgj (j = 1, . . . , n) consists of Pj−1. When
TAgj receives message Pj−1, then TAgj is able to perform an internal computation
leading to an internal behaviour BΣintTAgj consisting of Computej . Finally, the output
behaviour BΣoutTAgj of TAgj , (j = 1, . . . , n) consists of Pj .
We continue with the specification of TW . It is capable to output a commit-
ment β to inputW . Then, it is capable of receiving as input behaviour the last
circuit and the last decoding instructions to evaluate the final result min by start-
ing from what she has received and from inputW , by means of function eval.
Finally, TW outputs the final result min.
TW — Wannabe Traveller
Actions
Inp: {Pn}
Out: {P0} ∪ {min}
Int: {EvalGCn}
States
received, sent ⊆ Messages, result ⊆ Result, all initially ∅
Transitions
Pn
Pre: Pn /∈ received
Eff: received := received ∪ {Pn}
P0
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Pre: P0 /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {P0}
EvalGCn
Pre: Pn ∈ received ∧min /∈ result
Eff: result := result ∪ {min}
min
Pre: min ∈ result ∧min /∈ sent
Eff: sent := sent ∪ {min}
The input behaviour BΣinpTW of TW is clearly represented by Pn. When TW
receives message Pn, then TW is able to perform an internal computation leading





Now, we enforce maximal synchronization between the traveller and the agen-
cies. Thus, the max-ai TA over {TW , TAgj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, denoted by TWT , is
defined as
TWT = ||| {TW , TAgj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n},
which formalizes the Wannabe Traveller protocol. From the way CA are com-
posed, the resulting team has no input actions, while it has the union of the output
(internal) actions of TW and the TAgj ’s as its output (internal) actions.
4.8.1 Privacy
In this section, we show, through the use of TA, that W’s agent respects privacy,
in the sense of Definition 24, in the multiparty case (n > 1).
We abstract from the syntax details concerning the operations according to
which messages can be manipulated, but, as already seen in the previous sections,
we assume the presence of an inference system (defined by a derivation operator
`) that implements these operations.
We restrict the initial knowledge of an automaton A to be bound to a specified
set of messages φA. This informally means that the automaton should be able to
produce, by means of only its internal functioning, at most the messages contained
in D(φA). More specifically, when considered as a stand-alone component, the
automaton can only execute output actions belonging to D(φA).
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The initial knowledge can be increased to the set φ′A during the execution of
the protocol by the messages the automaton receives. Accordingly, the automaton
knowledge becomes at most D(φ′A).
We use this notion of knowledge to model privacy. (In order to restrict in a re-
alistic way the inference power of an automaton, we assume, as usual, polynomial
boundedness.)
Throughout the analysis, we abstract from the internal computations of the
single automata. This is justified by the following: since we are interested in
privacy properties, we care about the information flow between the principals,
rather than about their internal computations. Thus, in the following we restrict
our survey to analyze external actions of our system.
First, we show that W cannot determine any other offer but the lowest one less
than or equal to her budget, if it exists (Definition 24(i)).
We must analyze how the knowledge of W is altered in the course of protocol
execution. We want to highlight the interactions of W with the rest of the sys-
tem. Therefore, since we choose to take W’s standpoint, communications between
agencies, and any distinction among them, are of no interest. So, we combine
agencies into a unique block that interacts with W in a way that is indistinguish-
able from the original system.
We obtain this by defining TW as the max-ai TA over {TAgj | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} that





i.e., all messages that the travel agencies exchange with each other:
TW = hideΣcom( ||| {TAg1 , . . . , TAgn})
Thus, TW appears as a black box, with some input and output actions it will
use to interact with the environment. In our setting W plays the role of the en-
vironment. Intuitively, this reflects the nature of the protocol itself: W delegates
to its agent the choice of the agencies to visit, and does not need to (and cannot)








Proof. The equality follows from the construction of TW . 2
We can now use Proposition 12 to prove the part of Theorem 4 relative to
Definition 24(i):
Proof of Theorem 4 (part 1):
By construction, the initial knowledge of TW is bound to φW = {β, inputW}.
By definition of the automaton knowledge, the only way in which TW can signif-
icantly increase its knowledge is by performing input actions. To correctly model












From the way TAgn is composed, it follows that Σ
TAgn
out = {〈GCn, decoden〉}. From
Section 4.8, it follows that 〈GCn, decoden〉 will be executed, and it will be exe-
cuted only once. Thus, BΣoutTAgn = 〈GCn, decoden〉.
The latter, Proposition 12 and Equation (4.3) imply that the knowledge of
TW becomes at most D(φ′W ), with φ
′
W = {β, inputW , 〈GCn, decoden〉}. Then,
by Lemma 14, and since we are assuming correctness (i.e., GCn is exactly the
garbled circuit computing the (tagged) minimum among all of the private inputs),
we conclude that, if W is polynomially bounded, the privacy property of Defini-
tion 24(i) holds.
The proof of the second privacy property (Definition 24(ii)) is very similar.
This time we take the standpoint of Agj , for any fixed j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Again
we view the rest of the system as a unique block that interacts with Agj in a
way that is indistinguishable from the way that the collection of the single actors
interact with it. To this end we build the following TA:


























= BΣoutTW , if j = 1.
Proof. The equalities follow from the construction of TAgj . 2
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 4:
Proof of Theorem 4 (part 2):
By construction, the initial knowledge of TAgj is bound to φAgj = {inputj}. By
definition of the automaton knowledge, the only way in which TAgj can signifi-
cantly increase its knowledge is by performing input actions. To correctly model










= BΣoutTW , if j = 1.







From the way TAgj−1 is composed, it follows that Σ
TAgj−1
out = {〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉}.
From Section 4.8, it follows that 〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉 will be executed, and it will
be executed only once. Thus, BΣoutTAgj−1 = 〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉. From similar argu-
ments, it follows that BΣoutTW = β.
The latter, Proposition 13 and Equation (4.4) imply that the knowledge of TAgj
becomes at most D(φ′Agj), with
φ′Agj =
{
{inputAgj , 〈GCj−1, decodej−1〉} if j > 1
{inputAgj , β} if j = 1.
Then, by Lemma 14 (if j > 1) or Lemma 13 (if j = 1) and since we are assuming
correctness, we conclude that, if all actors are polynomially bounded, the privacy
property of Definition 24(ii) holds.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.
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Chapter 5
The Digital Certicate Chapter
Formal models and analysis of secure
procedures for certificate delivery
5.1 Introduction
ANALYSIS TOOLS. In this chapter, a tool is presented for the automated, finite-
state verification of security properties in communication protocols. In particular,
the feasibility of the methodology is shown through two case studies, both inher-
ited from real applications that were born to manage the secure delivery of digital
certificates over computer networks.
However, our goal is not only focusing on the benefits of the tool. Indeed,
from the days it was first theoretically thought and practically developed, [MM99],
other formal tools for finite-state verification, involving also stochastic and timed
aspects, either have been developed or they have been further optimized through
successive updates. Their development has been so far concentrated on two for-
malisms, process algebras and finite state machine models. Each of them has
been, and currently is, largely exploited. Here, we cite and briefly discuss the
main features of two general-purpose verification tools, enriched with support for
cryptographic primitives, that are not the most recent, but that have been exten-
sively used also to analyze large case studies. They are Murφ and FDR, respec-
tively [SS98] and [Low96].
FDR is a refinement model checker for the process algebra CSP [RSG+00].
The basic idea is to model the correct behavior of the system as a process algebra
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agent, and the protocol specification as another process algebra agent. Then, the
tool can check if the specification is a refinement of its correct behaviour.
Murφ is a finite-state machine verification tool. Its verification method is to
use state enumeration with state assertion checking. It is an efficient brute-force
reachability analyzer.
In both of them (as well as within other frameworks for finite-state verifica-
tion), a specification is run exhaustively, and in a specific environment. Some-
times, the modeling process helps in finding bugs, even before running the spec-
ification by the tool itself. The motivations should be found in the fact that the
modeler is forced to think about the behavior of the protocol participants and the
intruder in a much more detailed manner than when writing a protocol specifi-
cation in a non-formal manner. On the other hand, in the past years troubles
with lack of crypto-specification/verification education came up. People design-
ing cryptographic protocols may lack expertise, augmenting the risks for a bug-
design version of a final product. Automating the verification process has been
proved to be really efficient in finding significant attacks, failures as well as weak-
nesses, to protocols considered correct even for many years (we refer to the intro-
duction of this thesis, where the paradigmatic example of the Needham-Schroeder
Public Key protocol has been discussed).
Here, we get onto the previous discussion, for underlining that the measure of
the right trade-off between i) the need for an automated verification methodology
(without which some systems would be honestly unfeasible to be checked), and
ii) the need for formalizing the model for a system (and the goals that that system
aims to) will be searched throughout the chapter.
CASE STUDIES. In the following, we consider (part of) the OpenCA soft-
ware and (part of) the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) as two case
studies.
OpenCA Labs (http://www.openca.org) is “an open organization aimed to pro-
vide a framework for Public Key Infrastructures studying and development of re-
lated projects”. In particular, the OpenCA developers aim at implementing open
source code to easily setup and manage Certification Authorities (CAs). Conse-
quently, the project provides specification for the whole lifetime of digital certifi-
cates, from their emission, through their maintenance, to their expiration. CAs
based on OpenCA are really distributed, since there are distinct servers to manage
certificates. Furthermore, certificate requests and their validation are performed
over the Internet.
SCEP is the evolution of some specification developed by Verisign Inc. and
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Cisco Systems and it is commercially available in both client and CA implemen-
tations. It gives specifications for digital certificate enrollment, access and revo-
cation, for certificates and CRL queries. In particular, SCEP was developed for
the distribution of digital certificates to network devices such as routers and gate-
ways (it is indeed its peculiarity, with respect to implementations like OpenCA,
to release certificates to machines, rather than to individuals). Our study is based
on the SCEP Internet Draft, [LMMN05] (that should be considered a work in
progress, as mentioned by the same authors of the draft).
CONTRIBUTIONS. The chapter offers the following contributions.
• We formally model and analyze (part of) the OpenCA source code and (part
of) the SCEP protocol. The results of the analysis are here reported.
With regard to the OpenCA enrollment procedure, we anticipate that it is
correct (at least, at conceptual level). Nevertheless, we focus our attention
on the leakage of some sensitive data stored in an on line server. If a mali-
cious adversary discovers these sensitive data, it can force the CA to issue
erroneous certificates, in which the public key of a honest user is not tied to
the identity of the user itself.
With regard to the security properties listed in the SCEP draft, we did not
find attacks, at least within an analysis scenario consisting of a finite number
of participants. While this does not suffice to ensure the absolute security
of the protocol in all circumstances, it does enhance the reliability of SCEP.
However, we notice a vulnerability concerning the emission of two digital
certificates with the same subject name/public key binding.
• The application of automated verification tools is useful to better understand
how certain mechanisms and checks ensure certain security features of com-
munication protocols. This might be useful in revealing causes of omitted
or erroneously implemented security checks. It might be also useful to ren-
der more comprehensive for those less expert some statements written in
technical documents, where often it is asserted that a security check is nec-
essary but rarely is the reason given. In order to understand the reason, we
simply omit the security check in the description of the protocol, run the
verification tool and wait for the result of the analysis. This methodology
is particularly useful to study security protocols in a formal way by suit-
ably changing the protocol description in order to simulate possible faults
and check the relative effect (as is common in so-called methodology “Fail-
ure Model and Effect Analysis” adopted in software engineering, see, e.g.,
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http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/ and [CG01]). In the future, it would be
really appealing to systematically create such case studies in the security
protocol analysis framework as done in [CG01] for safety in critical sys-
tems.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to give a formal
description of some security procedures from OpenCA and SCEP.
We underline that we do not advocate the cause of our tool more than the one
of other existing tools. Being this tool developed within our research team, it is
more appealing and practical for us to use it. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to compare the results obtained by using our tool with the ones obtaining using
other formal instruments.
SUMMARY. The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we sketch
the methodology of our approach in the security analysis of protocols with finite
state behaviour. In Section 5.3, we describe the structures of messages exchanged
between parties during the OpenCA enrollment phase. Section 5.4 reports the
results we have obtained upon analyzing the OpenCA enrollment phase. In Sec-
tion 5.5, we describe the structures of messages exchanged between parties during
the SCEP enrollment phase. Section 5.6 highlights the motivations for the need
of some forms of correctness checks in SCEP specifications: without them, the
protocol would be vulnerable to attack by adversaries.
5.2 Analysis approach
This chapter inherits the analysis approach fully illustrated in [Mar03]. Briefly, it
was spurred by the observation that security protocols can be described as systems
with some component following an unspecified behaviour. This may depend on
several factors, e.g., one can simply be unable to predict the whole behaviour of
a component within a system. Whatever the not specified term is, it would be ap-
pealing that the resulting system works properly (e.g., satisfies a certain property).
As already discussed, given the sensitive nature of a cryptographic protocol,
one can imagine the presence of a hostile adversary trying to interfere with the
normal execution of the protocol in order to achieve some advantage. Due to
the unpredictable behaviour of this adversary, this can be seen as an unspecified
component of the system under investigation. When considering formal languages
for the description of concurrent systems, such as CCS [Mil89] or CSP [RSG+00],
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a concurrent system S with, for example, two specified components A and B and
a third unspecified one, can be described as S = A | B | ( ), where | is the parallel
composition operator. The hole takes into account the presence of the adversary,
whose behaviour is unpredictable.
Starting from these premises, to formally verify a security property of a spec-
ification S implies the verification of the property over S with respect to every
possible hole (i.e., every possible adversary behaviour). The problem has been
discussed in details in [Mar03], and solved by extending the partial model check-
ing techniques of concurrent systems, [And95].
A system specification is here described through the operational language
called Crypto-CCS (presented in Chapter 2). The adversary acts according to
a Dolev-Yao model, [DY83], and it follows a set of message manipulating rules,
that are used, e.g., to model cryptographic functions like encryption and decryp-
tion. Like the honest participants, it is able to send and receive messages over a
set of channels. Also, it can intercept and forge messages. In part, it can derive
new messages from the set of messages that it knows at the beginning of the com-
putation. This set is called the intruder’s initial knowledge. On the other hand,
new messages are derived from the intercepted ones, obtained after the beginning
of the computation.
Encryption is opaque, i.e., a message encrypted with the public key of i can-
not be decrypted by anyone but the person who knows the correspondent private
key (unless the decryption key is compromised). The adversary can intercept an
encrypted message and it can replay the message later, but the structure of the
message is not accessible, i.e., the adversary cannot split the encrypted message
unless he knows the decryption key.
The intruder’s knowledge grows as the computation evolves. The analysis is
over that knowledge, i.e., it is checked if, at a certain point of the computation,
that knowledge satisfies a predicate involving a security property. In case of a
positive result, this consists of a report of the attack with respect to that property.
The development of the theory has lead to the implementation of a partial
model checker, namely the Partial Model Checking Security Analyzer (for short,
PAMOCHSA), through which it is possible to analyze distributed systems. In
the following, only systems with finite computations will be investigated. This is
possible since: 1) we do not allow recursion within Crypto-CCS; 2) the messages
are of a fixed structure (due to the fact that they are typed, see Appendix C); 3) a
finite number of parties and sessions running the protocol is considered; 4) even
if the adversary is allowed to generate fresh messages, their structure is subject to
126 Chapter 5
the same type constraints above mentioned.
It is worth noticing that, though maintaining the analysis over a finite number
of parties and sessions, the absence of attacks over a particular system running the
protocol does not guarantee that there are no attacks on larger systems running the
same protocol. However, [Low98, Sto98] show how, under some assumptions, the
correctness of a protocol with an unbounded number of parties and sessions can be
inferred from the correctness of the same protocol with finite parties and sessions.
Hopefully, mixing the approaches may contribute to the development of a fully
automated analysis.
The PAMOCHSA tool needs the following set of inputs: the protocol specifi-
cation; the security property to be checked; the initial knowledge of the intruder.
An example input file and the input language used to write the input file are given
in Appendix C.
In the following, the OpenCA and the SCEP enrollment phase will be infor-
mally described, by using the standard notation with which security protocols are
usually described in the literature. The notation has already been given in Chap-
ter 2.
We remind the interested reader that the functional language used when de-
veloping the theory (i.e., Crypto-CCS) and the specification input language for
PAMOCHSA are presented, respectively, in Chapter 2 and in Appendix C.
5.3 The OpenCA enrollment phase
OpenCA Labs is an open organization aimed to provide a framework for pub-
lic key infrastructures studying and development (http://www.openca.org). An
open source code has been developed, and it is being maintained, by the OpenCA
developers for the setup and management of Certification Authorities. This soft-
ware is actually a front end to the CA facilities offered by the OpenSSL soft-
ware (http://www.openssl.org). A formalization of the enrollment procedure of
OpenCA will follow.
The following entities are involved in the procedure:
• User (U), requesting a certificate.
• Enrollment Server (ES): a web server used by the users to make certificate
requests, import CA Certificate, import requested certificates and import
other users’ certs. In the investigated implementation, this server is activated
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on the same machine of the RA Server (they are indeed the same). All
the interactions between ES and the user are through SSL, [FKK96] (client
authentication is not required).
• Local Registration Authority Operator (LRA): trusted operators verifying
the correctness of a certificate request. In the investigated implementation,
only one operator will be considered.
• Registration Authority Server (RA): the web server to which LRA connects,
in order to approve certificate requests. Web connections between LRA and
RA are secured through SSL.
• Certification Authority Server (CA): the server where the private key of
the Certification Authority is kept. Actually, CA issues certificates. For
security needs, this is an off-line server, disconnected by any network. All
file transfers (Requests/Certificates/etc..) with other computers get executed
via removable support, e.g., floppies.
Hereafter, a correctly issued certificate (where the name of the user is tied
to its public key) is formalized through the name of the user and its public key,
both signed by CA’s private key, i.e., {nameU , pkU}pk−1ca . An abstraction of a
digital certificate is here considered, not involving fields like the validity period.
Given that the analysis in Section 5.4 involves the verification of a correct corre-
spondence between an identity and a public key, and it does not involve temporal
validity issues, the structure of the certificate has been here simplified for the sake
of readability.
Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 give a pictorial representation of the enrollment proce-
dure. Detailed explanation on the use of public keys pkc1, pkc2 and pkc3 are given
in Subsection 5.3.1. Here, we briefly anticipate that they serve as a modeling trick
to give, at least, confidentiality to the content of the communication.
1. U connects to ES and sends a certificate request consisting of its name
nameU , a newly created random number pinU , the public key to be cer-
tified pkU and the so-called Netscape SPKAC, i.e., its public key plus a
newly created random number nU , both signed with U’s private key pk−1U .
SPKAC acts as a Proof of Possession (POP), attesting that U, that is request-
ing to link its name to a public key, also owns the corresponding private key.
(Only someone who knows the private key can create that SPKAC.) nU is
inserted to prevent replay attacks. It is up to the recipient of the message to
128 Chapter 5
1 U 7→ ES : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {pkU , nU}pk−1
U
}pkc1
2 U 7→ LRA : {{nameU}pk−1
Gov
, pinU}pkc2
3.1 LRA 7→ RA : {nameU , pinU}pkc3
3.2 RA 7→ LRA : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {pkU , nU}pk−1
U
}pkc3









5 CA 7→ RA : {nameU , pkU}pk−1ca
6 ES 7→ U : {nameU , pkU}pk−1ca




































Figure 5.2: Graphical representation of the OpenCA enrollment procedure.
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store nU in order to detect later replays. In the OpenCA specification, this
message is sent across SSL. For our rendering of the transmission over SSL
the reader is invited to read the following Subsection 5.3.1, OpenCA model.
2. U personally reaches the LRA Operator to identify himself by means of
a valid paper, e.g., an identity card, and by showing the same pin already
present in the formulated request.
The identity card is here represented by nameU signed by the private key of
the Government, i.e., {nameU}pk−1
Gov
. It is assumed that it cannot be forged
nor leaked.
3. LRA connects to RA and approves the request corresponding to nameU
and pinU . In particular, LRA transmits to RA a query regarding a particular
pair identity-pin (step 3.1). Then, RA sends back the request received in
step 1 (step 3.2) (corresponding to that pair identity-pin). Finally, LRA
sends the request back signed with its private key pk−1LRA (step 3.3). Signing
the request means that LRA has personally identified who is requesting the
certificate and that there is a correspondence between name and pin received
in step 2 and what received in step 3.2. All these three steps are through
SSL. Again, the reader is referred to the next subsection for details.
4. The request is exported from RA to CA (through removable media).
5. Before issuing the certificate, CA operator must verify the presence of a
correct LRA signature over the request. Then, CA operator checks the cor-
rectness of SPKAC (by applying pkU that is present in message 4). If the
checks are satisfied, the certificate is issued and exported into RA (through
removable media).
6. Finally, U connects to ES and gets its certificate. (Note that in the investi-
gated implementation ES and RA coincide.)
5.3.1 OpenCA model
All the interactions with the Certification Authority Server (steps 4 and 5) are
via removable media through trusted operators. No adversary may intercept or
listened to the exchanged messages (at least with high probability).
As far as the other steps are concerned, some modeling assumptions of the
OpenCA enrollment are hereafter listed.
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• In the OpenCA implementation, steps 1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 are performed through
SSL connections. That means that data sent over the network are kept con-
fidential (i.e., only the intended recipients can understand the meaning of
those messages), and that the server identity is somehow authenticated to
prevent server spoofing.
Step 1 requires no client authentication, i.e., only the user must be assured
that the other party is actually the enrollment server to which it is to request
a certificate.
On the contrary, steps 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 require both client (LRA) and server
(RA) authentication, i.e., both RA and LRA must be assured about the iden-
tity of the interlocutor.
To completely model the overall architecture, the SSL protocol should be
encoded within the formalization. To avoid the entire encoding, some confi-
dential channels established between the interested parties are assumed. In
particular, if one supposes that all possible users (and even the adversary)
know a public key pkc1 and that only ES knows the corresponding private
key pk−1c1 , encrypting requests in step 1 with pkc1 guarantee their confiden-
tiality. One may observe that the same does not guarantee server authenti-
cation. Given that the analysis is here focused on the right correspondence
between a public key and a name in a issued certificate, and since it is not
concerned with specific SSL properties, the claim is that one can afford to
maintain the formalization to a lower level of granularity with respect to the
SSL protocol. Moreover, if no attack is discovered with a weaker model,
one may optimistically imagine that no attack would be discovered with
a stronger representation (with respect to the same analyzed properties).
Thus, we assume that everybody knows pkc1 and only ES knows pk−1c1 .
The goal of confidentiality is similarly modelled in steps 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3,
with the specification that the key pair pkc3, pk−1c3 is only known by LRA
and RA.
• The formal language specifying the protocol is tailored for describing soft-
ware systems where all the interactions are made by means of communi-
cations. Thus, instead of considering that U physically reaches LRA, a
sending operation has been modeled in step 2. Furthermore, to maintain the
confidentiality that the physical action of showing the data to an operator
should guarantee, a confidential channel has been established by means of
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pkc2. pkc2 is known by all the users (plus the adversary), but only LRA
knows pk−1c2 .
• In Subsection 5.4.1 two analyses of the enrollment procedure will be carried
out by assuming that an adversary gathers information that should be secret,
i.e., pinU and SPKAC, respectively. In the respective specification files,
the leakage of these information is modeled by sending them on a public
channel. Alternatively, it could also be modeled by including them in the
initial knowledge of the adversary. Both the formalizations do not alter
the result of the analyses. The first choice differs in the sense that one can
decide at which point of the computation the adversary will know the secret.
5.4 OpenCA analysis
An analysis of the correct issuance of a digital certificate is here performed, with
respect to an active adversary that tries to interfere with the enrollment procedure
described in Section 5.3. The adversary is able to listen, intercept and forge com-
munication between honest participants. An incorrect certificate is here intended
as a certificate that testifies the association between a public key and the owner of
a private key that does not correspond to that public key.
In particular, two possible misbehaviours are considered for the analysis. Within
the enrollment procedure described in Section 5.3, it is investigated if it is possible
1. to issue certificates in which the name of an user is tied to the public key
whose correspondent private key is only known by another user;
2. to issue certificates in which the public key of an user, that also knows the
correspondent private key, is tied to the name of another one (that does not
know that private key).
If one of the two alternatives occur, it means that the enrollment procedure leads to
the issuance of certificates in which there is not a correct correspondance between
the owner of the certificate and the certified public key.
The occurrence of the first alternative could cause a responsibility attack, i.e.,
someone could sign some documents and makes another user responsible for that
signature. The failure of the second property could cause a credit attack, i.e.,
someone could claim credit for the origin of a document signed by another user.
It is worth noticing that Abadi has formally discussed the properties of responsi-
bility and credit in [Aba98]. Also, [GMP04] further investigates these topics and
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an attempt is given to formalize, within a theoretical framework, some of the ex-
amples discussed by Abadi in [Aba98].
First, the initial knowledge of the adversary is set to the set of public messages
that it knows at the beginning of the computation, e.g., the names and the public
keys of the other participants, its public/private key pair, its identity card.
Thus, the input given to the tool is, informally, as follows (details in Ap-
pendix C):
• Specification file: OpenCA
• Formula:
{nameU , pkX}pk−1ca or {nameX , pkU}pk−1ca
• Initial knowledge:




, pkU , nameU , pkc1, pkc2.
• The result is No attack found.
The specification file is written by following the input language shown in Ap-
pendix C. The same appendix contains some excerpts of that specification file, as
well as another excerpt from the SCEP specification, that will be discussed and
analysed in the following sections.
By requiring the analysis over that particular formula, a computation is searched
such that, at the end of such a computation, the adversary knows either message
{nameU , pkX}pk−1ca or message {nameX , pkU}pk−1ca (i.e., certificates attesting a
wrong association between a public key and its owner). The result of the anal-
ysis gives that such a computation does not exist. Thus, the procedure is correct,
with respect to the investigated properties, and at least at conceptual level.
5.4.1 Some attacks on the RA server
In the previous part it has been shown that the enrollment procedure of OpenCA
leads to the emission of correct certificates. However, under some circumstances,
it is possible to force the emission of incorrect certificates. This can happen with-
out breaking CA, but by performing some preliminary attacks on RA. Indeed,
the leakage of some confidential information, recorded into RA, may lead to an
incorrect certificate issue.
133
Figure 5.3: Graphical interface of PAMOCHSA
As is common in security analysis, the protocol is investigated by considering
that the adversary magically gathers some information.
In particular, here it is supposed that X obtains pinU and SPKAC. Note that
this information can be obtained by performing a direct attack on the RA server,
which is an on-line machine and it is more vulnerable to attacks than the off-line
CA.
Two attacks can occur, depending on the leaked secret:
• X knows pinU : then, X can associate its public key to the user’s identity.
• X knows SPKAC: then, X can associate its name to the public key of user1.
First attack.
X knows pinU . The input of PAMOCHSA is:
• Specification file: OpenCA known pin.
• Formula: {nameU , pkX}pk−1ca .
• Initial knowledge: same as before
• The result is Attack found
1This holds because of an incomplete management of SPKAC in the investigated version of
OpenCA, see Section 5.4.2 for details.
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Indeed, X is able to force the issuing of a certificate where its public key is tied
to the name of U. Informally, the attack consists of the following steps (see also
Fig. 5.4) (In the picture, step i indicates the normal execution of the protocol by
the honest participants, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1, whereas step iX indicates that
step i is performed by the intruder):
• Item 1. U connects to ES, as usual.
• Item 1X . X connects to ES and sends a certificate request consisting of
username nameU , pinU it has previously discovered, its public key pkX
and the so-called Netscape SPKAC, i.e., X’s public key plus another nonce
nX , signed by pk−1X .
• Item 2. U gets in contact with the LRA Operator to prove that the data in
the request of step 1 are correct.
• Item 3.1. LRA Operator connects to RA Server and approve the request cor-
responding to the related username and pinU . However, now two requests
exist, both related to the same name and pin. Thus, it could be possible that
the LRA Operator approves the wrong request. (Note that steps 3.2 and 3.3
are not formalized in Fig. 5.4, for the sake of simplicity).
• Steps 4, 5 and 6 are as usual. The final issued certificate ties the identity of
the user with X’s public key.
The avoidance of this kind of attack should be actuated by enforcing security
policies to keep sensitive values (like pinU ) secret.
Second attack
X knows SPKAC. (Once again, it is supposed that the adversary receives this
piece of information over a public channel. See Subsection 5.3.1.) The input of
PAMOCHSA is:
• Specification file: OpenCA known SPKAC.
• Formula {nameX , pkU}pk−1ca .
• Initial knowledge: same as before.
• The result is Attack found.
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1 U 7→ ES : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {pkU , nU}pk−1
U
}pkc1
1X X 7→ ES : {nameU , pkX , pinU , {pkX , nX}pk−1
X
}pkc1
2 U 7→ LRA : {{nameU}pk−1
Gov
, pinU}pkc2
3.1 LRA 7→ RA : {nameU , pinU}pkc3
3.2 as usual
3.3 as usual




5 CA 7→ RA : {nameU , pkX}pk−1ca
6 ES 7→ U : {nameU , pkX}pk−1ca
Figure 5.4: OpenCA - First attack
Informally, the attack consists of the following steps (see also Figure 5.5):
• Item 1. U connects to ES as usual.
• Item 1X . X connects to ES and sends its certificate request consisting of
nameX , a newly created nonce pinX , the user public key pkU and the leaked
SPKAC of the user.
• Item 2X . X gets in contact with the LRA operator to prove that the data
contained in the request in step 2 are correct. X can physically reach the
LRA operator and it can show its identity card.
• Item 3.1. The LRA operator connects to the RA server and it approves the
request corresponding to nameX and pinX .
• Item 4. The certificate requests are exported from the RA server and im-
ported into the CA server, as usual. The CA operator checks if all the
requests are signed by the LRA operator and if the Netscape SPKAC is
correctly signed. This is done by checking that pkU is able to verify the
signature on SPKAC.
• Item 5. The CA operator issues the certificate and exports it into the RA
server.
• Item 6X . X connects to ES and gets the certificate in which pkU is tied to
X’s identity.
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1 U 7→ ES : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {pkU , nU}pk−1
U
}pkc1
1X X 7→ ES : {nameX , pkU , pinX , {pkU , nU}pk−1
U
}pkc1
2X X 7→ LRA : {{nameX}pk−1
Gov
, pinX}pkc2
3.1 LRA 7→ RA : {nameX , pinX}pkc3
3.2 as usual
3.3 as usual




5 CA 7→ RA : {nameX , pkU}pk−1ca
6X ES 7→ X : {nameX , pkU}pk−1ca
Figure 5.5: OpenCA - Second attack
Prot. descriptions states CPU time Result
OpenCA NO attack 444 2.05 sec NO Attack (see 5.4)
OpenCA Known PIN 453 0,25 sec Attack (see 5.4.1)
OpenCA Known SPKAC 350 0.27 sec Attack (see 5.4.1)
Figure 5.6: OpenCA: results.
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5.4.2 A note on the use of SPKAC
The software architecture investigated above is based on OpenCA v.0.2.0 and
OpenSSL v.0.9.4. As explicitly mentioned in the OpenSSL documentation, the
SPKAC nonce challenge is not used in that implementation. Thus, the second
attack can be avoided by simply recording the nonce previously used in a SPKAC
structure.
In order to look for a practical evidence of this drawback, a test Certification
Authority has been built, based on the 0.9.4 SSL code. Actually, two requests
with the same SPKAC have been generated and, consequently, two certificates
have been issued, with different user name but same public key. However, if
SPKAC is correctly used, a single CA cannot issue such erroneous certificates.
On the other hand, in a more complex PKI infrastructure this is not true any-
more. Let the reader consider a PKI infrastructure consisting of a root CA and
two sub-CAs, CA1, and CA2 (i.e., a hierarchical structure). The root issues the
certificates for its sub-CAs, while these directly interact with the users. Let us
now suppose that user A discovers the SPKAC of user B. B is also supposed to
have previously obtained a valid certificate from CA2. A can send a correct cer-
tificate request to CA1, by using its name and B’s SPKAC. As a consequence, A
may obtain a valid certificate where its name is tied to B’s public key. Under this
scenario the nonce is useless, since CA1 receives the SPKAC for the first time.
A possible solution could be the insertion in the SPKAC structure of some
additional information, by following, e.g., the example of the PKCS#10 structure,
that is a standard describing the syntax for making a certificate request. In subsec-
tion 5.5.1 the interested reader will find more about the format and usage of this
standard.
Here, it is anticipated that, by following the PKCS#10 standard, the user re-
quest contains a digital signature (generated with the user’s private key) that signs
the name of the user, plus some additional attributes. Then, it makes no sense to
perform a duplicate request, as the one in step 1X of Fig. 5.5. Such an attack would
not work, simply because the LRA operator is now able to check if the name of
the user making the request matches the name in the signed field. Updating the
protocol by following the new guidelines, step 2 becomes:
X 7→ ES : {nameX , pkU , pinX , {nameU , pkU , attributes}pk−1
U
}pkc1
Thus, X cannot simply reply the request (if not in possess of pk−1U ). Indeed, the
devoted operator would find a mismatch between the identity within the signature
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(nameU ) and the identity outside the signature (nameX).
Upon analyzing the protocol through PAMOCHSA, the analyzed OpenCA
version has been updated by the authors of this paper, by allowing only requests a
la PKCS#10.
5.5 The SCEP enrollment phase
A description of the Simple Certificate Enrollment Procedure (SCEP) is hereafter
given.
SCEP is a two-way communication protocol whose goal is the secure issuance
of certificates to network devices, such as routers and gateways, using existing
technology. Up to today, the last document describing SCEP is an Internet Draft
available on Internet at [LMMN05]. The protocol is one of the first to be adopted
by numerous vendors because it offers a common method of enrolling (i.e., re-
questing and receiving digital certificates) from different Certification Authorities.
SCEP supports the following operations:
• CA public key distributions;
• Certificate Enrollment;
• Certificate Revocation;
• Certificate and CRL query.
Hereafter, the attention will be mainly focussed on the enrollment phase. That
consists of two main phases:
1. the SCEP client (also called user U), identified by a subject name consisting
of the Fully Qualified Domain Name (e.g., alice.somewhere.com), asks for
a digital certificate. It composes its certificate request and sends it to a
Certification Authority Server (CA), an entity which issues certificates and
whose name will be declared in the certificate issuer name field.
2. The Certification Authority tests the correctness of the received request2;
in case of positive outcome, CA issues the certificate, digitally signs it and
sends it to the applicant.
2In subsection 5.5.2 it is explained how CA tests the correctness of the request.
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The secrecy and integrity of the private key of the Certification Authority must
be preserved. (This is why the CA Server should be an off-line machine. In
this case, communications between CA and the applicant pass through an on-
line Registration Authority Server RA. However, CA Server and RA Server are
specified as one entity in the following).
U generates its pair of asymmetric keys with a specific key usage (i.e., only
for encryption, only for digital signature, or both). The public key to be certified
and the key usage are conveyed to CA through the certificate enrollment request.
5.5.1 User certificate request
After the generation of the keys and having obtained the CA’s certificate, nec-
essary to retrieve CA’s public key in order to enroll, the user generates its re-
quest using PKCS#10 and sends it to the CA exploiting PKCS#7. PKCS#10
and PKCS#7 were issued by RSA Labs and made public and modifiable as with
PKCS#i (Public-Key Cryptography Standards). They are “de facto” standards:
PKCS#10 describing the syntax for certification requests and PKCS#7 defining
formats to represent data with the addition of cryptographic information, i.e., en-
crypted data or digital signatures. PKCS#7 provides different kinds of formats,
like Signed Data (data plus digital signatures), Enveloped Data (encrypted data
plus encrypted key by means of RSA), Degenerated Mode (for the distribution of
certificates). Briefly, a PKCS#10 request can be formalized as follows:
PKCS#10 := {nameU , pkU , pinU , {nameU , pkU , pinU}pk−1
U
}
where nameU is the Subject Name of the user U (Fully Qualified Domain
Name plus IP Address), pkU is the public key to be certified and pinU is a secret
that associates the subject name to that certificate request3.
PKCS#10 is completed by adding the digital signature of the 3-tuple Subject
Name, Public Key and Pin, using the user’s private key. The signature acts as
a Proof of Possession (POP), i.e., once CA has verified the signature, it has an
evidence that whoever has originated the signature holds the corresponding private
key. The key usage is specified in the PKCS#10; in our formalization the key
3This pin is used for certificate revocation (currently implemented as a manual process: the
user phones a CA Operator asking for revocation of its certificate, the operator replies asking for
the pin. If it coincides with the one contained in the PKCS#10 request, the certificate is revoked).
The pin can also be used to authenticate the identity of U, as explained in subsection 5.5.2
140 Chapter 5
usage is not explicitly declared and the usage is intended for both encryption and
signature.
Upon composing PKCS#10, U builds the Enveloped Data4, exploiting PKCS#7
technologies:
EnvelopedData := {PKCS#10}KEY , {KEY }pkCA
where KEY is a randomly generated symmetric key. The construction of
Enveloped Data provides the encryption of KEY with the public key of the CA,
pkCA, so that only CA can retrieve KEY and successfully obtain the PKCS#10
as a clear-text.
To complete the enrollment request, U creates Signed Data, basically as fol-
lows:
SignedData := EnvelopedData, {ID,Nonce}pk−1
U
• The aim of the Transaction Identifier ID is to uniquely identify the transac-
tion. ID is the fingerprint of the public key to be certified.
• Nonce is a random number generated by U, and its aim is to prove the
freshness of the response from the CA to the user request.
ID, Nonce are sent as “authenticated attributes” of PKCS#7, signed with private
key of U . Answers5 of CA to U’s enrollment request can be of three kinds:
1. SUCCESS response: CA successfully issues the requested certificate;
2. PENDING response: CA is configured to act in manual mode. Before the
emission, it has to carry out some checks to verify enrollment request cor-
rectness;
3. FAILURE response: checks have produced a negative result and CA does
not issue the certificate.
When U receives an answer from CA containing a pending “status”, it can enter
into a polling mode, i.e., it can periodically send to CA Get Cert Initial messages,
pressing for the certificate emission. The structure of a Get Cert Initial message
4For the sake of readability the structures of Enveloped Data, Signed Data and Get Cert Initial
message here are simplified (without, however, affecting the results of our analysis).
5These answers contain the same ID and Nonce present in the User Certificate Request.
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is substantially the following:
GetCertInitial := {nameU , ID}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {Nonce}pk−1
U
5.5.2 Modeling the enrollment procedure
For the sake of clarity, it is worth spending a few words on the user authentication
phase. In protocols that use public key cryptography, the association between the
public keys and the identities with which they are associated must be authenticated
in a secure manner. SCEP provides two authentication methods: a manual one and
one based on a pre-shared secret.
In manual mode, once a certificate request has been sent to CA, U has to wait
until its identity can be verified using any reliable mechanism, to be performed
over channels other than the Internet. This mechanism could be performed, e.g.,
by personally reaching a devoted operator and directly showing some appropriate
credentials, or by delivering such credentials by surface mail or phone. In par-
ticular, [LMMN05] suggests that CA generates the fingerprint of the PKCS#10
retrieved from the user request and compares it with the one computed by the user
itself. During this period, the state of the whole transaction is set to “PENDING”.
Otherwise, CA can choose to act in automatic mode: before any request takes
place, CA should distribute a pre-shared secret to the user - the secret is assumed
to be unique for each user (the way in which the distribution takes place is subject
to the CA policy). When creating an enrollment request, the user will insert the
secret in the PKCS#10 (later on we refer to this secret as pinU ). Upon receiving
the request, CA should check the correspondence between pinU and the subject
name included in the PKCS#10.
Enrollment procedure with manual user authentication.
The enrollment procedure with manual authentication of the user can be described
as follows:
1. U connects to CA and sends enveloped PKCS#10 and authenticated at-
tributes. IDU is the fingerprint of pkU . NonceU is inserted in the authenti-
cated attributes to prevent replay attacks from the user point of view. In this
procedure, every answer from CA to U has to contain the same nonce of the
previous message from U to CA.
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1 U 7→ CA : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {....}pk−1
U
}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {IDU , NonceU}pk−1
U
2 CA 7→ U : {IDU , NonceU , “pending
′′}pk−1
CA
3 U 7→ CA : {nameU , IDU}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {Nonce1U}pk−1
U
4 CA 7→ U : h{nameU , pkU , pinU , {....}pk−1
U
}
5 U 7→ CA : Comparison : ok/ko
6 CA 7→ U : {{nameU , pkU}pk−1
CA
}KEY 1, {KEY 1}pkU , {Nonce1U}pk−1
CA
Figure 5.7: SCEP Enrollment Phase – manual mode.
2. CA is configured to manually authenticate the end entity, so it sends a
PKCS#7 message back to U containing only authenticated attributes: “sta-
tus” of transaction set to pending, same transaction identifier and same
nonce as in the user request.
3. Upon receiving a pending status, U enters into polling mode by periodically
sending Get Cert Initial messages to CA, until it either receives the certifi-
cate, or notification of rejection, or it simply times out. (Here, it is assumed
that the user successfully obtains its certificate after the sending of the first
Get Cert Initial.)
4. Communications over channels 4 and 5 should be intended other than the
Internet. (The analysis tool allows these two channels to be hidden from the
intruder, in order to simulate a reliable secure communication between CA
and all the users). This reliable communication is intended to be by phone
or by surface mail. In any case, CA must securely contact U and it must
communicate to U the fingerprint of the PKCS#10 received in Message 1
(Message 4). Thereafter, the user can compare the fingerprint with the one
computed from its original PKCS#10 (Message 5).
5. U gives a positive, or negative, answer to CA, depending on the result of the
comparison.
6. Upon receiving a positive answer, CA issues the certificate. SCEP dis-
tributes the certificates by following PKCS#7 Degenerated Mode, enveloped
and followed by the same user nonce contained in the previous Get Cert Ini-
tial.
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Enrollment procedure with automatic user authentication.
When a pre-shared secret scheme is used, the enrollment procedure is quite simple
(Fig. 5.8). The user authentication is subject to the correspondence between pinU
and nameU .
5.6 SCEP analysis
A formal analysis of security protocols turns out to be a useful mechanism to
better understand the motivations and the choices for the intrinsic structure of a
message, as specified in documents like Internet standards and drafts.
Briefly, the security goals of SCEP are that no adversary can:
1. subvert the public key/identity binding from that intended;
2. discover the identity information in the enrollment request and in the issued
certificates;
3. cause the revocation of certificates with any non-negligible probability.
The first and second goals are met through the use of the standards PKCS#7 and
PKCS#10 (by exploiting encryption and digital signatures with authenticated pub-
lic keys). The third goal is met through the use of a challenge password for revo-
cation.
The revocation phase is not a concern to the scope of this paper but rather the
phase of enrollment has been considered. The analysis deals both with the en-
rollment procedure with manual authentication of the user and with the automatic
procedure.
When running the tool, a finite number of processes, each of them having a
finite behavior, has been considered. Note that, with regard to this scenario, SCEP
guarantees the correct emission of certificates (i.e., goals 1 and 2 are achieved).
1 U 7→ CA : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {...}pk−1
U
}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {IDU , NonceU}pk−1
U
2 CA 7→ U : {{nameU , pkU}pk−1
CA
}KEY 1, {KEY 1}pkU , {NonceU}pk−1
CA
Figure 5.8: SCEP Enrollment Phase – automatic mode.
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However, the attention will be focused on particular checks suggested in [LMMN05],
in order to understand some security mechanisms and the possible consequences
of their absence.
In particular, in subsection 5.6.1 the security mechanisms suggested in the In-
ternet Draft to achieve Property 1 are considered. Namely, it is considered which
mechanisms are involved and whether without them it would be possible to issue
a certificate with a erroneous correspondence between an identity and the public
key to be certified.
The possibility of issuing two (or more) certificates with same subject name
- public key - key usage binding (whose validity periods overlap) is also taken
into account. In subsection 5.6.2 it is discussed why the event should be avoided,
what [LMMN05] suggests and what could happen without these suggestions.
5.6.1 Relevance of the user authentication.
Goal 1 in section 5.6 is that no intruder can force CA to issue erroneous certificates
in which the public key/identity binding is subverted. Here, a simple analysis is
performed, by checking if an intruder could be able to break that goal.
If CA was able to issue certificates in which the name of a legitimate user
is tied to a public key provided by an enemy, a so called “responsibility attack”
could be caused. Indeed, someone could sign something and make another person
responsible for that signature.
A specification following the Internet Draft (i.e., that one including the com-
parison of the PKCS#10 fingerprints) has been checked with the help of the tool.
The analysis confirms the correct emission of the certificate.
On the contrary, when no fingerprint comparison takes place, the protocol
results vulnerable to a man in the middle attack. The tool automatically unveils
the attack. This consists of the following steps (see also Fig. 5.9):
The attack consists of the following steps (see also Fig. 5.9):
1. U connects to CA as in a normal execution. The request is intercepted by
X.
2. X sends to CA a certificate request containing the user name.
3. CA’s answer contains a pending status.
4. U enters into polling mode. Its Get Cert Initial message is intercepted by
X.
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1 U 7→ X(CA) : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {...}pk−1
U
}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {IDU , NonceU}pk−1
U
2 X(U) 7→ CA : {nameU , pkX , pinX , {nameU , pkX , pinX}pk−1
X
}KEYX , {KEYX}pkCA ,
{IDX , NonceU}pk−1
X
3 CA 7→ U : {IDX , NonceU , “pending
′′}pk−1
CA
4 U 7→ X(CA) : {nameU , IDU}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {Nonce1U}pk−1
U
5 X(U) 7→ CA : {nameU , IDX}KEYX , {KEYX}pkCA , {Nonce1U}pk−1
X
6 CA 7→ U : {{nameU , pkX}pk−1
CA
}KEY 1, {KEY 1}pkX , {Nonce1U}pk−1
CA
Figure 5.9: No fingerprint comparison.
5. X simulates the polling mode.
6. Something went wrong with the comparison of the fingerprint. It is possible
to issue the certificate related to X request.
The absence of the fingerprint comparison could represent either the fact that
CA does not contact the user to communicate the received fingerprint (no Message
4 in Fig. 5.7) or the fact that the user itself omits the comparison (no Message 5
in Fig. 5.7).
Note 2 The particular structure of the messages in SCEP helps U to discover
that it actually receives a wrong certicate. Upon receiving CA’s answer con-
taining the certicate (message 6), U will not be able to open the envelope, since
the symmetric key KEY 1 is encrypted with the incorrect key, pkX . However, X
could intercept message 6, so that the user does not receive the certicate. In these
circumstances, the user presumably sends to CA a sequence of GetCertInitial mes-
sages, pressing for the certicate. The possible interceptions of Get Cert Initial
messages by the intruder and the consequent time out interrupt of U’s connection
may lead U to realize that something incorrect has happened.
5.6.2 How to avoid the issuance of two identical certificates
For authenticating the user in automatic enrollment, (Fig. 5.8), it is recommended
the use of a pre-shared secret scheme. The pre-shared secret is represented, in the
given formalization, by pinU . As CA receives a request of enrolment, it should
verify the correspondence between the identity of the applicant and its secret.
146 Chapter 5
Furthermore, [LMMN05] encourages CAs to enforce the so called certicate-
name uniqueness: at any time, there will be only one pair of keys for a given
subject name and key usage combination6.
We prefer to distinguish between two kinds of uniqueness. Thus, the above
mentioned property will be referred as a weak uniqueness, meaning that it is not
possible to issue two (or more) valid certificates with the same subject name,
same public key and key usage whose validity periods overlap. With respect to
the validity period of a certificate, weak uniqueness is in contrast with another
property, called strong uniqueness, meaning that it is never possible to issue two
(or more) certificates with the same subject name, same public key and key usage.
To better distinguish between weak and strong uniqueness, let the reader sup-
pose the existence of two certificates with same subject name, same public key
and key usage. Then, it could be the case that their validity periods overlap (e.g.,
the validity period of the first certificate is January 1st, 2005 – January 1st, 2006,
whereas the one of the second certificate is July 1st, 2005 – July 1st, 2006). It
could be also the case that their validity periods do not overlap at all (e.g., January
1st, 2005 – January 1st, 2006 and July 1st, 2006 – July 1st, 2007). In the first
case, both weak and strong uniqueness do not hold. In the last case, it holds weak
uniqueness, but not the stronger one.
In [LMMN05], U is allowed to re-use the same request when it times out
from polling for a pending request (or when the connection between U and CA
goes down for some reason). In any case, the second request should not create
a new transaction nor should the second request be rejected. So what should the
re-emission lead to? There are some possibilities expressed in the draft:
• If CA has already issued the certificate and the re-emission of the request
occurs less than halfway through the validity time of an existing certificate,
then CA should realize that something went wrong in the first sending of
the certificate. It can possibly re-send the same certificate to the applicant,
without issuing another certificate.
• If CA has already issued the certificate, and the re-emission of the request
occurs more than halfway through the validity time of an existing certificate,
6Uniqueness is not mandatory in the draft, but the draft itself claims that all current SCEP
client implementations expect the property. Moreover, the authors of the draft made examples
by assuming that uniqueness holds. Thus, the current analysis is performed assuming that the
property holds.
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this can be interpreted by CA as a renewal request. In that case, CA should
have previously revoked the existing certificate7.
• If CA has not yet issued the certificate, the reception of the same request
should be taken by CA as another GetCertInitial message, instead of a
request for a new enrollment.
Let the reader consider the hypothesis that CA issued two certificates with the
same subject name U, the same public key and key usage. They will differ in the
serial number, say sn1 and sn2, and the respective validity periods will overlap.
Suppose also that X was able to force CA to issue the last certificate, so X is con-
scious of its existence, while U is not. There are multiple reasons for preventing
the re-transmission of the same data from creating a second certificate. The most
significant reasons, according to the authors of this thesis, are:
• considering a large scale application scenario, the computational cost in
generating and signing unused certificates can be high;
• a document digitally signed by U (i.e., by the private key corresponding to
U’s public key) could be valid longer than expected, because the unexpired
certificate would validate the signature;
• U could maliciously extend his own certificate validity even when it is pur-
posely denied the right to a new certificate, e.g., in a corporate environment,
an employee might have access to a certain facility but only for a limited
time.
Each public key to be certified is strictly connected to the Transaction Identi-
fier ID, i.e., the fingerprint of the public key. To guarantee weak uniqueness, it is
assumed that CA records the pair (nameU , IDU).
A specification expecting weak uniqueness (i.e., a specifications including the
record of the pair (nameU , IDU)) has been checked with the help of PAMOCHSA.
The analysis confirms that it is not possible to issue two identical certificates
whose validity periods overlap.
On the contrary, if CA neglects to record that pair, the protocol results vulnera-
ble to the following attack: the intruder could eavesdrop on a legitimate certificate
7Before revoking the existing certificate, CA should presumably contact the user for confirma-
tion, but this is not specified in [LMMN05].
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request and simply repeat it later. In this way, X can force CA to issue two iden-
tical certificates - apart from the serial number. This replay attack is reported in
Fig. 5.10.
1. U connects to CA as usual. Its request is eavesdropped by X .
2. X connects to CA and repeats the initial U’s request.
3. CA issues a first valid certificate with serial number sn1.
4. CA issues a second valid certificate with a different serial number, because it
omits checks on crucial fields in the received requests. X is able to intercept
the message.
The user itself may unconsciously contribute towards the issuance of two iden-
tical certificates. Indeed, if U times out (or the connection to CA goes down for
some reason), CA could issue a first certificate but U may not receive anything
because of the connection crash (or the time out). Consequently, U is allowed
to re-issue the same request and the absence of checks by CA may lead to the
issuance of a double certificate.
In the discussion above, the existence of certificates whose validity periods
overlap has been investigated. When automatic enrollment is used, weak unique-
ness is not enough to protect against replay attacks on expired certificates requests.
Indeed, X could eavesdrop on a legitimate certificate request. The automatic pro-
cedure will lead to the issuance of a legitimate certificate, say {nameU , pkU}pk−1ca .
Then, X may send the replay of the request once the legitimate certificate has
expired. This can cause a new certificate to be issued with the same subject name
- public key binding. The existence of the last certificate may cause a document
previously signed by U to be valid longer than expected. It is our opinion that, to
avoid this vulnerability, CAs should guarantee strong uniqueness.
1 U 7→ CA : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {...}pk−1
U
}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {IDU , NonceU}pk−1
U
2 X(U) 7→ CA : {nameU , pkU , pinU , {...}pk−1
U
}KEY , {KEY }pkCA , {IDU , NonceU}pk−1
U
3 CA 7→ U : {{nameU , pkU , sn1}pk−1
CA
}KEY 1, {KEY 1}pkU , {NonceU}pk−1
CA
4 CA 7→ X(U) : {{nameU , pkU , sn2}pk−1
CA
}KEY 2, {KEY 2}pkU , {NonceU}pk−1
CA
Figure 5.10: Replay attack.
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Conclusions
In this section, conclusions are given with respect to what has been presented in
the body of this thesis. Conclusions related to what presented in the appendixes A
and B are left to those appendixes themselves, since, obviously, that material has
not been exposed yet.
The main thread of this work has been to study methodologies for the model-
ing and analysis of security protocols. The investigation has been made by con-
sidering cryptography reliable. Instead, we had an eye for formal methods.
Even though the literature offers a lot of interesting work in the area, the field
of survey was so wide that we have decided to investigate some aspects not deeply
analyzed so far.
Multicast security being a fertile field for computer science and engineering
researchers and developers, a subsequent attention was focused on methodologies
for certifying the goodness of the developed architectures. Thus, by means of
both a process-algebraic and an automata framework, we have modeled real life
protocols for signing and protecting digital contents. Also, we have verified some
of their properties by means of formal proofs.
Then, our attention was focused on the study of some informal documents giv-
ing guidelines for correctly ensuring authentic correspondences between a public
key and an identity. A translation of these procedures into more formal speci-
fications has been given. These specifications were given as input to a tool for
the automated specification, in order to investigate the effects of omitted (or erro-
neously implemented) security checks.
Finally, Team Automata have been proved to form a flexible framework for
modelling communication between components of distributed and reactive sys-
tems [BEKR03, Ell97, Kle03]. Given these premises, they have raised our atten-
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tion and we have investigated how to equip them with a framework for treating
security aspects.
In the following, we give a more detailed report of the contents and results of
the work, chapter by chapter.
6.1 The Multicast chapter
In the chapter dedicated to model multicast protocols and to verify some of their
security properties, a compositional analysis has been successfully applied. It has
been verified the property of integrity (i.e., a sort of robustness against packet
modification). In particular, we have proved that the exchanged multicast data
are not modified en-route, i.e., in their traveling from one sender to the set of
receivers.
The efficiency of modelling (and analysis) has been shown through three case
studies, some well-known protocols to sign digital streams. The reader is invited
to note that the analysis does not limit itself to check the property of integrity.
For example, in the timed case study, the fulfillment of the property of timed
integrity is a consequence of the fulfillment of the property of timed secrecy over
the keys that are going to be disclosed. We could also have checked explicitly
timed secrecy over those keys, with the same proposed machinery.
Systems with an unbounded number of components have been modeled and
analyzed.
The choice of the three case studies has not been occasional. The first is con-
sidered a pioneer protocol in the field of securing digital streams. However, it
suffers from the problem of packet loss, in the sense that, if a packet is missing,
the authentication chain is broken and the integrity of the subsequent packets can-
not be verified. Several protocols were born with the intent of fighting against this
problem. In particular, we have chosen EMSS, in order to model also packet loss.
We achieve it through a non-deterministic choice performed at the receiver’s side.
Finally, also timed issues in wireless environments have been considered. To this
aim, a process algebra enriched with timed primitives has been used to model the
relevant µTESLA protocol, a time-dependent wireless security protocol. In par-
ticular, the analysis framework has been extended by developing a compositional
approach for reasoning about security properties that rely on time constraints.
Relevant work related to the verification of digital streams are those in 1)
[Arc02], a formal analysis based on theorem proving techniques to analyze a
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well known stream authentication protocol (the TESLA protocol [PCST01]) and
2) [BL02], where the authors verify the same protocol by means of model check-
ing techniques.
Notable examples of compositional proof techniques for reasoning about cryp-
tographic protocols may be found in [GT00, BG02]. In [BG02] a compositional
proof system for an environment-sensitive bisimulation has been developed. One
main difference from ours is that we consider a weak notion of observation where
the internal actions are not visible. In [GT00] the concept of disjoint encryption
has been developed and the authors were able to perform compositional reason-
ing both for secrecy and authentication properties. What would be interesting,
for the future, it is the study of the relationships between disjoint encryption and
our stability assumption. We also note that compositionality is a fundamental is-
sue in static analysis approaches. An ongoing study is indeed the comparison of
our approach with the one proposed in [GJ01, GJ02], based on type systems for
checking authenticity and integrity properties.
Related work in security protocol verification in a timed setting may be found
in [ES00], where a timed variant of the process algebra CSP [RSG+00], namely
tock-CSP, is presented. This work presents differences (with respect to ours)
with respect to the treatment of the timed operators and the cryptographic mod-
elling. Moreover, [ES00] does not rely on any compositional principle, but it has
the appealing advantage that the theory is automatized through the use of PVS
([SOR93]), while ours, up to now, is a pen and proof analysis.
6.2 The Team Automata chapter
Team Automata have been equipped with a framework for security analysis by
defining a general insecure communication scenario for team automata and by
reformulating the GNDC schema, originally developed for process algebras, in
terms of team automata. Furthermore, for the given insecure communication sce-
nario, a compositional analysis has been proved and applied.
Firstly, by defining the most general intruder we have been able to avoid the
universal quantification in an initial reformulation of the GNDC schema for team
automata. Secondly, by defining a compositional analysis strategy for team au-
tomata we have shown how some security properties are preserved by composition
over an initiator and a responder. Finally, we have used the developed framework
to prove that integrity is guaranteed in a case study in which team automata model
the EMSS protocol, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of our framework for
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security analysis with team automata.
A significant trait d’union between the Multicast chapter and the Team Au-
tomata chapter is that the same case study, EMSS, has been considered. TA were
proved to be a natural formal model for multicast/broadcast communication. On
the contrary, some modeling tricks have been adopted to model multicast within a
process-algebraic framework. In fact, in the theory of TA, many variants of a con-
current composition operator can be uniformly defined. In particular, we defined a
multicast composition operator ‖J so that we were able to model a multicast pro-
tocol involving one sender and n copies of a receiver as one-to-J synchronizations
between the components of a TA.
Another interesting field of survey has been a proposal for modelling the se-
cure agents of [CCKM00] in the framework of TA. We have investigated a pos-
sible way of analyzing privacy properties with TA. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first attempt to use TA in order to analyze privacy properties. The in-
sight we gain from the analysis underlines a weakness of this approach to secure
agents. Indeed, it emerges in a natural way, that the protocol we study is not agent-
oriented in spirit, but it rather offers a means of adding a security layer over agent
technologies. Our impression is that such an approach cannot carry very far.
We would like to remark here what a referee stressed about the paper [EP04],
in which we describe the analysis of privacy properties of mobile agents. The
referee wrote that the results seem obviously true, appreciatively emphasizing
the simplicity of the proofs we had given. This simplicity depends on the fact that
TA abstract away from the cryptographic layer and focus on pure communication
aspects. On the other hand, the privacy properties of the protocol we analyzed
depend mostly on the cryptographic aspects of the construction. We argue that
simplicity is a desirable property in the setting of security protocols verification.
In our case, we owe it to the fact that we use a communication-based model, that
allows us to distinguish which are the sensitive ingredients of a protocol.
6.3 The Digital Certificate chapter
In the chapter dedicated to model and analyze the delivery of a digital certifi-
cate, a formalization of the OpenCA and the SCEP enrollment phases has been
given. The analysis of part of the security properties of the two procedures has
been performed, by means of a software tool. Our survey gives the flavor of the
needed trade-off between i) the need for an automated verification (without which
some systems would be honestly unfeasible to be checked) and ii) the need for
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formalizing in a rigorous way the model of a system and its goals.
Contrary to Chapter 3, this chapter is about a finite-state verification. Thus, a
scenario with finite number of processes, each of them with a finite behavior, has
been taken into account. With respect to this scenario, we did not find any attack,
meaning that all the analyzed properties hold.
However, with regard to OpenCA, it has been shown that, when sensitive data
are not accurately stored, the leakage of that data may lead to an incorrect certifi-
cate issuance. This can cause attacks on responsibility and credit, e.g., by mak-
ing a signature to be considered legitimate instead of invalid, or by considering
someone responsible for something (s)he has not actually signed. Hence, such an
analysis acts as a reminder for correctly implementing security checks, and not
only informally specifying them.
With regard to SCEP, when automatic enrollment is used, we found a vulnera-
bility concerning a replay attack on expired certificates requests. To deeply under-
stand certain security mechanisms in SCEP specifications, we purposely omitted
particular checks suggested in the draft in some of our experiments. As a conse-
quence, an attack regarding the issuance of certificates with the public key/identity
binding subverted and an attack concerning duplicate valid certificates were auto-
matically detected.
The proposed analysis technique is general enough to encompass several classes
of security protocols (with finite behaviour). We remark that it turns out to be a
valid support for the analysis of RFCs, drafts, codes and commercial products.
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A secure protocol for mobile
computing
A.1 Introduction
This appendix is devoted to the description of a general architecture for giving
authenticity to a reliable protocol for mobile computing.
Technological developments in computer and communication are enabling the
deployment of computing systems based on portable computers and wireless net-
working. Users may be equipped with hand-held computing devices and roam
around freely while maintaining connectivity with a wired infrastructure. Such
architectures may be exploited for novel applications and services spread out in a
variety of directions.
With the considerable spread of wireless access both undisputed advantages
and new security problems arise. Indeed, broadcasting messages over radio chan-
nels makes traffic eavesdropping and packets’ injection relatively easy for adver-
saries in possession of adequate resources. The practicality of security attacks in
wireless environments has been discussed and shown recently, [BGW01, SIR02].
We consider a simplified version of the multicast protocol for mobile com-
puting developed in [AB99, Bar98]. Design issues are considered in the cited
papers in order to support reliable and totally ordered communication within a set
of processes, running on mobile hosts. The protocol is concerned with reliable
multicast communication, where reliability means, very informally, that all pack-
ets (messages) are delivered and that duplicates are discarded. Each process at
stake is able to detect possible losses of packets. Lost packets are then recovered
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by using a mechanism based on nack messages and retransmission. The protocol
is not intended to support real time applications.
The design of the protocol does not take in any account security issues and
the presence of possible adversaries has not been considered. In this paper we
assume that a set of legitimate hosts are authorized to participate through the pro-
tocol. Unauthorized mobile hosts will be treated as potential adversaries. We
propose an extension of the original protocol with authentication mechanisms to
assure the capability for the legitimate hosts to authenticate a packet as originated
by a legitimate host. The proposed protocol could be fruitfully used in environ-
ments where authenticity and integrity are the main concerns, whereas secrecy
is less important. For example, taking into consideration a university environ-
ment, a professor and his assistants, whilst exchanging students grades, are more
worried about the integrity rather than the secrecy of the information exchanged.
We base the extension on some concepts coming from proposals by Balfanz et
al., [BSSW02], which seem to fit our context quite well. Further, an analogy be-
tween digital streams considered in [GR01] and the messages exchanged through
the protocol will be highlighted.
In the following, an overview of the original protocol is given. Then, upon
considering the protocol in a security environment, a new version will be pre-
sented, enriched with security mechanisms fulfilling authenticity.
A.2 Protocol overview
A very intuitive notation will be used throughout the appendix. The sending and





where cj is the j-th communication channel. Raised u stands for “unicast” modal-
ity (a point to point connection).
We represent the multicast of a message (from a sender A to a set B of multiple




where B is a set of processes. Raised m stands for “multicast” modality.
We represent the broadcast of a message (from a sender A to multiple receivers





where A possibly broadcasts msg to each process B belonging to the set B. Con-
trary to the multicast modality, here the set B may change dynamically and it is
not fixed in advance. Prime b stands for “broadcast” modality.
For a sketch of the original protocol, we refer to the simplified version in [ABFS01].
The full version can be found in [Bar98], along with a detailed discussion of its
motivation and advantages.
The system model on which the protocol is defined is as follows. It consists of
mobile hosts MHs and stationary hosts SHs, called gateways. The gateways are
connected both to a wired network (that provides reliable and FIFO-ordered com-
munication) and to a wireless link that covers a spatially limited cell nearby each
gateway. Cells provide only incomplete coverage and wireless communication is
unreliable. MHs communicate through wireless links and may move. Movements
are unpredictable, in the way that a MH may leave a cell without prior negoti-
ation and reenter any other cell or even remain out of coverage for some time.
The protocol establishes that MHs may only exchange messages with the gateway
of the cell where they happen to be located in and with a special stationary host
acting as the coordinator. The gateways may broadcast messages to all MHs in
their cell and send messages to a specific MH in their cell. The resulting scenario
is quite general since it can accommodate contemporary wireless LANs, infrared
networks, picocellular wireless networks where cells coincide with rooms in a
building, physical obstructions and long-range movements.
The protocol works as follows. A dedicated SH acts as the coordinator, de-
noted as C. A mobile host may receive messages from the application layer and
send them to the other hosts. Such messages are sent by the mobile host as
new messages to the coordinator C that processes incoming new messages in
sequence. C constructs a message containing the payload and an increasing se-
quence number. C then transmits the resulting message to all gateways through a
FIFO-multicast. Gateways broadcast this message in their respective cells.1
Due to their movement across cells and uncovered areas and to the unreliabil-
ity of the wireless links, MHs could receive duplicates or could miss packets.
The exchange of a new message can be formalized as in Fig. A.1 and the
procedure can be explained as follows:
1. A mobile host MH, wishing to communicate a new message to others, sends
the message to the coordinator C.
1Actually, the full version of the protocol is based on a set of coordinators whereas here a







−→{G1, G2, ..., GN} : new, seq
c3 Gi
b
−→{MH |MH is in cell i} : new, seq
Figure A.1: Transmitting a new message.
2. The coordinator multicasts new to only all the static hosts {G1, .., GN} on
the wired link. It adds to the message the tag seq, containing the sequence
number of the current new. Each gateway Gi maintains a list of messages
recently received from C.
3. Each gateway Gi, responsible for cell i, broadcasts what it previously re-
ceived from C in the cell and the mobile hosts currently present in cell i
receive the message.
By maintaining a history of the received sequence numbers, a mobile host discards
duplicates and sends the gateway a proper nack message upon receiving an out-
of-order message. Upon receiving a nack, the gateway sends MH a copy of the
missing multicasts. Each gateway stores a copy of each multicast previously sent
until it knows that the multicast has been delivered to every mobile host.
The protocol does not use any notion of hand-off, i.e., it does not require any
data exchange between the old gateway and the new one when a host moves from
one cell to another.
A.3 The secured protocol
A.3.1 Hostile environment
Hereafter, we consider a set of legitimate hosts, denoted as LMHs, authorized to
participate through the protocol plus an unauthorized mobile adversary with the
adequate technical equipment to eavesdrop on traffic and actively inject packets
over the wireless links. For details about the practicality of such interferences we
refer to [BGW01, SIR02].
The protocol was originally designed to guarantee a set of properties, among
which: i) Integrity, requiring that any packet received by a legitimate host has
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been originated by a legitimate host; ii) No Duplicate, stating that no legitimate
host accepts duplicate packets, i.e. duplicates are discarded.
The properties of the protocol have been formally analyzed in [ABFS01].
However, these properties might not hold in a classical context of security analysis
where the presence of an adversary has to be considered.
We now define two properties regarding authentication between legitimate
hosts and stationary hosts:
(PA) Capability for the coordinator to authenticate the sender of a new message
as a legitimate host.
(PB) Capability for all the legitimate hosts to authenticate the received broad-
casts as indeed originated from the stationary host responsible for the cell
in which they happen to be located.
We do not require that a gateway correctly identifies a LMH when it asks for
a lost packet sending a nack message. The authentication of origin of the nack
message is unimportant given that the contents of the packets do not have to be
kept secret.
We propose to add security procedures to the original protocol to make prop-
erties PA and PB hold.
With reference to asymmetric cryptography [Sch96], the digital signature is
the typical mechanism to guarantee authentication of origin and integrity. In our
context, unfortunately, to digitally sign each new message may cause an infeasible
computational overload for mobile hosts which have intrinsic limited resources.
Hence, we look for solutions with thrifty use of classical digital signature schemes
as in [RSA78].
Since we use public key cryptography, we need a method for guaranteeing
the ownership of the public keys at stake. Common solutions rely on Public Key
Infrastructures (PKIs) and digital certificates, [HFPS99]. We prefer not to use
digital certificates, since they may result as a bottleneck for the whole system.
Subsection A.3.2 presents an alternative method for bootstrapping authentication
without the need of a PKI.
A.3.2 Bootstrapping authentication
We make use of a method for bootstrapping authenticated and integral communi-
cation between mobile hosts participating in the protocol. A pre-authentication
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phase, in which a certain amount of information is exchanged between legitimate
hosts and SHs over a privileged channel will be inserted. Information exchanged
during the pre-authentication phase will be used through the main wireless link.
We inherit the concept of Location-Limited Channels from [BSSW02]. A
Location-Limited Channel (hereafter LLC) is separated from the main wireless
link and exploits security properties by virtue of the media over which data are
sent. In order to be used for pre-authentication, LLCs must support physical
identication, i.e., human operators must be able to visibly control which devices
are communicating with each other during a transmission over the LLC. Hence
audio and infrared channels could be good LLCs given the physical limited range
of their transmissions, [LEF+00, LA01].
We use LLCs to exchange information about the public keys of the station-
ary hosts. The physical identication property of the transmission over LLCs is
a smart loophole to bypass the need of a PKI to guarantee the authenticity of the
public keys at stake (to know more about the need for a right association between
a public key and its owner, the interested reader can see Chapter 5 of this thesis).
The physical proximity of the hosts during the transmission over the LLC (and the
consequent monitoring) is a way out to delegate the hosts themselves as guarantors
for the benign nature of data exchanged over the LLC. Subsequent communica-
tions over the main wireless link will be accepted as “well-originated” if they refer
to the data exchanged over the LLC. The practicability of such pre-authentication
schemes in wireless environments has been successfully shown in [BSSW02].
A.3.3 Assumptions
To distinguish between authorized and unauthorized hosts, we write LMH to de-
note a legitimate host. Each LMH is also a mobile host MH but the opposite is
not true: a generic MH is not necessarily a legitimate host.
We assume that the multicast over channel c2 in Fig. A.1 can not be compro-
mised. We trust the agents on the wired link. Furthermore, we do not consider an
adversary able to tamper with the communication on the wired link. If there is an
injection of data coming from unauthorized hosts, we assume it to occur on the
wireless link.
We use LLCs with the following assumptions: i) of all the mobile hosts, only
the legitimate hosts can transmit over the LLC; ii) the stationary hosts can transmit
over the LLC and hold a pair of public/private keys to perform regular signature
schemes as in [RSA78].
The environment under examination consists of both wired and wireless links.
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Communications necessarily pass through the stationary hosts on the wired link.
This architecture allows us to separate the authentication mechanism into two
distinguished parts: the first part concerns authenticating a legitimate host to the
coordinator, while the second is concerned with the authentication of the gateways
Gi to the legitimate hosts currently present in cell i. Even though we loose the
precise identity of the sender of a new message, we are interested only in generic
authenticity (each legitimate host can recognize whether a message was sent by
a legitimate host) rather than source authenticity (the capability to identify the
single party within a set).
A.3.4 Authenticating the mobile sender
We require a mobile host to prove its legitimacy in order to send a message. In








The pre-authentication phase takes place over a selected LLC (e.g., exploiting
infrared technology). First, the mobile host transmits the digest of a randomly
generated number NonceLMH to the coordinator over the LLC. The coordinator
replies transmitting its public key pkC . An adversary able to listen over the LLC
does not add any useful information to his knowledge, given the public nature
of the information exchanged from C to LMH. (The non-reversibility of one-way






−→C : Hash{new,NonceLMH , Ndup},
new,Ndup
Communication continues over the main wireless link. Communication over chan-
nel c0 has been added compared with the original protocol: LMH sends the en-
cryption of NonceLMH with C’s public key {NonceLMH}pkC . The contents of the
message over channel c1 in Fig. A.1 have been changed by applying a one-way
hash function to the 3-tuple consisting of the payload new, the nonce and another
nonce Ndup to be used only once.
How can the coordinator have guarantees about the origin of the message? C
can decrypt message over c0 with its private key and retrieve NonceLMH . Then,
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it computes the digest of the nonce and compares it with that received over the
LLC. If the two digests match, C may be reasonably sure that whoever sent
{NonceLMH}pkC over channel c0 is the same mobile host that previously trans-
mitted over the LLC. Further, the whole message is authenticated as coming from
the same mobile host, since NonceLMH is introduced as an argument of a one-way
function together with new (and Ndup). In this way, new is tied to NonceLMH .
From assumption i) on LLCs (see this section), it follows that the mobile host that
originated the message over c1 is indeed a legitimate host.
The nonce Ndup is inserted to avoid replay attacks: unauthorized hosts could
eavesdrop on channel c1 and simply transmit the same message later. Each time
LMH sends a new message, he should randomly generate a nonce Ndup to insert
in the packet both as plaintext and as an argument of the hash function. C should
record the Ndup he receives and should not accept any message with the same
Ndup in the future.
We get into the issue of defining the expiry period for the information sent
from LMH to C over the LLC. We suggest that LMH generates an explicit request
to invalidate the nonce NonceLMH . This request may be sent over the LLC and
may contain the nonce as a clear text seeing that once the nonce has been invali-
dated its knowledge on behalf of an adversary is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
very first request reasonably comes from the legitimate LMH, the one (except the
coordinator) to know NonceLMH .
In the construction above, LMH performs a public key encryption only once.
Further, there is no connection between this construction and the movement of
hosts from one cell to another: the transmission over LLC and channel c0 hap-
pens once only before the first packet is transmitted. There is no relation to the
gateways of a single cell.
A.3.5 The broadcast environment
Contrary to above, what will be proposed now is a sort of authentication on de-
mand. Each mobile host maintains its capability to receive broadcasted messages
apart from the fact that the gateways authenticate themselves to it. It is reasonable
to suppose that a LMH decides to trust a packet as sent by a legitimate gateway or
to willingly ask for an authenticity proof.
In the latter case we suggest to exploit part of a mechanism originally devel-
oped to sign digital streams, [GR01]. In Chapter 3 of this thesis we have discussed
the off-line case of that mechanism. Here, we focus and briefly describe the on-
line case, that is suitable when the sender of the stream does not know the content
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of the stream in advance (e.g., , a live broadcast).
Similarities between digital streams and the finite packets exchanged through
our protocol are straightforward to highlight: i) with regard to authentication tech-
niques they both require little use of traditional signature schemes (the stream
receiver has to check the signature as the packets arrive, the mobile hosts may
not have the resources to perform public key operations in their completeness);
ii) since each gateway is devoted to simply forwarding packets coming from the
coordinator, it does not know the contents of the packets in advance, as in live
broadcast.
Each forwarded packet will be treated as a block belonging to a digital stream,
see [GR01].
In the pre-authentication phase, LLC is used to transmit a first “1-time” public
key from the gateway to the petitioning LMH. 1-time signature schemes are a
special kind of signature scheme introduced in [Lam79], much faster to compute
and verify than regular signatures. These schemes can be used to sign only one








A legitimate host that wants authenticated packets asks for the transmission of
the first 1-time public key of the gateway responsible for the cell in which the
host happens to be located. This transmission happens over the LLC. (For the
transmission over the LLC the host is assumed to be close to the gateway.) With
notation 1pkseqGi we indicate the seq-th 1-time public key of Gi, where seq is the
sequence number of the packet the gateway is to broadcast in the cell (the same
seq as in the original protocol, Fig. A.1).
c3 Gi
b




{Hash{new, seq, 1pkseq+1Gi }}
Gi broadcasts in its cell the (new, seq) as in the original protocol in Fig. A.1 along
with a 1-time signature of its hash based on the 1-time public key sent over the
LLC. (With notation Sig−1
1pkj
Gi
{msg} we mean: “msg is signed with the private
key corresponding to the j-th 1-time public key of Gi.”) A new 1-time public key
1pkseq+1Gi is also transmitted and will be used to verify the signature of the seq + 1
broadcasted message. This structure is repeated for all the packets gateway Gi
broadcasts in its cell.
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Contrary to what proposed in Subsection A.3.4, there is no need for the inser-
tion of a nonce to prevent replay attacks. seq plays the role of the nonce Ndup in
the previous construction. seq can not be manipulated since it is an argument of
the 1-time signature.
Broadcast communication is received by everybody in the cell but the veri-
fication of the 1-time signature is likely to be taken into consideration only by
the hosts who have previously requested the first 1-time public key over the LLC.
The other LMHs do not take into account the signature and simply consider the
payload new and the sequence number seq.
To work correctly, the whole mechanism requires that no packet is lost. The
sending of “nack messages” already considered by the protocol under investiga-
tion guarantees such a requirement. Suppose a host receives a packet containing a
sequence number greater than expected: according to the original protocol, LMH
asks for the re-transmission of the lost packets (see Section A.2). LMH can re-
build the correct order for verifying the signature because each 1-time public key
is strictly related to the sequence number of the packets: the seq-th packet con-
tains the (seq + 1)-th public key, to be used to verify the signature of the (seq +
1)-th packet, and so on.
We give an informal justification on the correctness of the secured construc-
tion. Suppose a generic LMH, at the n-th point of the computation, accepts the
following as an authentic message:
newX , n, 1pkn+1Gi ,
Sig−11pkn
Gi
{Hash{newX , n, 1pkn+1Gi }}
where newX is originating from an unauthorized mobile host. If the generic LMH
accepts this message as being authentic, it means that i) the adversary knows the
private key corresponding to the n-th 1-time public key of the gateway and con-
sequently he is able to reproduce valid signatures (which shouldn’t be possible
seeing that private information of the stationary hosts are never exchanged during
the protocol) or ii) the adversary was able to forge the authentication chain by in-
serting in message (n-1)-th his own 1-time public key. This is possible only if the
unauthorized host is able to insert his own 1-time public key at the very first com-
munication over LLC. Taking into consideration the assumption on transmission
over LLCs, it follows that this possibility, in reality, is infeasible.
The adversary could be able to inject over cell i a broadcast coming from a
stationary host responsible for another cell. A generic LMH in cell i does not
accept this message as an authentic message since he does not have the right 1-
time public key to verify the signature (the last authentication chain in which he
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has involved is the chain related to the stationary host in which he happens to be
located).
A.4 Related work
The Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP) has been included in the 802.11 stan-
dard [otICS99] for wireless LANs as an attempt to solve security problems of
wireless connectivity. The primary goal of WEP is to protect the confidentiality
of user data from eavesdropping. A related goal concerns with access control, i.e.,
how to prevent the injection of new traffic from unauthorized mobile hosts. To this
aim, the 802.11 standard includes an optional feature to discard all packets not en-
crypted according to WEP. In reality we are not interested in the secrecy of the
exchanged packets, but rather reverting to WEP in order to achieve authenticity of
origin. Unfortunately, WEP contains security flaws that give rise to a number of
vulnerabilities prone to attacks, [ASW01, BGW01, FMS01, SIR02].
The use of out-of-band channels to bootstrap authentication in wireless net-
works was first proposed by Anderson and Stayano in [SA99]. Their Resurrecting
Duckling protocol sets up a relationship between two devices, in their terminol-
ogy a mother and a duckling. In the initial phase of the protocol the two devices
exchange a secret key over a LLC established through physical contact. Succes-
sively, the duckling uses the secret key to recognize its mother over the wireless
link. In [BSSW02] Balfanz et al. extend the concept of LLCs not only to set up a
master-slave relationship but they consider LLCs to be generally used for ad-hoc
wireless networks. To build up authentication mechanisms for the protocol under
investigation, we have chosen to avoid the restrictive condition of physical contact
for LLCs in order to exploit in the pre-authentication phase the wireless capability
of both the stationary and the mobile hosts.
Analogously to [BSSW02], we do not require our LLC to be resistant to eaves-
dropping. On the contrary, the Resurrecting Duckling protocol of [SA99] expects
a shared secret key to be exchanged over the LLC. This makes the LLC vulner-
able to eavesdropping. Being the shared key compromised, all subsequent com-
munications on the main wireless link could be compromised, i.e. an adversary
could obtain the information necessary to impersonate someone else. The usage of
public key cryptography renders the channel cold to passive eavesdropping over
the LLC because of the public nature of the information exchanged. Contrary
to [BSSW02, SA99], our environment does not properly follow the definition
of an ad-hoc wireless network: transmissions of meaningful payloads do not
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take place entirely over wireless links, nor are mobile routers present in the sys-
tem to forward messages to final mobile receivers. Communications necessarily
pass through the stationary hosts on the wired link. Bootstrapping authentication
through pre-authentication over LLCs can be applied to more general scenarios
than peer to peer authentication in ad-hoc wireless networks.
A.5 Summary
Starting from a known protocol for distributed mobile systems, we have added
authentication mechanisms over the wireless links. The mechanisms rely on two
different techniques: secure wireless channels to initialize the communications
and “1-time” signature schemes. These techniques have been mainly chosen to
avoid the need for a Public Key Infrastructure and for the low complexity of the
underlying encryption/decryption algorithms.
Appendix B
Selshness in mobile ad hoc
networks
B.1 Introduction
In this appendix, we briefly introduce the notion of selfishness in mobile ad hoc
networks. Then, we present a scheme for monitoring possible selfish behaviors.
Unlike traditional mobile networks, ad hoc networks do not rely on any wired
infrastructure. Instead, the network is kept connected by the mobile hosts. In or-
der to make a mobile network functional, the nodes need to be self-organized, in
such a way that a message is delivered from a source to a destination through a
set of intermediate nodes. The deployment of ad hoc networks for civilian appli-
cations is taking a footing. In such applications, the nodes are not governed by
a single authority and need not share a common goal (the contrary could be the
case in emergency and military applications). Thus, cooperative behaviours, such
as forwarding each other’s packets, cannot be easily assumed. The single nodes
could prefer to save battery life for their own communication, rather than to for-
ward packets for other nodes. Such an attitude is denoted in the recent literature
as selshness of the node. Simulation results (see, e.g., [MM02b]) have recently
pointed out that a selfish behaviour can be as harmful, in terms of the network
throughput, as a malicious one.
There is a growing interest in the research community for detecting and pre-
venting a selfish behaviour, and promoting cooperation between nodes, (see, e.g.,
[BB02, BH02, MGLB00, MM02a, SBHJ03, ZCY03]). Here, we propose an in-
frastructure for a local management of credits (i.e., a measure of how many pack-
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ets node A has forwarded for node B) and debits (i.e., a measure of how many
packets node B has forwarded for node A). Each node maintains this information
in a local repository that we call credit table, on which the node can rely to judge
the past behaviour of the other nodes in the network. More specifically, we define
rules for the table initialization, its maintenance, and secure acknowledgments
testifying the actual forwarding of packets in the network.
We propose to use network-layer acknowledgments (additional data in rout-
ing protocols specifications like [JMB01]) to provide to the packet source an au-
thenticated proof that the packet has been delivered to destination. We specify
the structure for the acknowledgment request and the corresponding acknowledg-
ment. Then, we introduce a mechanism that amortizes the signaling of “occurred
delivery” over blocks of n data packets, thus reducing the communication over-
head on the way back from destination to source. Further, we deal with some kind
of attacks to which our scenario is prone.
B.2 The credit table
A table called the credit table (CT) is maintained at each node’s side. Rows in the
table consist of triples (h(UC), # debs, # creds), where h(UC) is the hash value
of the identifier of the node, and # creds and # debs are the current values of the
credits and debits counter related to that node.
Who maintains the table, say node A, quantifies the good behaviour of the
node corresponding to h(UC), say node B, with respect to B’s past attitude to for-
ward packets for A. From a complementary point of view, node B, that maintains
in its turn memory about its behaviour w.r.t. A, quantifies how much A can be
indebted to B, i.e., until when B can run the risk to forward packets for A. To limit
the damages to forward packets for selfish nodes that do not return the favor, we
give an upper bound over which it is not possible to help a node. We set this
value to a default value gap > 0, equal for all nodes when they enter the network.
Potentially, who maintains a table can assign different values for gap to different
entries in its table. For example, after deployment, a node A can set n different val-
ues gap1, . . . , gapn, according to the perception A has about node1, . . . , noden’s
behaviour (the latter being entries in A’s table). Provided that node B correctly
behaves, it forwards packets for node A if creds − debs ≤ gap, where debs and
creds are the value of the debits/credits counters related to A in B’s table.
B spends the earned credit creds at A’s side when it starts sending packets
along a route including A. From another point of view, suppose B needs to send
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packets to destination D: it either can recover an established path from its route
cache or starts DSR Route Discovery (see the following subsection for a brief ex-
planation of the main features of DSR routing protocol) possibly returning several
paths. In any case, by maintaining history of the past behaviour of the network,
B could choose the more convenient route (in terms of the nodes belonging to the
route) rather than the shortest one.
CT Initialization. S asks for Route Discovery the first time it needs to send
packets to destination D. the hash values of the identifiers of the nodes in the
returned path are the first entries in S’s table. For all entries, the initial value
assigned to both debs and creds is zero.
A CT table is initialized also by nodes belonging to a discovered path. Hence,
a node forwarding a Route Reply message back to the source initializes its table
by inserting those nodes listed in the path list, source included.
CT Maintainance. CT Maintainance is the mechanism by which the nodes
update their CT. There could be two cases: 1) the node is the packet source S. In
this case, updating the table happens once received an authenticated proof testi-
fying that the packet has been delivered to destination. The authenticated proof
is contained in a network-layer acknowledgment. When the source receives the
acknowledgment, it increases by one the debs field correspondent to the identi-
fiers of all the nodes constituting the current route. Thus, debs gives a measure,
at S’s side, of how many packets a certain node has forwarded for S. 2) The node
belongs to the route from source S to destination D. Upon forwarding a packet,
the node increases by one the creds field for S. Thus, the creds counter maintains
information about how many packets the node has forwarded for S. Before for-
warding a packet, the node checks if the difference of creds and debs related to
S is greater (or equal) than the default value gap (or the value gapS that the node
has assigned to S). If so, the node forwards the packet for S (unless the node is a
selfish one), otherwise it drops the packet.
We do not need a tamper-proof security module at each node, because the
information recorded in a node’s CT does not influence the rest of the network.
B.2.1 DSR
Here, we briefly give an overview of the ad hoc routing protocol we rely on.
DSR (Dynamic Source Routing, [JMB01]) is an on-demand routing protocol
designed to be used in mobile ad hoc networks. It consists of two main phases,
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Route Discovery, i.e., the mechanism by which a source node initiates to find a
route, and Route Maintainance, i.e., the mechanism by which the source node
detects, while sending a packet to some destination, if the route has broken.
The initiator of Route Discovery sends a Route Request message as a local
broadcast specifying the Discovery’s target. Each node receiving the request ap-
pends to the request its own IP address, unless it has recently seen that request,
then it re-broadcasts the request. When the target receives the request, it creates
a Route Reply message containing the list of addresses and sends it back to the
initiator.
Route Maintenance monitors the reliability of a route. Detection of link breaks
is often provided at no cost, when the routing protocol in use relies on a Medium
Access Control protocol such as the 802.11 one, [otICS99], that provides link-
layer acknowledgments. In this case, to test the reachability of the next-hop node,
the previous-hop node waits for the reception of a link-layer acknowledgment
(ACK). A limited number of retransmissions of the same packet is due, then, if
the node does not receive link-layer ACKs from its next-hop neighbor, it sends a
Route Error message back to the source, notifying it of a link break.
Instead of using link-layer acknowledgments, a node can explicitly require a
network-layer acknowledgment to the next-hop neighbor, [JMB01]. The acknowl-
edgment request is added as an optional part in the DSR header. As depicted in
Section B.2, we exploit network-layer ACKs to convey information about the ac-
tual forwarding of packets in the route. Though these ACKs were born with the
intent of detecting link failures, we will exploit them to update information that
each node locally maintains. We will suitably modify the acknowledgment mech-
anism, such that the nodes will be able to prove to have forwarded packets along
a certain route.
Thus, we rely on link layer ACKs at Medium Access Control level to detect
link failures, while network-layer ACKs are used to convey information about the
forwarding of packets. Furthermore, we assume bidirectional communication on
every link, i.e., if node A is able to transmit to node B, then B is able to transmit
to A.
B.2.2 Authentication of data packets.
In the following, we consider a simple path from node S to node D through inter-
mediate nodes A, B and C. We call route S-A-B-C-D Route 1.
In [SBHJ03], the authors consider two kind of attacks to which a mobile ad
hoc environment is prone. The first attack is when an intermediate node, say A,
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exploits a sub-route of Route 1, e.g., A-B-C, to send its own packets. A may
claim that those packets come from S and intermediate nodes B and C will charge
S upon forwarding the packets. The second attack is the free riding attack. A may
append (or substitute) its own payloads to the data packets transmitted from S to
D over Route 1. The forged payloads may be consumed by C, that colludes with
A, and B will charge S1.
The above-mentioned attacks may be solved by exploiting the off-line mech-
anism of [GR01] (detailed in Chapter 3). We briefly remind the technique. Let us
suppose that S is to send blocks of n data packets to D. The construction exploits
the technique of embedding the hash of the following packet in the current packet.
Bootstrapping authentication is obtained by applying an initial digital signature,
in combination with hash chaining. Let pi be the i-th data packet sent by S (packet
header plus meaningful payload). Then, the high-level formalization is as follows
(we omit to explicitly denote the intermediate nodes A, B, C):




i) S → D : p′i : pi, h(p
′
i+1) i = 1, . . . , n− 1
n) S → D : p′n : pn
By doing so, source authentication is provided. Then, an intermediate node
neither can append nor substitute meaningful payloads to the data in the packet,
since it should be able to forge digital signatures and hash functions, nor can claim
its own transmissions to come from S, since it does not know the private key pk−1S
2. Finally, this technique is applied on the whole packet, thus preserving integrity
both of the data and of the packet header. Note that that construction assures
authenticity to the ACK request option too.
Structure of network-layer ACKs and ACKs requests. Instead of requiring
one ACK for every single packet arrived to destination, we expect one ACK for
every single block of n packets. This reduces the communication overhead on the
way back from D to S.
To this aim, we propose the ACK request option in the first data packet header
to have the following structure:
1Note that possible solutions to these attacks are beyond the scope of secure ad hoc routing
protocols like Ariadne. Indeed, they address the authenticity of routing control packets, but not
the one of data packets.
2As an overall assumption valid throughout this thesis, digital signatures and hash functions
cannot be forged, and moreover it is not possible for an adversary to guess secrets of the other
participants.
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ACK Req Opt: << type, len, id, SAddr,DAddr >>
where type specifies this is an acknowledgment request option, len is the length
of the option, id is the identifier of the packet to be acknowledged. We set id = n,
i.e., the number of packets for which an acknowledgment is required, starting from
this data packet. SAddr is the address of the node requesting the acknowledgment3
and must be set to (IPS, h(UCS)). DAddr is the address of the node that should
acknowledge the reception of n packets and must be set to (IPD, h(UCD))4. An
acknowledgment request option must be ignored by all the intermediate nodes and
must be processed only by D. If D correctly receives all the n packets for which
ACK has been requested, it processes the request by sending back to SAddr an
authenticated acknowledgment, whose structure is the following:
ACK Opt: << {type, len, id, SAddr,DAddr, path}pk−1
D
>>
where type specifies this is an acknowledgment option, len is the length of the
option, id = n is the number of packets that are acknowledged as received. SAddr
is the address of the node originating the acknowledgment, i.e., (IPD, h(UCD)).
DAddr is the address of the node to which the acknowledgment is to be deliv-
ered, i.e., (IPS, h(UCS)). With respect to routing protocols specification such as
[JMB01], we have added the extension path, i.e., the sequence of addresses as in
the DSR Source Route Option in the header of the received packets. Here, path
=(IPA, h(UCA)), (IPB, h(UCB)), (IPC , h(UCC)).
ACKs have smaller size than control and data packets, then we assume that the
nodes co-operate in sending ACKs back to the source. Further, given that S does
not update its CT until it receives the proof that the packets have been delivered to
destination, it appears reasonable to assume that the intermediate nodes, that have
already forwarded the packets, will cooperate in forwarding back to S the ACK.
If a node stops forwarding packets within a block, D never acquires the last
packet, and it does not send back the ACK. As a consequence, the well-behaved
nodes are never awarded by S. Possible patches to this drawback are: i) when D
stops receiving packets, it notifies the anomaly to S, by sending an alert message
(possibly over multiple routes); ii) an upper bound gap to the block size may be
fixed. Thus, the intermediate nodes will not forward more than gap packets (i.e.,
the limit we gave at the beginning of this Section).
3Extension already implemented in routing protocols specification like [JMB01].
4The last field can be included as additional data in the Acknowledgment Request option in
routing protocols specification like [JMB01].
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Like control and data packets, ACKs may be lost because of link breaks. We
deal with this matter as follows: provided that D has in its Route Cache multiple
routes to S, ACKs can be sent over all the available routes to S. Again, we assume
to send (and forward) ACKs to be less power consumpting than sending (and
forwarding) data packets.
In the model we have developed, if node A behaves well in forwarding packets
for node B, then it can exploit this correct behaviour only with B (meaning that A
may rely on routes including B for sending its packets). Intuitively, systems based
on such a rule can get stuck. We further extend the work by introducing the notion
of credits transferring, according to which A may ask B to transfer, in a secure
way, its credits to some other nodes (details in [MPV04]).
Furthermore, MANETs are prone to the following security threat: a node
could be tempted to discard its initial identity and re-enter the network in dis-
guise in environments where i) users are punished for their selfish behaviour, or
ii) new users are a priori granted to have an initial amount of packets forwarded.
We investigate solutions to achieve a univocal relation between a physical device
and the identity it claims at its first steps in the network (details in [MPV04]).
B.3 Related work
We discuss here some work related to secure on demand routing protocols and
cooperation enforcement in mobile ad hoc networks.
So called –on demand routing protocols– are those routing protocols in which
a node tries to discover a route only when it has a packet to send.
Among on demand routing protocols, the Dynamic Source Routing protocol
(DSR [JMB01]) is a protocol providing self-organization in configuring routing
topologies for mobile wireless networks. It consists of two main phases, Route
Discovery, the mechanism by which a source node, that does not have in its Route
Cache the route to some destination yet, initiates to find a route, and Route Main-
tainance, the mechanism by which the source node detects, while sending a packet
to some destination, if the route has broken.
Hu et al. propose Ariadne, [HPJ02], securing a basic version of DSR. Ariadne
provides: i) source authentication at target’s side; ii) authentication of each entry
of the discovered path at source’s side; iii) integrity of the discovered path.
In [ZH99], the authors highlight peculiarities of ad hoc networks to fight
against possible misbehaviors. Since routing protocols like DSR can return mul-
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tiple routes, a node could exploit this redundancy to switch to an alternative route
when the primary one has broken because of a misbehavior.
A reputation system may be used in ad hoc networks to provide incentives
in order to forward messages, e.g., see [BB02, MGLB00, MM02a]. Both [BB02]
and [MGLB00] assume a network layer based on DSR. In [MGLB00], the authors
consider complementing DSR with a watchdog mechanism to identify the misbe-
having nodes, plus a path-rater mechanism to build new routes avoiding those
nodes. Even if they show it is possible to keep the throughput of the network
over a certain threshold even in presence of misbehaving nodes, the last are still
allowed to send and receive packets. In [BB02], the authors choose to act in a
similar manner. They propose the CONFIDANT protocol, in which DSR is forti-
fied by a neighborhood monitoring5 and a trust manager which sends and receives
alarm messages to and from other trust managers. A reputation system maintains
a table listing ratings for all nodes and a path manager changes the route when the
ratings for some nodes fall under a certain threshold. Hence, misbehaving nodes
are totally isolated from the rest of the network.
We base our work on a (secure) DSR, like [BB02, MGLB00] for MANETs.
Similar to [MGLB00], our nodes do not exchange information with each other and
they locally maintain history about their past behaviour. Contrary to [MGLB00],
we achieve information through cryptographic and acknowledgment mechanisms,
whereas [MGLB00] assumes wireless interfaces that support promiscuous mode
operation. When this mode is enabled, a node can listen in on a neighbor’s traffic.
Thus, when A forwards a packet to B, A can overhear if B, in its turn, forwards
the packet. Hence, [MGLB00] relies on first-hand information (e.g., experienced
and observed forwarding behaviour of neighbors). Instead, we rely on trusted
second-hand information, close to the approach of [BB02], but we do not directly
punish misbehaved nodes, rather we distinguish the well-behaved ones. Further,
we focus on cryptographic solutions to handle the security of the information
about the nodes attitude to forward or drop packets.
Michiardi and Molva, [MM02a], analyze enforcement of cooperation in game
theoretical terms. The authors introduce the concept of redemption of nodes, i.e.,
a misbehaving node starts well-behaving can be re-integrated in the network. The
work in [UBG03] develops a formal model, based on the game theory too, captur-
ing features of MANETs like node mobility and selfishness. The paper provides
a general model to describe cooperation enforcement policies.
5In broadcast mediums, hosts are able to listen to messages that are not addressed to them. In
particular, neighboring nodes are able to listen to their next-hop node transmissions.
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Another possibility to provide incentives is to award well-behaving nodes with
credits. [BH02] introduces a virtual currency called nuglets, by which a node is
being paid when it forwards packets. Also, the node is forced to pay nuglets to
send its own packets. With a pure selfish behaviour, the node will soon finish
its money and will not be able to send packets. In order to avoid the possibility
that a node arbitrarily increases its own nuglets, a tamper-proof security module
is required at each node.
The approach in [BH02] may appear close to our approach. As shown in Sec-
tion B.2, our packet source increases a debit counter for B upon receiving a proof
that B has actually forwarded the source’s packets. On the other hand, [BH02]’s
philosophy is different from ours since our money is not physically gained by B,
rather we rely on the fact that the source reasonably returns the favor to B for
subsequent communication. Further, we do not put constraints to the node’s ca-
pability to send packets. For this reason, and for the fact that each node will base
its behaviour on the data locally maintained, we do not need a tamper-proof mod-
ule at each node. Within our framework, the credits that we gain cannot be spent
with all nodes in the network, but only with those nodes for which we have for-
warded something. On the contrary, nuglets can be spent for sending packets over
all the available routes. We try to fill this gap by introducing the notion of credit
transferring.
An award-based technique has been recently proposed also in [ZCY03], where
the authors rely on a central authority. Basically, when a node receives a message,
it keeps a receipt for that message. Then, the node reports to the authority all
the collected receipts. The authority evaluates the receipts and, consequently, it
assigns charges and credits. The system does not need tamper-proof modules.
[ZCY03] presents similarities with our work because it considers secure receipts
to testify the correct packet delivery. However, we rely on a central infrastructure
only when a node enters the network, in order to bootstrapping trust. Indeed, our
solution exactly tries to avoid the necessity of such a central authority during the
whole life cycle of the community. We propose a self-organized credit manage-
ment.
We ought to cite relevant work related to enforce cooperation between nodes
belonging to other scenarios. Indeed, besides pure ad hoc networks, so called
multi-hop cellular networks are getting a footing too. They combine features of
both cellular and mobile ad hoc networks. Basically, they are cellular networks
where there is the possibility of peer to peer or relayed multi-hop connections.
Mobile hosts communicate with a wired infrastructure by means of wireless tech-
nology. Peculiarity is that communication between a base station and a mobile
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station may be relayed by other mobile stations. As novel work on cooperation
in multi-hop cellular networks, we cite the approach of [SBHJ03]. Here, all com-
munication between mobile hosts are required to pass through a base station, that
actually acts as an authority for the distribution of symmetric primitives for se-
curing data. Further, the base station is responsible for charging the initiator of a
communication and awarding the forwarding nodes. .
Note that a multi-hop cellular network scenario allows [SBHJ03] to exploit
a base station either for the distribution of secret keys, thus exploiting symmetric
cryptography between the base station and the nodes, and for charging and award-
ing nodes. Thus, [SBHJ03] nicely addresses a scenario where a central authority
is given for free.
[LPW03] proposes another award-based mechanism for motivating coopera-
tion in what the authors call stub ad hoc networks, i.e., mobile networks with
access to the Internet. Again, an external third party authenticates the nodes in-
volved in a communication and it assigns charges and credits.
B.4 Summary
The management of information about the forwarding behaviour of the nodes in
mobile ad hoc networks has been proposed. Cryptography makes the informa-
tion deduced by each node more reliable. The novelty, with respect to previous
mechanisms, is the avoidance of a central authority, the special stress on secure
communication as well as on mechanisms to avoid that a user drops its identity.
Appendix C
Input Language and Example Input
Files for PAMOCHSA
This appendix describes the syntax of the PAMOCHSA input language and gives
examples for the drawing up of a PAMOCHSA input experiment file.
The reader is invited to note that the PAMOCHSA input language is not the
functional language Crypto-CCS described in the Preliminaries. Indeed, it is a
variant, a sort of translation of Crypto-CCS into a more readable and intuitive
language, that was thought in order to help the user in preparing a correct input
file.
C.1 The input language
Typed messages. The messages are typed, i.e., each message has an associated
type that denotes its structure. Types are used to record the structure and kind of
exchanged data. Since certain operations are meaningful only over data with a
certain structure, types permit to define managing rules that precisely correspond
to those operations.
A message m of type T is represented as: m : T. This expression forms a typed
message. Typed messages can be basic or compound and they are recursively
defined.
















Special identifiers contain the main sections of the file.
Each formula can be either a single typed message or a set of typed messages
tied by the logic operators and, or and not.
The intruder initial knowledge is a set of typed messages.
The hidden channels list is a list of channel names where the intruder cannot
interfere during the run of the protocol.
The protocol specification is actually the body of the protocol, i.e., a sequence
of sending, reception and control actions.
The grammar of the input language is recursively defined as follows (for the
sake of readability, only a simplified version is here reported):
experiment form ::=
< FORMULA > form < /FORMULA >
< KNOWLEDGE > m list < /KNOWLEDGE >
< HIDE CHANNELS > str list < /HIDE CHANNELS >
< SPEC > term < /SPEC >
term ::= 0
| Send ( pstr, expr).term
| Recv ( pstr, ident : msg type). term
| If ( expr = expr) Then term Else term End If
| If Deduce ( ident = expr) Then term Else term End Deduce
| Choice c list End Choice
| Parallel p list End Parallel
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expr ::= typed msg form ::= typed msg
| ident | form & form
| Fst expr | form | form
| Snd expr | Not form
| ( expr) | ( form )
| ( expr, expr)
| Encrypt ( expr, expr)
| Decrypt ( expr, expr)
pstr and ident are alphanumeric strings (plus special characters ′ ′ ’<’ ’>’
’/’).
form can be either a single typed message or a combination of typed messages
by means of the logical operators & (AND), | (OR) and Not.
The definition of term maps the control part of CryptoCCS (Chapter 3) into a
more friendly notation. Indeed,
- 0 is the process that does nothing.
- Send ( pstr,expr).term is the process that can perform the sending of mes-
sage expr on channel pstr and then it behaves like term.
- Recv ( pstr,ident:msg type).term is the process that receives a message
ident of type msg type on channel pstr and then it behaves like term;
- If ( expr = expr) Then term Else term End If maps the match construct of
CryptoCCS.
- If Deduce ( ident = expr) Then term Else term End Deduce is the
inference construct. The inference system adopted in this appendix is shown in
Fig. C.1, where rules to perform encryption, decryption and for retrieving the el-
ements of a pair are given. In particular, rule (1) builds the pair of two messages;
rules (2) and (3) are used to obtain the elements of a pair; rules (4) and (5) al-
low messages to be encrypted using a public key of type EKey or a private key
of type DKey; rules (6) and (7) allow messages to be decrypted using the corre-
sponding inverse keys. As already declared in Chapter 3, It is worth noticing that
other inference systems are allowed and that the analysis sketched in Chapter 5 is
parametric with respect to the given system.
- Choice c list End Choice maps the non deterministic choice. Thus, it
represents a process that non-deterministically decides to behave as one of the
terms in c list.
- Parallel p list End Parallel represents the parallel composition of the pro-
cesses in p list.
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p list is a list of terms to be executed in parallel. c list is a list of terms of
which only one will be executed.
A typed message has the following structure:
typed msg ::= msg : msg type;
where
msg ::= pstr msg type ::= ident
| ( msg) | EKey
| msg, msg | DKey
| Enc [pstr] (msg) | (msg type)
| msg type ∗ msg type
| Enc(msg type ∗ msg type)
Commas are used to separate elements in a pair, while symbol * is for sepa-
rating the types of the pair.
The types of the messages are freely assigned, except two special types de-
noting encryption (type: EKey) and decryption (type: DKey). Public keys are
always of type EKey, whereas DKey is the type for private keys. The correspon-
dence between a public and a private key is established by the name of those keys,
e.g., :
• key A : EKey denotes the public key of user A;
• key A : DKey denotes the private key of user A.
Symmetric cryptography can be simulated by using a pair of public/private
key.
In the recursive definition of expr, construct Fst (resp., construct Snd) returns
the first (resp., the second) element of a pair, while Encrypt (resp., Decrypt)
returns the encryption (resp., the decryption) of the first element with the second
one, that must be an encryption (resp., a decryption) key.
Message Enc [pstr] (msg) can be used to set up formulas. Let the reader
suppose that the formula is a typed message consisting of a pair, e.g., (name,
nonce) encrypted with the public key pkey. Syntactically, this corresponds to:
<FORMULA>
Enc[pkey](name, nonce) : Enc((Name * Nonce) * EKey)
</FORMULA>
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x : T1 y : T2
x, y : T1 ∗ T2
(1)
(x, y) : T1 ∗ T2
x : T1
(2)
(x, y) : T1 ∗ T2
y : T2
(3)
x : T y : EKey
Encrypt(x, y) : Enc(T ∗ EKey)
(4)
x : T y : DKey
Encrypt(x, y) : Enc(T ∗DKey)
(5)
Encrypt(x, y) : Enc(T ∗ EKey) y : DKey
x : T
(6)
Encrypt(x, y) : Enc(T ∗DKey) y : EKey
x : T
(7)
Figure C.1: Inference system with typed messages
C.2 OpenCA and SCEP specifications
Here, excerpts of the formal specifications given as input to the PAMOCHSA tool
are presented (so as to give the reader a feeling about how these files are written).
In particular, it will be given an excerpt of the experiment file OpenCA de-
scribing the enrollment procedure presented in Section 5.3, Fig. 5.1, Chapter 5
and the experiment file describing the SCEP enrollment phase with automatic
user authentication presented in Section 5.5.2, Fig. 5.8, same chapter.
C.2.1 OpenCA experiment file
<FORMULA>
Enc[pk_ca](u_name,pk_x) : Enc((Name * EKey) * DKey) |
Enc[pk_ca](x_name,pk_u) : Enc((Name * EKey) * DKey)
</FORMULA>
<KNOWLEDGE>
pk_c1 : EKey; pk_c2 : EKey; x_name : Name;
x_pin : Pin ; pk_x : EKey; pk_x : DKey;
Enc[pk_gov](x_name):Enc(Name * DKey) ;








Send(c1, Encrypt((((u_name : Name, pk_u : EKey ), u_pin : Pin),
Enc[pk_u](pk_u, n_u):Enc((EKey * Nonce)* DKey)),
pk_c1 : EKey)).
Send(c2, Encrypt(((Enc[pk_gov](u_name), u_pin) :
(Enc(Name * DKey)) * Pin), pk_c2 : EKey)).
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Recv(c6, Y : (Enc( (Name * EKey) * DKey))).0
And
(* CA *)
Recv(c4, Z : Enc ((((Name * EKey) * Pin) *
Enc ((EKey * Nonce) * DKey)) * DKey)).
If Deduce ( Z1 = Decrypt (Z , pk_lra : EKey)) Then
(* verify LRA signature *)
If Deduce ( M = Snd (Fst (Z1))) Then
(* retrieve U public key *)
If Deduce (M1 = Decrypt (Snd (Z1), M )) Then
(* decrypt SPKAC with U public key *)
If (M = Fst(M1)) Then
(* equalities of public keys *)
If Deduce (Z2 = Fst (Z1)) Then
(* retrieve name_u, pk_u *)
Send(c5, Encrypt (Z2 , pk_ca : DKey)).0







(* Enrollment Server *)
[...]
And
(* RA Server *)
[...]
And
(* LRA Operator *)
Recv(c2, Z : Enc ((Enc(Name * DKey) * Pin) * EKey)).
If Deduce (X = Decrypt (Z , pk_c2 : DKey)) Then
If Deduce (Z1 = Decrypt (Fst X , pk_gov : EKey)) Then
(* verify the identity card *)
Send(c31, Encrypt ((Z1, Snd X), pk_c3 : EKey)).
(* name and pin to RA *)
Recv(c32, Z2 : Enc ((((Name * EKey) * Pin) *
Enc((EKey * Nonce) * DKey)) * EKey)).
If Deduce (Z2_p = Decrypt (Z2 , pk_c3 : DKey)) Then
If (Z1 = (Fst (Fst (Fst Z2_p)))) Then
(* check u_name *)
If (Snd X = (Snd (Fst Z2_p))) Then
(* check u_pin *)










C.2.2 SCEP experiment file
<FORMULA>
Enc[pk_ca]((u_name,pk_u),sn1) :
Enc(((Name * EKey) * Snumber) * DKey)
&
Enc[pk_ca]((u_name,pk_u),sn2) :
Enc(((Name * EKey) * Snumber) * DKey)
</FORMULA>
<KNOWLEDGE>
pk_x : EKey; pk_x : DKey; x_name : Name;






(* SCEP automatic enrollment *)
Parallel
(* automatic authentication of client by means of
correspondence between u_name and u_pin *)
(* ID : Encrypt(pk_u: EKey, pk_hash : EKey) *)
(* User *)
Send(c1, ((Encrypt((((u_name : Name, pk_u : EKey), u_pin : Pin),
Encrypt( ((u_name : Name, pk_u : EKey), u_pin : Pin),
pk_u : DKey)), des_key : EKey),
Encrypt(des_key : DKey, pk_ca : EKey)),
Encrypt((nonce_u : Nonce,
Encrypt(pk_u: EKey, pk_hash : EKey)), pk_u : DKey))).
Recv(c2, DM : ((Enc(Enc(((Name*EKey) * Snumber) * DKey) * EKey) *
Enc ( DKey * EKey)) * Enc (Nonce * DKey))).
(* receive cert in degenerated mode *)
If Deduce (N = Decrypt (Snd(DM), pk_ca : EKey)) Then
If (N = nonce_u : Nonce ) Then
(* check nonce_u in user request *)
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If Deduce (KE = Decrypt( Snd(Fst(DM)), pk_u : DKey)) Then
If Deduce (CERT = Decrypt (Fst(Fst(DM)), KE)) Then






(* CA Description *)
Recv (c1, R : ((Enc((((Name * EKey) * Pin) *
Enc ((( Name * EKey ) * Pin) * DKey)) * EKey) *
Enc( DKey * EKey)) * Enc((Nonce * Enc(EKey * EKey)) * DKey))).
If Deduce (KEY = Decrypt (Snd(Fst(R)), pk_ca : DKey)) Then
(* retrieve DES key over channel 1 *)
If Deduce (PKCS = Decrypt ( Fst(Fst(R)), KEY )) Then
(* retrieve pkcs#10 over channel 1 *)
If Deduce (P = Decrypt (Snd(R), Snd(Fst(Fst(PKCS))))) Then
(* P = (nonce,ID) *)
(* Snd(Fst(Fst(PKCS))) = public key to be certified *)
If ( Snd(P) = Encrypt(Snd(Fst(Fst(PKCS))), pk_hash : EKey)) Then
(* check on ID *)
If ( (Fst(Fst(Fst(PKCS))), Snd(Fst(PKCS))) =
(u_name : Name , u_pin : Pin) ) Then
(* check on pin_u for user authentication *)
Send(in_ch1, ( Fst(Fst(Fst(PKCS))), Snd(P)) ).
(* Fst(Fst(Fst(PKCS))) = u_name *) (* Snd(P) = id *)
(* Snd(Fst(PKCS)) = u_pin *)
(* record the (name,ID) - send to the other operator CA *)
(* id tied to this transaction *)
Recv(in_ch2, OTP : (Name * Enc(EKey * EKey))).
(* recv (name,ID) from the other operator CA *)
Send(public_ldap, Encrypt((Fst(Fst(PKCS)),
sn1 : Snumber), pk_ca : DKey)).
(* cert on ldap *)
Send(c2, ((Encrypt(Encrypt((Fst(Fst(PKCS)), sn1 : Snumber),
pk_ca : DKey), des_key1 : EKey),
Encrypt(des_key1 : DKey, pk_u : EKey)),
Encrypt(Fst(P), pk_ca : DKey))).0
(* issued cert; pkcs#7 degenerated mode *)








Recv (c1, R : ((Enc( (((Name * EKey) * Pin) *
Enc ((( Name * EKey ) * Pin) * DKey)) * EKey) *
Enc( DKey * EKey)) * Enc((Nonce * Enc(EKey * EKey)) * DKey))).
If Deduce (KEY = Decrypt (Snd(Fst(R)), pk_ca : DKey)) Then
(* retrieve DES key over channel 1 *)
If Deduce (PKCS = Decrypt ( Fst(Fst(R)), KEY )) Then
(* retrieve pkcs#10 from channel 1 *)
If Deduce (P = Decrypt (Snd(R), Snd(Fst(Fst(PKCS))))) Then
(* P = (nonce,ID) *)
(* Snd(Fst(Fst(PKCS))) = public key to be certified *)
If ( Snd(P) = Encrypt(Snd(Fst(Fst(PKCS))), pk_hash : EKey)) Then
(* check on ID *)
If ( (Fst(Fst(Fst(PKCS))), Snd(Fst(PKCS))) = (u_name : Name , u_pin :
Pin) ) Then
(* check on pin_u for user authentication *)
Recv(in_ch1, OTP : (Name * Enc(EKey * EKey))).
If (Fst(OPT) = Fst(Fst(Fst(PKCS)))) Then
If (Snd(OPT) = Snd(P)) Then
(* (name,ID) already used in pre existing request *)
(*invalid ID for a new transaction *)
Send (up, invalid_id : Special).0
Else
Send(in_ch2, (Fst(Fst(Fst(PKCS))), Snd(P) )).
Send(public_ldap, Encrypt( (Fst(Fst(PKCS)),
sn2 : Snumber) , pk_ca : DKey)).
(* cert su ldap *)
Send(c2, ((Encrypt(Encrypt( ( Fst(Fst(PKCS)),
sn2 : Snumber) , pk_ca : DKey), des_key1 : EKey),
Encrypt(des_key1 : DKey, pk_u : EKey)),
Encrypt(Fst(P), pk_ca : DKey))). 0
(* issued cert; pkcs#7 degenerated mode *)
End If
End If
End If
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End Deduce
End Deduce
End Deduce
End Parallel
</SPEC>
